Great W. Accident Ins. Co. v. Martin

• Citation: 166 N.W. 705,183 Iowa 1009
• Decision Date: 12 March 1918
• Docket Number: No. 31730.,31730.
• Parties: GREAT WESTERN ACCIDENT INS. CO. v. MARTIN, COUNTY TREASURER, ET AL.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

183 Iowa 1009

166 N.W. 705

GREAT WESTERN ACCIDENT INS. CO.

v.MARTIN, COUNTY TREASURER, ET AL.

No. 31730.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 12, 1918.

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; W. S. Ayers, Judge.

This was a suit in equity to compel the correction of a tax levy. The relief prayed by the appellee was granted, and the defendants appeal. Affirmed.H. M. Havner, Atty. Gen., J. W. Kindig, Asst. Atty. Gen., and A. G. Rippey, Asst. Co. Atty., of Des Moines, for appellants.

Carr, Carr & Evans, of Des Moines, for appellee.

SALINGER, J.

I. The trial court changed the assessment to one fixed by section 1310, Code Supp. 1913. The sole question is whether it should not instead have adopted the tax rate fixed by section 1305. Section 1310 provides, so far as its provisions have any applicability here:

That “corporation shares or stocks * * * shall be taxed upon the uniform basis throughout the state of five mills on the dollar of actual valuation,” and that this “millage tax * * * shall be in lieu of all other taxes upon moneys and credits.”

The court adopted this rate. If section 1310 stopped at what we have quoted, the action of the court is right, beyond debate. But the statute adds, “except as otherwise provided.” The point for our decision is therefore narrowed to whether there is elsewhere a provision that such shares as are involved shall be taxed at some rate other than “five mills on the dollar of actual valuation.” No statute has been called to our attention, and we find none, which in terms purports to make any change in the taxation of such shares as are before us. The effect of the argument for appellant is that section 1305 makes the change by implication. It provides that all property subject to taxation shall be assessed at 25 per cent. of its actual value.

[1][2] It seems to us that section 1310 is a limitation of the general provision of section 1305, and that, therefore, section 1305 is not an enlargement of section 1310. The specific controls the general. The two statutes must be read as if they were one and provided that all property, except specified shares, should be taxed at 25 per cent. of actual value, and that said shares should be taxed at five mills on the dollar. Any other construction violates the rule that nothing enacted shall, if it may be avoided, be made ineffective or useless. On the theory of appellants, section 1310 need not have been enacted, and has nothing to operate on. If section 1305 fixes the tax rate for “all property,” and section 1310 is no modification, it is impossible to understand why section 1310 was passed. If section 1305 controls, then 25 per cent. of actual value is the rate for all property, and it was idle to say in other statutes that some property should be taxed at a rate differing from the one fixed in section 1305. The only way in which elementary canons of construction can be made effective is by holding, as did the trial court, that, as to the property specified in section 1310, that statute controls.

[3][4] This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that section 1310 fixes its own exceptions as to shares; wherefore the Legislature did not intend that other statutes should be looked to for exceptions. Moreover, section 1310 not only makes its own exceptions, as for instance shares of loan and trust companies, but requires that those who desire a definition of the excepted classes shall ascertain by investigating how such classes are “hereinafter” defined. Certainly section 1310 did not intend that section 1305 should be looked to. For that statute is not “hereinafter.” Certainly “hereinafter” does not refer to a preceding section. There is nothing in Layman v. Telephone Co., 123 Iowa, 591, 99 N. W. 205, nor in Morril v. Bentley, 150 Iowa, 677, 130 N. W. 734, which has any bearing upon the claim that section 1310 does not fix the assessment of such shares as the one in consideration.

[5] II. It may be true that the statute exhibits unfairness. If there were any substantial doubt...