Greco v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America

• Decision Date: 01 June 1970
• Docket Number: No. 862-A,862-A
• Parties: George GRECO et al. v. SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 50

266 A.2d 50

107 R.I. 195

George GRECO et al. v. SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA.

No. 862-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 1, 1970.

[107 R.I. 199] Don G. Sinesi, Providence, for plaintiffs.

Albert Lisker, Providence, for defendant.

OPINION

ROBERTS, Chief Justice.

This is a civil action brought to recover on a fire insurance policy commenced by a summons and complaint served on the state Insurance Commissioner at his office in Providence on July 23, 1969. No answer was filed thereto within 20 days as is required by the pertinent provisions of Rule 12(a) of Super.R.Civ.P. On August 20 on motion of the plaintiffs the defendant was defaulted, and judgment entered in the amount of $18,000 plus interest. The defendant filed an answer on August 25 by its attorney, who had been unaware that judgment had entered at the time the answer was filed in Superior Court. Thereafter the defendant was notified by the plaintiffs of the default judgment, and on August 29 the defendant moved to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) and (6) of Super.R.Civ.P. This motion was granted with terms on September 19, and the plaintiffs are now prosecuting an appeal to this court.

Rule 60(b) provides that, on motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment for several reasons. The reasons upon which defendant relies in seeking relief from the instant judgment are '(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; * * * or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.' The rule further provides that such motion shall be made within a reasonable time and not more than one year after the judgment was entered.

The plaintiffs contend that the trial justice, in granting relief in the instant case, abused his judicial discretion in that defendant had not set forth specifically the circumstances surrounding the neglect that would warrant the relief being granted on the grounds set forth in Rule 60(b)(1). It is to be conceded that this court has taken the position that the mere disclosure of an unexplained neglect, standing alone and without evidence establishing the existence of extenuating circumstances that would serve to render such neglect excusable, will not automatically excuse noncompliance with the rules. King v. Brown, 102 R.I. 42, 227 A.2d 589; Fields v. S & M Foods, Inc., R.I., 249 A.2d 892.

It is our opinion, however, that, in so contending, plaintiffs overlook defendant's primary argument in this court, that is, that it was entitled to be relieved of the default judgment by virtue of the provisions set out in Rule 60(b)(6). It is therein provided that relief from a default judgment may be granted for any other reason justifying relief from the judgment. As we understand the position of defendant, it relies primarily upon Rule 60(b)(6) to justify its position that the trial justice, in granting the relief here given, did not abuse his judicial discretion.

Under Rule 60(b)(6) courts have wide latitude within which to grant relief from default judgments for reasons other than those set out in the first five clauses of the rule. It has generally been held that, under the statutes prior to the adoption of the rule, relief from default judgments should be given liberally in order to avoid denying litigants their day in court, excepting, of course, situations in which the time limitations have run. It is obvious, however, that the courts, in acting pursuant to the 'other reason' rule, should exercise that liberality cautiously.

In Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614, 69 S.Ct....