Green v. Green

Decision Date30 September 1897
Citation27 S.E. 952,50 S.C. 514
PartiesGREEN et al. v. GREEN et al.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Richland county; O. W Buchanan, Judge.

Action by Frederick L. Green (as administrator of the estate of Allen J. Green, deceased, and as administrator of the estate of Frederick L. Green, deceased, and also in his own right) William G. Green, G. Washington Pringle, Allen C. Green Walter G. Green, Sally S. Green, Allen J. Green (of Alabama) Walter Green, and Martha C. Green against Lucy J. Green, Halcott P. Green (as trustee), Sally G. Heyward, Lucy P. Heyward, Nathaniel B. Heyward, Halcott P. Green (as administrator of the estate of Halcott P. Green, deceased, and also as administrator of the estate of John S. Green, deceased, and also in his own right), Allen J. Green (of South Carolina), Eliza G. Singleton, M. Caroline Jervey, Walter Izard, Henry Izard, Allen Izard, Izard Heyward, and Frederick G. De Saussure to declare a trust, etc. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the answer, defendants other than Frederick G. De Saussure appeal. Affirmed and remanded.

The exceptions and grounds of appeal are as follows:

"Defendants except to the order of Judge Buchanan upon the following grounds: (1) Because it appears from the pleadings that the foundation of the plaintiffs' claim and that of the defendants to the relief sought by them is one and the same, to wit, the will of Lucy P. Green, deceased, and hence the defense or counterclaim is a proper one, under the laws of this state; and the judge erred in not so holding. (2) Because it appears from the complaint that the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action is derived by inheritance from devisees under the will of Lucy P. Green, deceased; and, it being admitted by the demurrer that the ancestors of the plaintiffs are indebted to the estate of Lucy P. Green, plaintiffs, take the assets descended, charged with the debt of their respective ancestors, and must account for such debts before they can receive any portion of said estate; and the judge erred in not so holding. And (3) because one of said devisees, to wit, Allen J. Green, being also one of the executors of the said Lucy P. Green, the plaintiffs who inherit through him can take no assets of the said estate until accounting is had of his executorship; and the judge erred in not so holding. (4) Because, the demurrer admitting that the contract of insurance only covered the interest of the life tenant, the defendant Lucy J. Green, as matter of law the remainder-men can have no interest in the insurance money; and the judge erred in not so holding. (5) Because, even if the contract of insurance be held, as matter of public policy or law, to redound to the benefit of the remainder-men, the defendant Lucy J. Green must be reimbursed the insurance premiums and repairs made necessary by the casualties of war, the same having been paid out of her private funds; and the judge erred in not so holding. (6) Because the insurance money arising from the destruction of the dwelling house by fire became personal; property, and, if it passed at all under the will of Lucy P. Green, became a part of the residuary estate, and, the answer alleging and the demurrer admitting an original failure of assets, the defense was proper either as a counterclaim or set-off; and the judge erred in not so holding. (7) That under section 292 of the Code, and the general principles of equity jurisprudence, all parties in interest being before the court (Halcott P. Green, one of the defendants, being admitted by the demurrer to be the administrator de bonis non of the estate of Lucy P. Green), the defendants have the right to have all matters arising under the will of Lucy P. Green, and germane to the settlement of her estate, adjusted in this action, even though the matter be subject for an independent cause of action, if for no other purpose, to prevent circuity of action and multiplicity of suits; and the judge erred in not so holding. (8) Because his honor erred in referring all the issues of fact to the master, whereas it is submitted that the defendants not having consented to such order, it should have been referred only to take the testimony and report the same to the court."

The motion to dismiss is as follows: "Defendants (appellants) move the supreme court to dismiss the complaint herein because it appears from the face thereof that the same does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants, in that (1) it fails to allege facts sufficient to show any obligation on the part of the life tenant to keep the buildings insured, or that the insurance effected by life tenant was taken to protect the interest of the remainder-men; (2) it fails to allege that the amount received by the life tenant from the insurance company upon the burning of the dwelling exceeded the value of her interest therein; (3) that from the facts stated, as matter of law, the money arising from the insurance is the sole property of the defendant Lucy J. Green, and neither the plaintiffs not their ancestor, who were remainder-men under the will of Lucy P. Green, deceased, have any interest therein; and, failing in this, (4) that if the remainder-men under the will of Lucy P. Green have any interest in the said money arising from the insurance, as matter of law, that interest is the right to receive, upon the death of the defendant Lucy J. Green, the life tenant, only so much of the $3,000, insurance money, as remains after deducting all premiums of insurance that have been paid, without any interest, and without any profits or accretions that may have arisen from its use; and, there being no allegation of insolvency, there is neither a resulting trust nor a case for equitable interference made by the complaint."

