Green v. Copperstone Ltd. Partnership
| Decision Date | 04 November 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 40,40 |
| Citation | 28 Md.App. 498,346 A.2d 686 |
| Parties | Helen GREEN v. COPPERSTONE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Steven J. Fox, Columbia and Geraid R. Walsh, Baltimore, with whom wre Talkin & Abramson, Columbia, on the brief, for appellant.
Louis A. Becker, Ellicott City, with whom were Lewis Straughn Nippard and Sybert, Sybert & Nippard, Ellicott City, on the brief, for appellee.
Argued before MENCHINE, LOWE and MELVIN, JJ.
This case reaches us on certiorari to the Circuit Court for Howard County. The litigation had been initiated by Copperstone Limited Partnership (Landlord) against Helen Green (Tenant) in the District Court for Howard County by a Complaint in Ejectment-Tenant Holding Over, under Real Property Article § 8-402 1 of the Annotated Code of Maryland. After hearing in the District Court, judgment of restitution of leased premises to the landlord was extended. Tenant appealed to the Circuit Court for Howard County. After hearing on appeal, monetary judgment against tenant and a warrant of restitution to landlord was entered in the Circuit Court. A stay of execution of judgment was granted pending petition for certiorari.
Tenant occupied apartment 4 of 5858 Stevens Forest Road, Columbia, Maryland under a written lease executed by both landlord and tenant. The lease, dated December 17, 1971, was for the term of twelve (12) months beginning on that date, at a monthly rental of $137.00. Landlord and tenant agreed that the fair market rental of the premises was $215.52 monthly. [346 A.2d 689] Paragraph 4 of the lease read as follows:
After tenant had continued in possession under that lease for almost three years she received the following letter by certified mail:
'September 5, 1974
Ms. Helen Green
5858-4 Stevens Forest Road
Columbia, Maryland 21045
Dear Ms. Green:
This letter is to constitute a thirty-day (30-day) written notice of our intent to terminate the month-to-month lease agreement between yourself and Copperstone Limited Partnership, as called for in Page 2, Paragraph 4, of your lease for the unit at 5858-4 Stevens Forest Road, and to notify you that you must vacate the premises on or by October 31, 1974. Should you fail to do so, you will be considered a tenant holding over, and appropriate measures will be instituted.
It is our duty, under the law, to advise you that if you hold over beyond the expiration of this term ending October 31, 1974, you can be held liable for double the amount of rent apportioned for the duration of the hold-over.
Your monthly rent for September and October must be paid as usual per your lease agreement.
Failure to do so will afford immediate appropriate legal action prior to the October 31st termination date.
Sincerely,
PATRICIA L. WEYHRAUCH
Resident Manager
Copperstone Circle Apartments.'
When tenant refused to vacate the premises on October 31, 1974, the landlord filed its complaint in the District Court for Howard County seeking restitution of the premises pursuant to the cited provisions of the Annotated Code of Maryland.
For reasons that will become apparent we emphasize at this point that both the notice to the tenant and the complaint against her for restitution as filed in the District Court declared that expiration of the term of the lease was the sole ground for termination of the tenancy, and no other cause was assigned.
The case presents the issues: (a) whether an apartment complex developed pursuant to section 236 of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z-1 et seq.) involves such government action that a landlord must assure due process of law before eviction of a tenant may occur; (b) whether the appellant, as a tenant in such a facility, acquired such a property right as entitled her to the protection accorded by the due process of law provisions of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States; and (c) whether eviction may be based solely upon expiration of a lease.
Appellant tenant contends that procedural due process demands that there be notice of eviction and a hearing to determine if good cause exists for eviction, and that the mere expiration of the term of a lease is not good cause. Appellant concedes that the provisions for a hearing set forth in the Real Property Article § 8-402 comply with procedural due process requirements, if notice and proof at the hearing demonstrate good cause for eviction.
