Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Compton

• Decision Date: 02 January 1933
• Docket Number: 30314
• Citation: 164 Miss. 553,145 So. 105
• Parties: GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA CO. v. COMPTON
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

145 So. 105

164 Miss. 553

GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA CO. v. COMPTON

No. 30314

Supreme Court of Mississippi

January 2, 1933

Division B

Suggestion Of Error Overruled January 30, 1933.

APPEAL from circuit court of Adams county, HON. R. L. CORBIN, Judge.

Action by Miss Charlie Compton against the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and rendered.

Judgment reversed.

Engle &amp Laub, of Natchez, for appellant.

Delegated authority cannot be delegated.

Partee v. Partee, 114 Miss 198, 577, 74 So. 438, 827.

The act of an agent who exceeds his authority is binding upon his principal to the extent of his authority, but is void for the residue.

1 S. & M. 17; 26 Miss. 510.

An agent having limited powers cannot bind his principal by an agreement beyond the scope of his authority.

Gruner Lumber Co. v. Algonquin Lumber Co., et al., 85 So. 191, 132 Miss 157.

A principal cannot be made liable for the act of an agent, unless such act is within the ordinary and usual scope of the actual or apparent authority of the agent, and as agent cannot enlarge his authority by unauthorized acts.

White v. Lee, 52 So. 261, 97 Miss. 493.

Limitations upon an agent's authority are not waived by the principal by a custom of the agent in acting in violation thereof, unless such custom is known and acquiesced in by the principal.

Odd Fellow v. Smith, 58 So. 100, 101, Miss. 332; Royal Feed and Milling Co. v. Thom, 107 So. 282, 52 Miss. 263.

Appellant should not be held liable for the acts of someone acting as manager, when it had no voice in selecting that manager.

39 C. J., sec. 1459, page 1272.

Whittington & Brown, of Natchez, for appellee.

The real defense that defendant urges seems to be a disclaimer of any liability for the acts of Mrs. Becton on the theory that she was not the agent of the defendant. The proof shows that she acted for the defendant; received money for the defendant; attending to all duties incumbent upon anyone acting as she did for defendant and that all her acts were ratified by the defendant. Her husband was manager for defendant, had the right to employ extra help; she went with his consent clearly by his direction, to take his place in defendant's store; she transacted defendant's business, acted within the scope of her position in collecting for goods sold. Moreover, the defendant never advised Miss Compton that Mrs. Becton was not an employee and appellant cannot now deny her authority.

Argued orally by Charles F. Engle, for appellant, and by J. E. Brown, for appellee.

OPINION

Anderson, J.

Appellee brought this action in the circuit court of Adams county against appellant to recover damages in the sum of two thousand, nine hundred, ninety dollars for an alleged injury to her person and character, charged to have been caused by a servant of appellant. The declaration averred that appellant's servant wrongfully charged appellee with theft and committed an assault and battery upon her. There was a trial resulting in a verdict and judgment for appellee in the sum of one thousand, two hundred fifty dollars. From that judgment appellant prosecutes this appeal.

Appellant was refused a directed verdict. It assigns and argues that action of the court as error. We are of opinion that appellant was entitled to a directed verdict upon the ground that whatever wrong was done appellee by Mrs. Beckton, who was temporarily in charge of appellant's store in Natchez, was not the wrong of appellant, but of Mrs. Beckton alone for which appellant was not responsible.

Appellant is a corporation engaged in the retail grocery business. It has a chain store system consisting of several thousand stores scattered over the United States. It operates one of these stores in the city of Natchez. John Coon was appellant's division superintendent in charge of its stores in Mississippi and Louisiana, with headquarters at New Orleans. Clarence Deckton and his wife lived in the city of Natchez, and at the time of the alleged injuries Clarence Beckton was the manager of this store. On Saturday, the 17th of January, 1931, the appellee went in the Natchez store to make some purchases. She found the wife of Clarence Beckton, the manager, in charge of the store. Appellant's stores are "cash and carry" stores. Appellee went the rounds in the store and came out with some packages. An altercation arose between Mrs. Beckton and appellee in reference to one package in the latter's possession. Appellee claimed that Mrs. Beckton at least by insinuation, charged her with stealing the package from the store, and that during the altercation Mrs. Beckton committed an assault and battery upon her.

The view we take renders it unnecessary to decide whether the language used by Mrs. Beckton was slanderous or whether she committed an assault and battery upon appellee. For the purposes of this decision it will be conceded that she did both. Appellant was not responsible for Mrs. Beckton's acts while she was assuming to manage the store, because under the undisputed evidence she was not the agent of appellant. We reach this...