Greater Motors Corp. v. Metropolitan Taxi Co.

• Decision Date: 15 April 1921
• Docket Number: 16098.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: GREATER MOTORS CORPORATION v. METROPOLITAN TAXI CO.

197 P. 327

115 Wash. 451

GREATER MOTORS CORPORATION v. METROPOLITAN TAXI CO.

No. 16098.

Supreme Court of Washington

April 15, 1921

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; J. T. Ronald, Judge.

Action by the Greater Motors Corporation against the Metropolitan Taxi Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

J Speed Smith and Henry Elliott, Jr., both of Seattle, for appellant.

Bausman Oldham, Bullitt & Eggerman and W. L. Nossaman, all of Seattle, for respondent.

MAIN J.

This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages to an automobile owned by it, claimed to be due to negligence chargeable to the defendant. The cause was tried to the court without the jury, and resulted in findings of fact conclusions of law, and a judgment sustaining the plaintiff's right to recover. From this judgment the defendant appeals.

The accident occurred at the intersection of Ninth avenue and Madison street, in the city of Seattle. While not strictly accurate, it may be said that Madison street extends east and west and Ninth avenue north and south. On the 5th day of May 1919, a Hudson automobile, driven by an employee of the appellant, was proceeding south on Ninth avenue. It entered the intersection of the two streets mentioned at about the middle of Ninth avenue and continued in the same direction. A Packard automobile driven by an employee of the respondent was proceeding east on Madison street and entered the intersection on the south side of that street. The front of the Hudson automobile struck the rear left wheel of the Packard, while the latter car was proceeding across the intersection on the south side of Madison street.

The pivotal point in the case is: Which car entered the intersection first? Both cars were traveling at the time at a greater rate of speed than the ordinance permitted. The Hudson car was in the center of the street, while the ordinance required that the car be driven as near the right-hand curb as practicable. Upon the question as to which car entered the intersection first, the evidence is conflicting. The trial court found that the Packard automobile owned by the respondent first entered the intersection. If this be the fact, then the Packard car had the right of way. The fact that it was proceeding at a greater rate of speed than that fixed by the ordinance would not prevent a recovery, providing the driver of the Hudson automobile was guilty of negligence which proximately caused the accident, and that there was no causal connection...