Green v. City of Atlanta
| Decision Date | 13 September 1926 |
| Docket Number | 5283,5284. |
| Citation | 135 S.E. 84,162 Ga. 641 |
| Parties | GREEN v. CITY OF ATLANTA et al. CITY OF ATLANTA et al. v. GREEN. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
The court did not err in holding section 1 of the ordinance in question to be valid as against the contention that it is void because unreasonable.
The court did not err in holding the ordinance and election held thereunder valid as against the contention that they were void because based on an unconstitutional statute-that the statute was unconstitutional on the ground that a referendum is contrary to a republican form of government. This question cannot be determined in a court of equity, and is not a justiciable question; on the contrary, it is a matter to be determined by the Legislature.
Section 215(b) of the act amending the charter of the city of Atlanta (Laws 1913, p. 599) is not void on the ground that it deprives the plaintiff of "due process of law."
The court did not err in rendering a judgment holding said section of the ordinance valid as against article 3, § 7 par. 8, of the Constitution of Georgia (Civ. Code 1910, § 6437), which provides: "No law or ordinance shall pass which refers to more than one subject-matter, or contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereon."
The court did not err in holding the second section of the ordinance invalid on the ground that the mayor and council were without authority to abandon or surrender the power conferred on them.
Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; W. D. Ellis, Judge.
Suit by Victor E. Green against the City of Atlanta and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error, and defendants assign cross-error. Affirmed on both bills of exceptions.
Act amending charter of city of Atlanta and providing for referendum held not void as denial of due process (Laws 1913 p. 599, § 215[b]; Const. art. 1,§ 1, par. 3).
Victor E. Green, as a citizen and taxpayer, in behalf of himself and other taxpayers, brought suit against the city of Atlanta the mayor and general council, the finance committee of council, and the comptroller of the city, alleging, in substance, as follows:
On or about December 2, 1925, an election was held in the city of Atlanta, in which the people voted on the question of the adoption or the rejection of "an alleged ordinance providing for an increase in the salaries paid to officers and members of the fire department." The returns in said election were something more than 5,000 votes in favor of the proposed increase and more than 2,000 votes against such increase. A copy of said ordinance, in so far as is material, is as follows:
There are 292 men, including officers, in the fire department, whose compensation is purported to be increased by said ordinance, and it will require an increase of $117,000 yearly to pay such extra compensation. The total amount now paid by the city for the salaries of the fire department is $508,000.
Said ordinance is illegal and void, for the following reasons: It is unreasonable, in that it arbitrarily provides that the members of the fire department shall never receive less pay per month than the salaries paid by the United States government to its mail carriers, and that, if the salaries paid to the mail carriers be increased, the salaries of the members of the fire department shall be increased accordingly, but it does not provide that the salaries shall be lowered if the pay of the mail carriers be lowered; there is no similarity between the services rendered by mail carriers and the services rendered by the fire department; the resources of the city and of the United States are vastly different; and the salaries should be regulated, not only by the worth of the services rendered, but also by the ability of the employer to pay. The ordinance is unreasonable because it purports to make the change in the salaries of the fire department depend upon federal legislation instead of legislation by the city of Atlanta. Said election was held in pursuance of "an alleged amendment to the charter of the city of Atlanta, which is found in the Acts of 1913, pp. 507 to 604; the particular portion relating to such election being section 215(b)." The ordinance and the election held thereunder are void, because the same are based on a void act of the Legislature.
Section 215(b) is void because: (1) It undertakes to delegate legislative authority to a body not legislative in character and not consisting of elected representatives, but only of those who happen to vote, and because such method of making laws does not provide for any investigation by persons who vote for or against the law. Section 215(b) introduces an entirely new principle of government which is not found in the original charter of Atlanta, or in any act amendatory thereof, by providing for direct legislation by the people of the city of Atlanta without the concurrence of the city council or the Legislature, and even providing that an "act of the city council" could be repealed in a popular election. (2) The act is void, because it is in conflict with article 1, § 1, par. 3, of the Constitution of the state of Georgia (Civil Code 1910, § 6359), which provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law." (3) Section 215(b) is unconstitutional and void, because it violates article 3, § 7, par. 8, of the Constitution of the state of Georgia (Civil Code 1910, § 6437), which provides: "No law or ordinance shall pass which refers to more than one subject-matter, or contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof." The title of the act is, "An act to amend an act establishing a new charter for the city of Atlanta, approved February 28, 1874, and the several acts amendatory thereof, and for other purposes," and the subject-matter of section 215(b) is different from what is expressed in the title of the act and is not germane to the amending of statutes only providing for mayor and council form of the government.
The act of the General Assembly purporting to amend the charter of the City of Atlanta, found in Georgia Laws of 1913, pp. 507 to 604, inclusive, consists of 217 sections as well as a number of subsections. Section 215 provides that:
"The foregoing acts [sections] shall not become effective nor of force unless the majority of the qualified voters of the city of Atlanta voting at a special election *** shall vote in favor thereof."
Section 215 then provides how the question of adopting the foregoing section shall be submitted to a popular vote of the people, but that section also provides that:
The section attacked by the petitioner in this case (215 [b]), in so far as necessary to be quoted, is as follows:
The remainder of the section provides the rules and regulations under which the question of adoption shall be submitted to the people. Other allegations in the petition are immaterial to the decision, and need not be stated.
The trial judge rendered judgment as follows:
"The within application for injunction coming on for a hearing, it is ordered that same be denied and the restraining order is revoked, except that section 2 of the ordinance, with reference to increases according to increases in pay of postal employees, is enjoined."
The plaintiff excepted to so much of the judgment as refused an injunction as to the entire ordinance. The defendants excepted to that part which held section 2 of the ordinance invalid.
A. H. Davis, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
J. L. Mayson, C. S. Winn and Troutman & Troutman, all of Atlanta, for defendants in error.
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