Great Lakes Properties, Inc. v. City of Rolling Hills Estates

• Decision Date: 12 March 1964
• Citation: 225 Cal.App.2d 525,37 Cal.Rptr. 448
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: GREAT LAKES PROPERTIES, INC., a corporation, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF ROLLING HILLS ESTATES et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 27257.

Page 448

37 Cal.Rptr. 448

225 Cal.App.2d 525

GREAT LAKES PROPERTIES, INC., a corporation, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF ROLLING HILLS ESTATES et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 27257.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

March 12, 1964.

Rehearing Denied April 8, 1964.

Hearing Denied May 6, 1964.

Musick, Peeler & Garrett, David P. Evans, Bruce E. Clark, Norman L. Roberts, Edward J. Riordan, Los Angeles, for appellants.

Latham & Watkins, H. Randall Stoke, Alan N. Halkett, John P. McLoughlin, Los Angeles, for respondents City of Rolling Hills Estates, City Council of City of Rolling Hills Estates and individual members thereof, and Donald W. Mansfield, City Clerk.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, David D. Mix, Deputy County Counsel, for respondents County of Los Angeles, Boundary Commission of County of Los Angeles, and members thereof.

KINCAID, Justice pro tem.

Petition for writ of mandate was brought by plaintiffs to prevent annexations of territory by defendants City of Rolling Hills Estates, et al., by virtue of its proposed Annexation Nos. 7, 8 and 10 and test the validity of the refusal by the Los Angeles County Boundary Commission to accept for filing a proposal for incorporation of the new City of Rancho Palos Verdes. Following issuances of alternative writs a trial was had, resulting in a judgment for defendants and a dissolving of the alternative writs and stay orders. Plaintiffs appeal from this judgment.

Plaintiffs Great Lakes Properties, Inc. and Brockett are owners of property within the limits of the proposed new city, the boundaries of which includes the territory encompassed by the proposed annexations.

On August 28, 1962, the city counsel of defendant City of Rolling Hills Estates, hereinafter referred to as 'City', authorized the filing of two annexation proposals with defendant Boundary Commission of Los Angeles County, hereinafter referred to as 'Commission', and the following day filed the two annexation proposals with legal descriptions and maps thereof with said commission.

On September 11, 1962, a Notice of Intention to Circulate a Petition for the Incorporation of a New City to be called the City of Rancho Palos Verdes, with maps and legal descriptions thereof, was filed with and accepted by the Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles, hereinafter referred to as 'board'.

On September 12, 1962, the commission approved the boundaries filed by the City on August 29, 1962, for Annexation Districts Nos. 7 and 8.

On September 12, 1962, following approval by the commission, the city council adopted it resolution declaring its intention to annex the property described in Annexation Districts 7 and 8.

On September 16, 1962, the clerk of the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County gave notice to the City of said notice of intention to incorporate, filed with such board on September 11 by the proposed new city.

On October 15, 1962, the City filed with the commission an additional annexation proposal designated Annexation District No. 10 of the City of Rolling Hills Estates, the territory of which was additionally within the territory proposed to be incorporated under the notice of intention filed September 11, 1962.

Thereafter, on October 15, 1962, plaintiff Brockett presented to the commission a proposal for the incorporation of the new city. The commission rejected this proposal for incorporation and refused to accept it for filing.

Plaintiffs contend that by their filing on September 11, 1962, with the board, of a notice of intention to incorporate the new city, the boundaries of which included all of the territory sought to be annexed to defendant City of Rolling Hills Estates, all persons, including defendant City, were barred for at least ninety days from instituting or proceeding with an annexation of any of the territory sought to be incorporated as the new city. This contention is made despite the prior filing on August 29, 1962, by defendant City of its proposal to annex the territory with the commission.

