Greaves v. State
| Decision Date | 22 November 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 13631,13631 |
| Citation | 528 P.2d 805 |
| Parties | Jerald W. GREAVES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STATE of Utah, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Bernard M. Tanner, Earl F. Dorius, Asst. Attys. Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant-appellant.
Lyle W. Hillyard and Gordon J. Low, Logan, of Hillyard & Gunnell, Logan, for plaintiff-respondent.
Jerald W. Greaves brought this declaratory judgment action to have Section 41--6--44.2, U.C.A.1953, (Pocket Supp.) quoted below, which deals with driving or controlling a vehicle while intoxicated, and which he had been charged with violating, declared unconstitutional. 1
Plaintiff was arrested on August 1, 1973, by a Logan City police officer for driving while intoxicated. A test was taken of plaintiff's blood shortly after his arrest, showing a blood-alcohol content of .12 per cent by weight. He was first charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol under a city ordinance. But after a plea of not guilty and other proceedings, that case was dismissed and he was charged under the state statute referred to.
Thereafter, and prior to his trial on that charge, in anticipation of the use of his blood test by the State, the plaintiff instituted this action challenging the validity of the statute under which he was charged. It provides:
(a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in subsection (b) of this section for any person with a blood alcohol content of .10% or greater, by weight, to drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle within this state.
Upon the submission of the issue to the trial court and briefs in support thereof, the trial court issued his decision that Section 41--6--44.2 was unconstitutional, assigning reasons of its vagueness and that it fails to require either a specific intent, or an act which implies intent, to violate the statute. One of the claimed frailties pointed out is that a person cannot tell when his blood alcohol is .10 content without a chemical test; and this is compared with other offenses where one can easily tell whether he is violating the law. In his ruling the trial court commented that a person might have such a concentration of alcohol in his blood by medical treatment or injection, and without any intent to violate the law, rather than by drinking alcoholic beverages.
In regard to the judicial determination of the constitutionality of statutes there are certain principles relating to statutory construction, to be taken into consideration. Because the duty rests upon the courts to determine the scope of the powers of all three branches of government, they have a special responsibility to exercise a high degree of caution and restraint to keep themselves within the limitations of the judicial power in order not to infringe upon the prerogatives of the executive or the legislative branches. In harmony with that policy it is the well-established rule that legislative enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of validity; and that they should not be declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable basis upon which they can be found to come within the constitutional frame work; and that a statute will not be stricken down as being unconstitutional unless it appears to be so beyond a reasonable doubt. 2
We think the contentions against the validity of the statute, and the comments of the trial court, indicate an undue concern with the factor of guilt and punishment with respect to controlling or operating a vehicle while intoxicated. It is well enough known to require no elaboration that driving while under the influence of liquor is so hazardous that it involves the public interest and welfare, and consequently, is a proper subject for regulation and control by law; 3 and this is also true of the operation of motor vehicles. 4
We suppose that the danger to one's self and to others, which it is the purpose of this statute to guard against, would be just as great, however, the alcohol got into the blood. In determining whether the statute carries out that purpose, it should not be given any tortured or strained application to conjectured or hypothetical situations, but should be understood and applied in a fair, realistic and practical manner to the situation confronted, and in the awareness that all of the law is not stated in one sentence or one paragraph, but a statute is to be construed and applied in relation to other requirements of the law.
This statute is part of the Motor Vehicle Code, whose purpose is to govern the safety of the use and operation of motor vehicles. Inherent in its language is the legislative determination and declaration that the stated blood content of .10 per cent of alcohol makes it dangerous for a person to operate or be in control of a vehicle. This is one of those situations where from the doing of the prohibited act one is presumed to intend its natural consequences; and it is the intentional doing of the act prohibited by law which constitutes the offense. 5 To be considered in this connection and consistent with the conclusion we have reached is Section 41--6--12 of the Motor Vehicle Act which expressly states that it is 'a misdemeanor for any person to do any act forbidden . . . in this act.' (Emphasis added.)
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