Great Divide Ins. Co. v. Linda Constr.
| Decision Date | 01 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | 19-cv-621 |
| Parties | GREAT DIVIDE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. LINDA CONSTRUCTION, INC., JESSIE McGEE, LINDA McGEE, and SENG LEASING SERVICES, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
This case involves insurance coverage for tractors and trailers. Great Divide Insurance Company sold a business auto policy to Linda Construction, which is owned by Jessie and Linda McGee. The policy covered bodily injury and property damage caused by accidents involving the vehicles.
Linda Construction leased trucks from Seng Leasing Services, but apparently fell behind in its payments. In 2014, Seng Leasing sent Linda Construction a notice of default, letting the company know that it was overdue. A few weeks later, Seng Leasing repossessed some of the tractors and trailers. But others mysteriously vanished.
Three years later, Jessie McGee sent a letter to Great Divide seeking insurance coverage for the allegedly stolen tractors and trailers. Great Divide opened an investigation. That's when the insurance company discovered that Seng Leasing had sued Linda Construction in 2014 in state court for failing to pay for the vehicles.
Great Divide responded by filing this declaratory judgment action against Linda Construction and the McGees. The insurer sought a declaration that it has no duty to cover the allegedly stolen vehicles, and no duty to defend the state court action filed by Seng Leasing for non-payment.
Linda Construction did not respond to the complaint, so this Court entered a default judgment against the company. The McGees are the only remaining defendants, and Count VII is the only remaining claim. The theft claims are no longer pending. The only issue is whether the policy covers the state court lawsuit filed by Seng Leasing against the McGees about the failure to pay for the trucks.
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. Great Divide argues that the McGees are not “insureds” within the meaning of the policy. Great Divide also contends that the business auto policy does not cover the type of claims at issue in the state court case. It covers accidents involving the trucks, but not a failure to pay for the trucks.
For the reasons stated below, Great Divide's motion for summary judgment is granted, and the McGees' motion for summary judgment is denied.
Before drilling down into the facts, and diving into the record, the Court must call attention to the McGees' failure to comply with the Rules.
The Local Rules specify how parties must file and respond to motions for summary judgment. They explain what parties need to file, and how they need to do it. Those Rules exist for good reason, and compliance is essential for the orderly administration of justice. All litigants must follow the Local Rules, and pro se litigants are no exception.
Local Rule 56.1 establishes the requirements for a motion for summary judgment. The moving party must provide a “statement of material facts that complies with LR 56.1(d) and that attaches the cited evidentiary material.” See L.R. 56.1(a)(2). That statement of facts must rest on evidence in the record, with user-friendly citations. “Each asserted fact must be supported by citation to the specific evidentiary material including the specific page number, that supports it.” See L.R. 56.1(d)(2). A district court “may disregard any asserted fact that is not supported with such a citation.” Id. A fact without evidence isn't a fact.
The moving party must submit the evidence that supports each of the proposed facts. “All evidentiary material identified in LR 56.1(a)(2) and LR 56.1(b)(3) citations must be included as numbered exhibits with the statements of fact.” See L.R. 56.1(d)(3).
Local Rule 56.1 also explains how to respond to a motion for summary judgment. The non-moving party must file a “response to the LR 56.1(a)(2) statement of material facts that complies with LR 56.1(e).” See L.R 56.1(b)(2). That response “must consist of numbered paragraphs corresponding to the numbered paragraphs” of the movant's statement of facts. See L.R 56.1(e)(1).
The non-movant must confront the statement of facts head-on. “Each response must admit the asserted fact, dispute the asserted fact, or admit in part and dispute in part the asserted fact.” See L.R. 56.1(e)(2).
But it is not enough to say that a fact is disputed, without more. “To dispute an asserted fact, a party must cite specific evidentiary material that controverts the fact and must concisely explain how the cited material controverts the asserted fact.” See L.R. 56.1(e)(3). Notice the words: the non-movant must “cite” evidence - “specific” evidence - and “explain” why it matters. Id. (emphasis added). Otherwise, the non-movant has not “dispute[d]” the movant's facts. Id.