Jones, J., dissenting.

Allen J. Green and Halcott P. Green, for appellants.

Robert W. Shand, for respondents.

POPE J.

This action was commenced on the 28th May, 1896, in the court of common pleas for Richland county. The complaint alleged, in substance.

In first paragraph: That Lucy P. Green, widow, late of the city of Columbia, in this state, departed this life on the 6th day of April, 1864, leaving of force her last will and testament whereby, in the first item thereof, she devised as follows: "1st. I devise and bequeath to my daughter, Lucy J. Green, my house and lot in Columbia, my present residence, together with all the furniture and things appurtenant in the house and kitchen. The lot contains one acre and a half, and is separated by a fence from my adjoining lot. This devise is made to her for life, for her sole and separate use, not subject to debts, contracts, or control of any husband with whom she may intermarry. At her death I devise and bequeath the same to my four sons, Allen J. Green Halcott P. Green, Frederick L. Green, and John S. Green, and the children of my daughter, Lucy, if she should have any living at her death, they taking among them one share. If she leaves none living at her death, then to my four sons." "(2) That the defendant Lucy J. Green, who is the devisee for life named in said will, immediately after the death of said testatrix took possession of the said lot of land, and, in person or by her tenants, occupied the dwelling house thereon until its destruction by fire in the year 1878. (3) That prior to said fire the said Lucy J. Green, the life tenant, had caused said dwelling house to be insured against fire, and, the said fire having occurred while the said policy or policies of insurance were in force, the said Lucy J. Green received early in 1878, under said policy or policies, and on account of said loss by fire, the sum of three thousand dollars, which was paid to her by the insurance company or companies which had underwritten such policy or policies. (4) That no portion of the insurance money so received by the said Lucy J. Green on account of the loss of the dwelling house on the lot of which she is life tenant under her mother's said will was used in rebuilding on said lot of land so held by Lucy J. Green for life, but, though said money was held by her in trust for the remainder-men under her mother's said will, it was wholly used by her in the purchase of a tract of land in and near the city of Columbia, known as the 'Brickyard Tract, containing 418 acres, more or less, and hereinafter more particularly described, and was further used in the purchase of one acre of land at the northeast corner of Pendleton and Bull streets, in the city of Columbia, S. C., bounded north by the life-estate lot first above described, and east by Amy Taylor's; that other money used by said Lucy J. Green in making said purchase, with perhaps some inconsiderable exception, was obtained by her borrowing the sum of ten thousand dollars on the security mortgage of the said brickyard tract, which was afterwards paid off and satisfied out of the proceeds of sale of said brickyard tract made by her in the year 1891. (5) That on the 6th January, 1879, the said Lucy J. Green purchased at judicial sale the said brickyard tract for the sum of $2,500, and received title deed thereto, and all the money paid by her on account of such purchase was received by her on account of said fire insurance and said loan, and was applied to a first mortgage covering said brickyard tract, to costs and expenses of sale, and to a second mortgage and costs, which had been previously purchased by her with a portion of the said insurance money. (6) That on the 2d of February, 1880, the said Lucy J. Green purchased at sheriff's sale the said one-acre lot at the corner of Pendleton and Bull streets in Columbia, S. C., for the sum of $690, and received a title thereto. A...

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1 cases
  • Underwood v. Fortune
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • September 28, 1928
    ...by the life tenant, it is on the theory that the life tenant holds the remainderman's share in trust for him. Green v. Green, 50 S. C. 514, 27 S. E. 952, 62 Am. St. Rep. 846; Welsh v. London Assurance Corporation, 151 Pa. 607, 25 A. 142, 31 Am. St. Rep. 786. While the cause here was not tri......

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