Great Barrington Sav. v. Day

Decision Date24 October 1934
PartiesGREAT BARRINGTON SAV. BANK v. DAY.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Exceptions from Superior Court, Berkshire County; W. A. Burns, Judge.

Action by the Great Barrington Savings Bank against W. Taylor Day. A verdict was directed for the plaintiff in the sum of $3,892.75, and the defendant brings exceptions.

Exceptions sustained.

F. J. Brothers, of Great Barrington, for plaintiff.

F. H. Wright, of Great Barrington, for defendant.

CROSBY, Justice.

This is an action of contract to recover upon a promissory note, payable to the plaintiff on demand and signed by Warren H. Davis, Frank A. Minkler and the defendant, as makers in that order. The defendant's answer is a general denial and a denial of the genuineness of the signature, and an averment that the defendant was an accommodation party. The defendant further answered that if he signed the note he did so as an accommodation party and that the party accommodated was the plaintiff.

There was evidence tending to show that in 1920 a note in the sum of $3,000 was given the plaintiff which was signed by the three persons above named; that a check for that amount was drawn by the plaintiff to the order of the defendant and indorsed by him. The note was renewed several times, each of the three parties thereto signing each renewal, and the note not being paid upon demand this action was brought.

The defendant offered evidence tending to show that in the year 1920 the defendant, an attorney at law, made application to the plaintiff for a loan to one Davis upon real estate secured by a mortgage. The loan was declined, and thereafter the president of the plaintiff stated to the defendant that the reason for the refusal to make the loan on the real estate was that lumber was to be taken from the property which would reduce the value thereof, but that the bank was willing to assist Davis and could lend him on a personal note. The defendant did nothing further as a result of any employment by Davis. He was at that time also acting as attorney for the bank in certain other transactions. The president of the bank then asked the defendant to sign the note with the other parties thereon, stating that the defendant was acting as attorney for the bank, and that he wanted the money lent to be applied in accordance with the original application for a real estate loan and desired the defendant to attend to it. The defendant testified that the then president of the bank said that if he would sign as an accommodation maker to the bank and attend to the application of the proceeds the loan might be made, and that he did so as the result of the request and extended his credit to the bank and not to benefit Davis. Upon cross-examination he testified that he understood his liability on such a note; that he made no effort to vary the note despite several renewals thereof, nor did he at any time seek to fix his personal position; that as he understood it, there was no liability on his part when he was acting at the request of the bank; ‘that he could not say why he did not stipulate that in the note, that it might have been a careless transaction.’ He further testified that the then president of the bank brought the note to the defendant at his office and the note had then been signed by the other parties. There was further testimony tending to show that neither Davis nor Minkler ever asked the defendant to sign the note; that he had nothing to do with any application for the personal loan which was finally made; and that the plaintiff did not in this transaction request any financial statement from the defendant for credit purposes, as it did in another transaction several years afterwards. There was evidence that the note was renewed annually until 1927. The vice president of the plaintiff requested the defendant to take action against Davis toward the collection of the note, and thereafter the defendant caused Davis to come before the board of investment of the bank from time to time and make proposals for securing or paying it. None of the proposals was accepted by the plaintiff and the vice president then...

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12 cases
  • Pearson v. Mulloney
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 25 Febrero 1935
    ...E. 995; Id., 211 Mass. 541, 98 N. E. 577;Wolff v. Perkins, 254 Mass. 10, 13, 149 N. E. 691;Great Barrington Savings Bank v. Day (Mass.) 192 N. E. 533. Compare Perlmutter v. Holsberg, 282 Mass. 421, 185 N. E. 357;Tanners National Bank of Woburn v. Dean, 283 Mass. 151, 154, 186 N. E. 219. How......
  • Leonard v. Woodward
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 28 Febrero 1940
    ...244 Mass. 528, 530, 138 N.E. 910;Tanners National Bank of Woburn v. Dean, 283 Mass. 151, 154, 186 N.E. 219;Great Barrington Savings Bank v. Day, 288 Mass. 181, 184, 192 N.E. 533;Quincy Trust Co. v. Woodbury, Mass., 13 N.E.2d 377. But the jury were not obliged to find that the defendant sign......
  • Pearson v. Mulloney
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 25 Febrero 1935
    ... ... 541, 98 N.E. 577; ... Wolff v. Perkins, 254 Mass. 10, 13, 149 N.E. 691; ... Great Barrington Savings Bank v. Day (Mass.) 192 ... N.E. 533. Compare Perlmutter v. Holsberg, 282 Mass ... ...
  • Guinness Import Co. v. Destefano
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • 30 Marzo 1988
    ...so, is exempt from liability to Guinness under the principle now codified in G.L. c. 106, § 3-415(5). See Great Barrington Sav. Bank v. Day, 288 Mass. 181, 184, 192 N.E. 533 (1934); Leonard v. Woodward, 305 Mass. 332, 334, 25 N.E.2d 705 (1940). While the status of signatories as accommodati......
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