Green v. Garland

• Decision Date: 03 May 2022
• Docket Number: C. A. 4:21-cv-2514-SAL-KDW
• Parties: Juantia Green, Plaintiff, v. Merrick Garland, Attorney General Department of Justice; Bureau of Prisons, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

Juantia Green, Plaintiff, v. Merrick Garland, Attorney General Department of Justice; Bureau of Prisons, Defendants.

C. A. No. 4:21-cv-2514-SAL-KDW

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Florence Division

May 3, 2022

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Kaymani D. West, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Juantia Green (“Plaintiff” or “Green”) filed the instant employment action against her former employer, the federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP,” the “Agency,” or “Defendant”),^[1]bringing claims of disability-related discrimination and retaliation. Compl., ECF No. 1. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation (R&R) on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 8, to which Plaintiff has responded, ECF No 9. Based on the parties' submissions and applicable law the undersigned recommends that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 8, be granted in part and denied in part and this matter proceed to discovery.

I. Background

Plaintiff was formerly employed by BOP as a Correctional Officer at the Federal Correctional Institution, Williamsburg (“FCI Williamsburg”). Plaintiff went out of work on medical leave in early 2014. She has filed three separate Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) claims since then; however, only the third such claim is the subject of this litigation. See Pl. Mem. 4, ECF No. 9.

According to Plaintiff's Complaint, her Third EEO Claim-BOP-2019-0882 & EEOC No. 410-202000354X (Case 3)-concerns “Plaintiff's mistreatment after work injury when she was returned to work August 2018, but no interactive accommodation search was performed by Defendant.” Compl. ¶ 7.^[2] Somewhat conflictingly, Plaintiff's Complaint also describes Case 3 as having been initiated by “certified letter to Defendants dated October 25, 2018, requesting ‘to initiate a third EEO complaint regarding failure to accommodate and reprisal from May 2015 to the present as BOP continues to discriminate and retaliate against Juantia Green Presently.'” Compl. ¶ 8; see also id. ¶ 10 (averring “Defendant[] ignored Plaintiff's request for hearing to properly state the issue was failure to accommodate and reprisal from May 2015 to termination January 30, 2019.”).^[3]

Plaintiff's Complaint includes causes of action pursuant to Titles I and II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and Sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1983 (“Rehabilitation Act”). Compl., ECF No. 1.^[4] Defendant responded to Plaintiff's Complaint by bringing the instant Motion to Dismiss seeking Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) dismissal based on Plaintiff's alleged failure to exhaust remedies or, alternatively, her failure to state a plausible claim.

Mot. Dism., ECF No. 8. In support of its Motion Defendant has submitted a memorandum of law (Def. Mem., ECF No. 8-1), as well as the declaration of BOP Assistant General Counsel Marie Clarke, which provides details and documents regarding the EEO actions (“Clarke Decl.,” ECF No. 8-2). Plaintiff opposes the Motion to Dismiss, asserting her federal-court Complaint and her EEO action were timely brought and that she has exhausted administrative remedies. She submits part of her argument relates to disputed facts concerning equitable tolling and argues Rule 12(b) dismissal would be premature. Further, she briefly submits she has sufficiently pleaded plausible disability-related claims. Alternatively, she seeks leave to amend to provide additional detail in an amended pleading. Pl. Mem., ECF No. 9. Defendant did not submit a reply.

II. Standard of review and what may be considered

A. Applicable review standard

Defendant seeks Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal of Plaintiff's claims based on her alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies and Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Plaintiff's entire Complaint for failure to plead plausible claims. Def. Mot., ECF No. 8. As an initial matter, Defendant's challenges concerning failure to administratively exhaust remedies before the Agency and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and timely filing of this litigation more properly are considered pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Fort Bend Cnty., Tx. v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 1843, 1850- 51 (2019) (holding “Title VII's charge-filing requirement is a processing rule, albeit a mandatory one, not a jurisdictional prescription delineating the adjudicatory authority of courts.”).^[5] Because “Rehabilitation Act claims against the federal government must comply with the same administrative procedures that govern federal employee Title VII claims[,]” Wilkinson v. Rumsfeld, 100 Fed. App'x 155, 157 (4th Cir. 2004), Fort Bend County's ruling applies to Rehabilitation Act claims, as well. See Lee v. Esper, No. CV 3:18-3606-TLW-KFM, 2019 WL 7403969, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 13, 2019) (noting challenge to administrative-exhaustion requirements appropriately considered under Rule 12(b)(6)), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 32526 (D.S.C. Jan. 2, 2020). Accordingly, all grounds of Defendant's Motion are considered pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

“A motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). The court measures the legal sufficiency by determining whether the complaint meets the Rule 8 standards for a pleading. Id. The Supreme Court considered the issue of well-pleaded allegations, explaining the interplay between Rule 8(a) and Rule 12(b)(6) in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . .

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556)). When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The court is also to “‘draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.'” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009)). Although a court must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true, this is inapplicable to legal conclusions, and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, factual allegations must support the complaint for it to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 679. Therefore, a pleading that provides only “labels and conclusions” or “naked assertion[s]” lacking “some further factual enhancement” will not satisfy the requisite pleading standard. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557. Further, the court “need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs., Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). At bottom, the court is mindful that a complaint “need only give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Apps., 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. What may be considered

Here Defendant has submitted the Declaration of Assistant General Counsel Clarke as well as nearly 80 pages of exhibits in support of the Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 8-2. In response, Plaintiff has submitted six pages of exhibits (as well as a file-stamped copy of the Complaint in this matter). ECF No. 10, 10-1. Typically, in cases such as this one in which no discovery has yet taken place, additional exhibits are not considered. “In deciding whether a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss, a court evaluates the complaint in its entirety, as well as documents attached or incorporated into the complaint.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d at 448. The court may consider such a document, even if it is not attached to the complaint, if the document “was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint,” and there is no authenticity challenge. Id. at 448 (quoting Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 1999)). See also Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Haley, 832 F.Supp.2d 612, 622 (D.S.C. 2011) (“In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court . . . may also ‘consider documents attached to . . . the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.'”) (quoting Sec'y of State for Def. v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007)); Bowie v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys., No. CIV.A. ELH-14-03216, 2015 WL 1499465, at *6 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2015) (granting Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of plaintiff's ADA claim as time-barred and considering the EEOC Charge and Right to Sue Letter as being “integral” to the decision). However, if the court goes beyond these documents in...