A failure to offer contrary evidence means that there is nothing on the other side of the evidentiary scale. So the movant's facts are unopposed. “Asserted facts may be deemed admitted if not controverted with specific citations to evidentiary material.” Id. “[M]ere disagreement with the movant's asserted facts is inadequate if made without reference to specific supporting material.” Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003).
The Local Rules also allow the non-moving party to supplement the record with additional facts. The non-moving party must file a statement of additional facts and “attach[] any cited evidentiary material.” See L.R. 56.1(b)(3).
To help pro se litigants, the Local Rules require parties to serve a notice that explains the procedure, so that they are not lost at sea. See L.R. 56.2. That way, unrepresented parties will receive clear instructions about what they need to file, and how they need to do it.
Substantial compliance with Local Rule 56.1 is not enough. See Ammons v. Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004). When it comes to summary judgment, there is no such thing as “close enough for horseshoes and hand grenades.” All parties, including pro se litigants, must fully comply with Local Rule 56.1. See Flint v. City of Belvidere, 791 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2015); Collins v. Illinois, 554 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2009) ().
Compliance is important because the rules are designed to give district courts the information that they need to ferret out if there needs to be a trial. And the uniformity of the procedure - across all cases - helps district courts manage a pile of motions in a mountain of cases.
Great Divide complied with the Local Rules. Great Divide supported its motion for summary judgment by filing a statement of undisputed facts. See Pl.'s Statement of Facts (Dckt. No. 145). Great Divide also supported each fact with citations to admissible evidence in the record. Id.
By filing for summary judgment, and offering admissible evidence, Great Divide put the ball in the McGees' court. And the McGees were not left without guidance. Great Divide also served on the McGees a notice that explained the requirements of the Local Rules. See Notice to Unrepresented Litigants (Dckt. No. 146). So, the McGees received a how-to manual in plain English for how to respond to the motion for summary judgment.
Unlike Great Divide, the McGees did not comply with the Local Rules. The McGees filed their own motion for summary judgment, and also filed a response to Great Divide's motion for summary judgment. But the filings fell far short, in form and substance.
The McGees' motion for summary judgment suffered from a number of problems. For starters, the McGees failed to file a freestanding statement of facts. Instead, they filed a single 63-page document, entitled Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment. See Def. McGees' Mtn. for Summ. J. (Dckt. No. 147). They filed a 35-page brief, and 28 pages of exhibits (without supporting deposition transcripts, affidavits, or declarations), without a statement of facts.
A single filing does not comply with the Local Rules. The moving party must file a “supporting memorandum of law . . . and . . . a statement of material facts that complies with LR 56.1(d).” See LR 56.1(a) (emphasis added). Stuffing facts in a brief, without a freestanding Rule 56.1 statement, is not what the Local Rules have in mind.
Instead of filing a separate statement of facts, the McGees offered their version of the events in the brief itself. And even then, the brief includes two sections about the facts. Pages 10-11 include twelve paragraphs under a heading “Statement of Facts.” See Def. McGees' Mtn. for Summ. J., at 10-11 (Dckt. No. 147). Eight pages later, a second section of facts appears in the brief, under the heading “Facts on Executed Contracts.” Id. at 19-22. That section includes 25 new paragraphs, and each paragraph begins with letters instead of numbers (so, they run from paragraph A to Y, for a total of 25 paragraphs). Id.; see also L.R. 56.1(d)(1) ().
But the biggest problem is a lack of evidence. Putting those two sections together, the McGees offered 37 paragraphs of facts in their brief. But only 13 of the 37 paragraphs include citations to evidence in the record. See Def. McGees' Mtn. for Summ. J., at 10 (Dckt. No. 147) (paragraph 2); id. at 19 (paragraph B); id. at 21 (paragraphs K-T); id. at 22 (paragraph Y). So there is no evidence to support 24 of the 37 paragraphs.
That omission violated the core requirements of Local Rule 56.1(d)(2). “Each asserted fact must be supported by citation to the specific evidentiary material, including the...
To continue reading
Request your trial