Great Northern Nekoosa Corp. v. Board of Tax Assessors of Early County, s. 35152

Citation244 Ga. 624,261 S.E.2d 346
Decision Date06 November 1979
Docket NumberNos. 35152,35173,s. 35152
PartiesGREAT NORTHERN NEKOOSA CORPORATION v. BOARD OF TAX ASSESSORS OF EARLY COUNTY, Georgia (two cases).
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

Alston, Miller & Gaines, Oscar N. Persons, B. Harvey Hill, Jr., Michael G. Wasserman, Atlanta, Philip Sheffield,, Blakely, for appellant.

Thomas H. Baxley, Blakely, for appellee.

HILL, Justice.

In 1977 and 1978, Great Northern Nekoosa Corporation enlarged its Great Southern Paper Company paper mill facilities in Early County, Georgia, at the alleged cost of $6,429,329. Great Northern's 1978 ad valorem tax assessment from Early County was based in part on this enlargement. Great Northern challenged the inclusion of the enlargement by the Board of Tax Assessors before the Early County Board of Equalization on the ground that it was exempt from the tax pursuant to a local amendment to the Georgia Constitution referred to herein as the Early County Amendment. Ga.L.1962, p. 808. The Equalization Board affirmed the original assessment.

Great Northern appealed to the Superior Court of Early County, both as to the exemption issue and as to an additional question of property valuation. Great Northern and the Board of Tax Assessors each moved for summary judgment on the exemption issue. Great Northern's motion was denied and the board's was granted. Great Northern appealed the grant of the board's motion for summary judgment directly to this court and filed a petition for immediate review, which was granted, as to the denial of its motion for summary judgment. These two appeals were consolidated.

In granting summary judgment to the Board of Tax Assessors, the trial court upheld the board's contentions that the Early County Amendment violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution, and that, alternatively, Great Northern was not entitled to the exemption because the Amendment allows discretion in the board as to who shall be exempt. Great Northern appeals from both of these rulings.

1. Preliminarily, Great Northern argues that the trial court erred in failing to rule that the appellee board, as an agent of the county, lacked standing to challenge a local constitutional amendment on federal constitutional grounds. Great Northern relies on Williams v. Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 53 S.Ct. 431, 77 L.Ed. 1015 (1933).

Because we have determined that the amendment does not violate equal protection or due process, it is unnecessary for us to decide in this case the more difficult question of whether a county has any standing to challenge a state constitutional provision on fourteenth amendment grounds.

2. The local constitutional amendment at issue provides as follows: "Any person, natural or artificial, a resident of this State, who may after January 1, 1962, in Early County, build, equip, establish, complete, or enlarge a plant for the manufacture or processing of any properties May, as to such building (including equipment utilized thereon or in connection therewith), enlargement or equipment, Be exempt from all county, incorporated town or city, and school districts ad valorem taxes for five (5) years from the date of the first use of the building, equipment, or enlargement of such plants. This provision shall be selfexecuting and shall not require additional implementing legislation." Ga.L.1962, pp. 808, 809. (Emphasis supplied.)

In holding this local amendment unconstitutional under the federal constitution, the trial court relied on Smith v. State, 222 Ga. 552, 150 S.E.2d 868 (1966). In Smith, this court sustained a constitutional challenge based on the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution to a local constitutional amendment of Telfair County. Ga.L.1960, p. 1400. This court held that to survive constitutional attack, an amendment providing for issue by the county of Revenue bonds must limit the issuance of the bonds to situations involving public purposes; i. e., the court held that spending public funds for private purposes would violate the fourteenth amendment. Smith, supra, 222 Ga. at 556-557, 150 S.E.2d 868.

Smith v. State, supra, is inapposite here. The Early County amendment merely provides a tax exemption; it does not involve the expenditure of public funds for private purposes. Thus the rule to be applied is found in Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 1003, 35 L.Ed.2d 351 (1973): "Where taxation is concerned and no specific federal right, apart from equal protection, is imperiled, the States have large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation." Lehnhausen involved a corporation challenging Illinois' exemption of individuals from personal property taxation. Applying that principle, we hold that the Early County amendment is well within the parameters of the equal protection clause. 1 See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 94 S.Ct. 1734, 40 L.Ed.2d 189 (1974).

The Early County amendment is not unconstitutional under the equal protection or due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.

3. The trial court also ruled that even if the amendment is constitutional, Great Northern is not entitled to an exemption because the amendment gives the board the discretion to allow the exemption or not. The trial court based this ruling on the fact that the amendment provides the installation "May . . . be exempt . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) We disagree with that interpretation for three reasons. First a review of the legislative history of the amendment persuades us that the word "may" appears in the amendment at issue because this amendment tracks the language of a similar constitutional amendment...

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5 cases
  • Cox Enterprises, Inc. v. Carroll City/County Hospital Authority
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • January 15, 1981
    ...would call them governmental entities. Tax exemptions may be extended to private corporations, Great Northern Nekoosa Corp. v. Board of Tax Assessors, 244 Ga. 624(2), 261 S.E.2d 346 (1979), as may the power of eminent domain. Code Ann. § 36-801. The fact that the power of eminent domain may......
  • City of Atlanta v. Heirs of Champion
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • November 6, 1979
    ... ... Fulton County", 215 Ga. 551, 111 S.E.2d 364 (1959) ...     \xC2" ... ...
  • TEC America, Inc. v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 20, 1984
    ...there is no doubt that appellant was granted an exemption from taxation on its inventory. See Great Northern Nekoosa Corp. v. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 244 Ga. 624, 626(2), 261 S.E.2d 346 (1979). The only question is whether appellant has waived or forfeited the exemption it has been granted. U......
  • Caldwell v. Hospital Authority of Charlton County, 38079
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • February 9, 1982
    ...protection. See Ingalls Iron Works Co. v. Chilivis, 237 Ga. 479, 482-483, 228 S.E.2d 866 (1976); Great Northern Nekoosa Corp. v. Board of Tax Assessors, 244 Ga. 624(2), 261 S.E.2d 346 (1979). It should be noted that the Hospital Authority may become a contributing employer by terminating it......
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