Great N. Energy, Inc. v. Circle Ridge Prod., Inc.
| Decision Date | 28 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-16-00029-CV,06-16-00029-CV |
| Parties | GREAT NORTHERN ENERGY, INC., Appellant v. CIRCLE RIDGE PRODUCTION, INC., Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 71st District Court Harrison County, Texas
Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
Circle Ridge Production, Inc. (Circle Ridge), is attempting to collect from Great Northern Energy, Inc. (Great Northern), a money judgment it had been awarded1 against Great Northern. Frustrated in its efforts to get post-judgment discovery from a less than fully active company, Circle Ridge sought injunctive relief and a turnover order. Within hours of filing that motion and after a brief hearing focused mainly on the discovery issues, Circle Ridge was granted a temporary injunction prohibiting Great Northern and certain officers and agents from disposing of assets. Three days later, after another brief hearing, Circle Ridge was awarded a turnover order describing, along with a broad range of other assets, causes of action against Burdick Baker in Civil Action No. 3:14-CV-00240-B, Burdick Baker v. Great Northern Energy, Inc., et. al., pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division (the Baker Claims), and corporate stock owned in, and causes of action against, Rangeford Resources, Inc. (the Rangeford Rights).
On appeal of both the temporary injunction and the turnover order, Great Northern asserts that the trial court's judgment was not final, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue the injunction, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the individuals named in the injunction, that there was no evidence to support the injunction, that the injunction violates the constitutional rightsof the named individuals, that the injunction has no termination date, that it was error to include the Baker Claims in the turnover order, and that there is no evidence to support appointing the receiver or entering the turnover order.
We reverse the temporary injunction in its entirety and partially reverse the turnover order as set forth below, because (1) the December 7 Judgment was final,2 and—although (2) the trial court had jurisdiction to issue the temporary injunction, and (3) the temporary injunction restrains individuals only as agents of Great Northern—(4) no evidence supported the temporary injunction, (5) the complaint about including the Baker Claims in the turnover order is moot, and (6) only as to the Rangeford Rights did any evidence support the turnover order.
Just six days before the trial in the underlying case began, Circle Ridge filed its fifth amended original petition in which it purported to join three additional defendants, WJ SouthWaskom #1, LLC, Topcat Oilfield Transport, LLC, and the United States of America (the "Newly-Named Defendants").3 Circle Ridge alleged that each of the Newly-Named Defendants was asserting claims that were clouds on its title. Nothing in the record suggests that any of the Newly-Named Defendants were served with citation before the trial began or that any of them either filed an answer before trial or appeared at trial.4
Great Northern asserts that post-judgment remedies were not available because the December 7 Judgment was not final, on account of the Newly-Named Defendants' alleged claims against Circle Ridge's title. Great Northern also argues that, since Circle Ridge did not establish its title against the Newly-Named Defendants, the December 7 Judgment is interlocutory.
Great Northern has not offered any authority that, by our reckoning, supports its arguments, and we have found none. The two cases cited by Great Northern do not support either of its arguments. See Hunt v. Heaton, 643 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. 1982); Allen v. Sharp, 233 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1950, writ ref'd).
If a judgment "disposes of all pending parties and claims in the record," it is a final judgment. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Further, there must be a clear indication in the judgment "that the trial court intended . . . to completely dispose of the entire case." Id. at 205. As we more fully addressed in our opinion on Great Northern's mandamus petition, when a judgment expressly disposes of all defendants, except those who have not been served and have not answered, and nothing in the record indicates the plaintiff expected to obtain service on the unserved defendants, the judgment is a final judgment. In re Great N. Energy, Inc., No. 06-16-00030-CV, 2016 WL 3068629, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 31, 2016, orig. proceeding) (citing In re Sheppard, 193 S.W.3d 181, 187 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding)). In such a case, the plaintiff has effectively discontinued its claims against the unserved defendants. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1962).
As we noted in our opinion in the mandamus action, by choosing to proceed with trial without serving the Newly-Named Defendants, Circle Ridge indicated its intent to abandon itsclaims against them. Great N. Energy, Inc., 2016 WL 3068629, at *3. Further, there is no evidence in the record that the Newly-Named Defendants were served before trial or before the entry of the final judgment. Therefore, Circle Ridge effectively discontinued its claims against the Newly-Named Defendants. See Penn, 363 S.W.2d at 232. As such, the Newly-Named Defendants were effectively not parties to this suit. And, since the Newly-Named Defendants were not parties to the suit, their claims, if any, are not affected by the judgment. See Ramirez v. Wood, 577 S.W.2d 278, 286 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1978, no writ) (judgment in trespass-to-try-title suit not binding on any non-party); Farhart v. Blackshear, 434 S.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ().
The December 7 Judgment expressly disposes of all claims and all parties. Further, after specifically disposing of the specific claims of the parties, the judgment recites that Except for the Newly-Named Defendants, Great Northern does not contend that the judgment does not dispose of all claims and parties.
The December 7 Judgment was final.
Great Northern's attack on the injunctive relief employs five different arguments. One of those challenges the trial court's jurisdiction on the basis that the injunction was granted after the court's plenary jurisdiction had expired. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(e). Circle Ridge responds thatthe trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce its judgment even after its plenary jurisdiction expires. Here, we agree with Circle Ridge.
We review the granting of a post-judgment injunction under an abuse of discretion standard. See In re Cantu de Villarreal, No. 13-08-00408-CV, 2009 WL 888467, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Apr. 2, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Under this standard, the trial court will be reversed "only if we determine that it acted in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner, without reference to any guiding rules and principles." W.T.J. v. S.L.S., No. 03-10-00335-CV, 2012 WL 3793333, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 29, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991)).
Great Northern's motion for new trial was overruled February 22, 2016. More than thirty days later, on March 28, 2016, the trial court granted injunctive relief to Circle Ridge. The authority, under Rule 329b(e) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, of the trial court to vacate, modify, correct, or reform its judgment or to grant a new trial expires thirty days after a motion for new trial is overruled by a written and signed order. TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(e). A trial court, however, has power beyond Rule 329 to enforce its judgment. Arndt v. Farris, 633 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1982). Generally, a trial court has the inherent power to enforce its judgments, even after its plenary power ceases, and it may employ suitable methods to do so. Kennedy v. Hudnall, 249 S.W.3d 520, 523 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 308; Arndt, 633 S.W.2d at 499; Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex. 1979)).
In its motion for turnover order and motion for temporary injunction, Circle Ridge sought an injunction pursuant to Rule 680 through Rule 693 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure andSection 31.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 680-693; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(a) (West 2015). Section 31.002, which authorizes the granting of a post-judgment injunction, is an aid to the enforcement of the trial court's judgment, and the trial court has continuing jurisdiction over such matters as set forth in the statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(a); Arndt, 633 S.W.2d at 499. The trial court had jurisdiction to issue a temporary injunction.
Great Northern, however, attacks the injunction also on the basis that (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the named individuals, and (2) the terms of the injunction violated the named individuals' constitutional protections against illegal seizures of property. Great Northern's arguments spring from its contention that the injunction restrains the named individuals' rights to use or spend their personal assets. Circle Ridge responds that the injunction applies to the named individuals only in their capacity as officers, employees, or attorneys of Great Northern. In a...
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