Appellee landlord contends that the litigation is between private parties contesting their respective contractual rights under a Maryland statute authorizing eviction, after notice, when the term of the lease has expired, and that there is no constitutional bar to her eviction.
Section 236 of the National Housing Act, as amended, (12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z-1) is a statutory scheme seeking to achieve improved housing at reduced rentals for low and middle income families. The statutory aim is accomplished in part by governmental rent supplements to some tenants and in part by periodic federal government payments of interest for owners to mortgagees who meet the special requirements of the section. Among project owners authorized to participate in the statutory scheme are limited dividend corporations or other limited entities. 2 Tenants of a section 236 facility include some who receive rent supplement payments; 3 and some whose monthly rent is on a sliding scale, depending on income, not less than a basic monthly rental charge and not more than a fair market monthly rental charge. 4 The tenant in the subject case pays only the basic monthly rental charge but does not receive a rent supplement.
In sum, landlord is a limited dividend owner of a multi-family apartment complex developed pursuant to section 236 of the National Housing Act (Title 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1715z-1-6) and tenant derives benefits under that section by virtue of being required to pay only the basic monthly rental of $137.00, rather than the fair market rental of $215.52.
In the subject project twenty-five tenants are subsidized by government provided rent supplements. The remaining one hundred seven tenants pay rent based on income, 5 varying from $137.00 to $215.52 monthly.
Tenant acknowledges that she received the letter notice dated September 5, 1974, supra, and that she executed a lease that included the provisions contained in paragraph 4 thereof, supra. She contends, however, that such paragraph 4 is invalid as applied to tenancies arising under section 236 of the National Housing Act. Landlord acknowledges that the apartment was constructed under section 236 of the National Housing Act, as amended.
That the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments affect only Federal and State action, and do not relate to the conduct of private individuals is firmly fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court. The Fifth Amendment 'is a limitation only upon the powers of the general government.' Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382, 16 S.Ct. 986, 988, 41 L.Ed. 196, 198. It is not directed against the action of individuals. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 46 S.Ct. 521, 70 L.Ed. 969. The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment 'have reference to state action exclusively, and not to any action of private individuals.' Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318, 25 L.Ed. 667, 669. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 3 S.Ct. 18, 21, 27 L.Ed. 835, 839. 'It is obvious that (neither) of these amendments prohibited private individuals from entering into contracts respecting the control and disposition of their own property. * * *' Corrigan v. Buckley, supra, at 330, 46 S.Ct. 523, 70 L.Ed. at 972.
Thus, it would appear at first blush that the subject case involves no Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment issue.
There are, however, Supreme Court decisions exemplified by American Communications Asso., C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed. 925, declaring that:
'* * * when authority derives in part from Government's thumb on the scales, the exercise of that power by private persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to its exercise by Government itself.' (at 401, 70 S.Ct. at 685, 94 L.Ed. at 945)
Thus in Public Utilities Comm. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 72 S.Ct. 813, 96 L.Ed. 1068, the Capital Transit Company, a privately owned corporation contracted with a privately owned radio broadcasting company for radio programs to be received and amplified in busses operated by the transit company. Protesting passengers who were compelled to listen, argued that their Fifth Amendment right to liberty was infringed. The Supreme Court, although denying that the facts showed violation of Fifth Amendment rights, acknowledged its obligation to pass upon the constitutional issue, saying in 343 U.S. at 461, 72 S.Ct. at 820, 96 L.Ed. at 1076-77:
'It was held by the court below that the action of Capital Transit in installing and operating the radio receivers, coupled with the action of the Public Utilities Commission in dismissing its own investigation of the practice, sufficiently involved the Federal Government in responsibility for the radio programs to make the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States applicable to this radio service.'
adding in 343 U.S. at 462, 72 S.Ct. at 820, 96 L.Ed. at 1077:
'We find in the reasoning of the court below a sufficiently close relation between the Federal Government and the radio service to make...
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