The trial court held, under Section 35002 of the Government Code, that for a period of 45 days following the filing by defendant City of its annexation proposals with the commission of its proposed Annexation Districts Numbers 7 and 8 on August 29, 1962, and of its proposed Annexation District Number 10 on October 15, 1962, no one else, including plaintiffs, could proceed to annex or incorporate any portion of the same territory. Therefore the notice of intention filed by plaintiffs on September 11, 1962, was of no force or effect since it was filed within the 45-day period following filing by defendant City of its boundaries for its proposed Districts Numbers 7 and 8. That the commission properly rejected and refused the filing of both the plaintiffs' proposals for incorporation of September 11, 1962, and of October 15, 1962, because said proposals included territory within Annexation Districts 7, 8 and 10 and said proposals were offered within 45 days after the filing with the commission by the City of its proposals for annexation of August 29, 1962, and October 15, 1962. That the proposals to incorporate offered by plaintiffs did not constitute a filing or submission thereof to the commission within the purview or requirements of Section 34303.5 of the Government Code and the notice of intention to circulate petition filed by plaintiffs on September 11, 1962, in no way prohibited or affected the right of the City to proceed with its proposed Annexation Districts 7, 8 and 10.

Plaintiffs challenge the holding of the trial court on the grounds that: (1) the last paragraph of Government Code section 35002, relied upon by the defendants and upheld by the trial court in its judgment, is unconstitutional in that it is violative of Article IV, Section 25, Clauses 28 and 33 of the California Constitution; (2) Even if this paragraph were constitutional, it would not give the annexing city jurisdiction as against the proponents of a new city under the circumstances of this case, but rather merely provided a 45-day waiting period during which the annexing city and the proponents of the new city might have settled their differences if they had been able to do so; and (3) Exclusive jurisdiction is acquired by proponents of a corporation by the filing of the notice of intention, whereas exclusive jurisdiction is acquired by a city seeking to annex territory by the adoption of a resolution of intent to annex (Government Code, § 35308), not by filing of a proposal with the commission.

At the 1961 session of the Legislature, section 35002, Government Code was amended by adding the last paragraph thereof which provides as follows:

'Additional proposals; restriction In a county having a population of 4,000,000 or more, for a period of 45 days after the filing by a city with the secretary of the boundary commission of a proposal for the annexation of territory to a city, no other proposal shall be filed hereunder for the annexation of any of the same territory to any city, or for the incorporation of any of such territory.'

Plaintiffs contend that this provision of the Government Code is unconstitutional and specifically that it is violative of the 28th and 33rd clauses of Article IV, Section 25 of the California Constitution which provide in part as follows: 'The Legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say: * * * Twenty-eighth--Creating offices, or prescribing the powers and duties of officers in counties, cities, cities and counties, townships, election or school districts. * * * Thirty-third--In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable.'

Plaintiffs contend that section 35002 purports to require certain county officers--members of the Los Angeles County Boundary Commission--to perform their duties differently from their counterparts in other counties. That it thus violates the above quoted clause twenty-eight, while also violating clause thirty-three in that general laws can be made applicable to annexations and incorporations.

In support of their position that the last paragraph of section 35002 is unconstitutional, plaintiffs argue it creates a special law applicable to Los Angeles County alone without reason. That use of the words 'a county having a population of 4,000,000 or more' is no different than referring to Los Angeles County by name. They rely in part on cases wherein legislative enactments applying to counties of a named class were held violative of said constitutional provisions. (Hollman v. Warren, 32 Cal.2d 351, 359, 196 P.2d 562, limiting notaries in counties of the second class (San Francisco); Pratt v. Browne, 135 Cal. 649, 67 P. 1082, fixing salaries of court reporters in counties of the thirtieth class (Ventura); Consolidated Printing & Publishing Co. v. Allen, 18 Cal.2d 63, 112 P.2d 884, establishing procedure for publication of tax delinquent property for counties of the first class (Los Angeles).)

They point out that the population of Los Angeles County according to Government Code section 28020 is 6,038,771 whereas the next most populous county is San Diego with 1,033,011, therefore the arbitrary figure of 4,000,000 in section 35002 is no different than referring to the excluded county as being one of the first class.

Plaintiffs contend that a classification of the county of largest population is not a reasonable one in the field of annexation and incorporation. That the problems of conflicting annexations, or an annexation conflicting with an incorporation, are not exclusive to Los Angeles County or to large counties in general, but have and will occur in numerous counties. If the need for the system established by the last paragraph of section 35002 exists, that need exists in many other counties.

Plaintiffs also rely on Stout v. Democratic County Certral Committee, 40 Cal.2d 91, 94-95, 251 P.2d...