Grebla v. Danbury Hosp.
| Docket Number | 3:22-cv-13 (KAD) |
| Decision Date | 29 June 2023 |
| Parties | MIROSLAWA GREBLA, Plaintiff, v. DANBURY HOSPITAL, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
CORRECTED [1] MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT (ECF NO. 20)
Plaintiff Miroslawa Grebla (“Grebla” or “Plaintiff”) brings this employment discrimination action against her former employer, Danbury Hospital (“Defendant” or “the Hospital”). She alleges discrimination on account of her age under both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (“CFEPA”), breach of contract breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, wrongful termination in violation of public policy and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). Pending before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 20) For the reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED. However, the dismissal is without prejudice as to some claims and Plaintiff is permitted to file a Second Amended Complaint as detailed below.
To survive a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Legal conclusions and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Nevertheless, when reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court must accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw “all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor.” Interworks Sys. Inc. v. Merch. Fin. Corp., 604 F.3d 692, 699 (2d Cir. 2010).
The appropriate analysis for a facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), as is raised by Defendant, is similar to that required under Rule 12(b)(6). “When the Rule 12(b)(1) motion is facial, i.e., based solely on the allegations of the complaint or the complaint and exhibits attached to it . . ., the plaintiff has no evidentiary burden.” Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2016). The task of the district court is to determine whether, after accepting as true all material factual allegations of the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, the alleged facts affirmatively and plausibly suggest that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 56-57. “A plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists.” Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113.
Goel v. Bunge, Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016) (citations omitted, internal quotation marks omitted).
Grebla is a 66-year-old woman. Am. Compl. ¶ 11. Grebla began working at the Hospital as a nursing assistant in 1986 and remained there as a full-time employee until her termination on December 11, 2019. Am. Compl. ¶ 13.
At the time of her termination, Grebla was a Monitor Technician on the night shift. Id. She was also a union member of the Connecticut Health Care Associates AFSCME, AFL-CIO (“Union”); the terms and conditions of her employment were governed by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between the Union and the Hospital. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16-17. The CBA provides that employees such as Grebla can only be terminated for “just cause.” Am. Compl. ¶ 18.
In October 2019, the Hospital suspended Grebla with pay for three nights because she was being investigated for allegedly threatening a registered nurse who was in her twenties. Am. Compl. ¶ 20. The Hospital allegedly received an anonymous call about the threat. Id. Grebla contends that the allegations against her were false, and she had not threatened any employee. Am. Compl. ¶ 21. When Grebla returned to work, she was informed that Defendant could not find any evidence of threats or other wrongdoing by her. Am. Compl. ¶ 22.
On December 4, 2019, Grebla received a phone call from her manager in which she was informed she was again being suspended from work and investigated. Am. Compl. ¶ 23. Grebla's manager did not give her a reason for the suspension at the time of the call. Id.
On December 11, 2019, Grebla had a meeting with the Director of Nursing, her manager, a Union representative, and a Human Resources representative. Am. Compl. ¶ 24. During this meeting, Grebla's manager falsely accused her of not performing her job duties while monitoring a patient for a coworker. Am. Compl. ¶ 25. According to the Hospital, while Grebla was covering for her coworker, a patient had a V-Tach incident that she failed to report. Am. Compl. ¶ 26. Grebla denies that the patient had a V-Tach during her period of coverage, because when she was shown a video taken of the patient's room, there was no red alarm indicating that the patient was in V-Tach. Am. Compl. ¶ 27. Yet, the Director of Nursing and Grebla's manager continued to harass and question her regarding the incident and insisted that she failed to report the patient being in V-Tach. Am. Compl. ¶ 28. Grebla was then asked why she ripped the event strip from the monitor, as seen on the video, and Grebla explained that she wanted to review the event strip to make sure she didn't miss any medical events. Am. Compl. ¶ 30. Grebla was blamed for the patient being in V-Tach and not her coworker. Am. Compl. ¶ 32. Grebla was also accused of not being able to answer questions from registered nurses about patients and not following Hospital policy regarding patients being of telemetry. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33-34.
Prior to the December 11, 2019 meeting, Grebla had complained about younger coworkers behaving unprofessionally but the Hospital failed to address those concerns. Am. Compl. ¶ 36.
Defendant moves to dismiss as untimely Plaintiff's age discrimination claims brought pursuant to the ADEA and the CFEPA. Plaintiff argues that her age discrimination claims are not time barred because Defendant continued its course of discriminatory conduct from December 11, 2019 to an arbitration hearing on April 27, 2021, and, alternatively that the applicable statutes of limitations should be equitably tolled.
Employees who believe that an employer has violated the CFEPA must, by statute, first pursue administrative remedies with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (“CHRO”) before bringing suit. See Sullivan v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs of City of Waterbury, 196 Conn. 208, 215-16 (1985) (). A charge of discrimination to the CHRO must be made within 300 days of the alleged act of discrimination. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-82(f). Further, Section 46a-101(a) provides that “[n]o action may be brought in accordance with section 46a-100 unless the complainant has received a release from the [CHRO] in accordance with the provisions of this section.” The release of jurisdiction triggers administrative dismissal or disposal of the complaint, and the complainant has 90 days from the date of receipt of the release to file an action in court. Id. § 46a-101(d)-(e). The failure to satisfy the exhaustion provisions of CFEPA results in dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Anderson v Derby Bd. of Educ., 718 F.Supp.2d 258, 272 (D. Conn. 2010) (collecting cases).
An ADEA claimant must also exhaust administrative remedies as “a precondition to bringing such claims in federal courts.” Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 274 F.3d 683, 686 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The purpose of this exhaustion requirement is to give the administrative agency the opportunity to investigate, mediate, and take remedial action.” Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local 40, 790 F.3d 378, 384 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 712 (2d Cir. 1998)). A work-sharing relationship between the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and a state discrimination agency such as the CHRO enables the complaint to be cross-listed with the EEOC at the time the CHRO receives it. See Ortiz v. Prudential Ins. Co., 94 F.Supp.2d 225, 231 (D. Conn. 2000).
In states with their own antidiscrimination laws and agencies, like Connecticut, the time period to file the complaint with the EEOC extends from 180 days to 300 days. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)(B).
Plaintiff's claims arise out of the termination of her employment on December 11, 2019. See Vollemans v. Wallingford, 103...
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