Green v. Harrington

• Decision Date: 27 November 1972
• Docket Number: No. 5--6103,5--6103
• Citation: 253 Ark. 496,487 S.W.2d 612
• Parties: Louis A. GREEN, Appellant, v. Hosea A. HARRINGTON et al., Appellees.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 612

487 S.W.2d 612

253 Ark. 496

Louis A. GREEN, Appellant, v. Hosea A. HARRINGTON et al., Appellees.

No. 5--6103.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Nov. 27, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 8, 1973.

Kenneth Coffelt, Little Rock, for appellant.

John I. Purtle, Little Rock, for appellees.

HOLT, Justice.

The appellant, a school teacher, brought this action against the appellees, members of the Board of the Pulaski County School District, alleging that the appellees had 'unlawfully breached their said contract with' appellant by terminating his contract although appellant had offered to continue performance. He sought compensation for the alleged balance due on his annual written contract. It was stipulated that the appellant had served appellees in a teaching capacity for the preceding 13 years. The trial court, sitting as a jury, found that appellees had just cause in discharging appellant; that in doing so the appellees did not act arbitrarily or capriciously; and that the appellees had offered the appellant all available administrative remedies. Appellant contends for reversal of the judgment that the trial court erred in denying judgment to the appellant against the appellees upon his 'motion and as prayed for in the complaint because the judgment of the trial court is contrary to the evidence in the case and the applicable law, the facts being that there is a clear, unjustifiable breach of the contract * * *, without any just cause.'

It is an oft stated rule that it is the function of the jury or the trial court sitting as a jury to determine the preponderance of the evidence, and we affirm if there is any substantial evidence to support the finding after reviewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the appellee. Fanning v. Hembree Oil Co., 245 Ark. 825, 434 S.W.2d 822 (1968). Before we reverse the finding of a jury or a trial court sitting as a jury, it must appear to us that '(T)here is no reasonable probability that the incident occurred as found by the trial court sitting as a jury.' Fanning v. Hembree Oil Co., supra, Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 245 Ark. 81, 431 S.W.2d 256 (1968). In the case at bar we are of the view there is substantial evidence to sustain the trial court's action.

Appellant was placed on probation in writing during the 1970--1971 school term for assertedly having an unprofessional attitude and failing to maintain a proper standard of teacher-student relationship. He was later advised that this complaint had been corrected and was rehired for the 1971--1972 school year term. A few months after the beginning of the new term he was suspended by written notice which detailed four reasons for the suspension. Appellees afforded the appellant an opportunity to be heard before the board to make an explanation and refute the written accusations upon which his suspension was based. Appellant appeared by counsel and refused to offer any explanation on the theory that the burden was upon the appellees to adduce proof to sustain the charges against him. He was offered another similar hearing which he refused to attend upon advice of counsel. Appellant, also, was offered the opportunity to appear before the Pulaski Association of Classroom Teachers (PACT). This is a voluntary organization which exists as a policy of the School District. This committee is composed of four classroom teachers (elected by the teachers), two principals (selected by the principals), and one administrative staff member (chosen by the administrative staff). The appellant, with his counsel, appeared before this committee and declined to discuss the charges on the basis that the committee was illegally convened and had no statutory authority. It appears that the purpose of the committee was to investigate and hear complaints concerning teachers and merely offer recommendations. The committee recommended suspension to the appellees. Upon being discharged by appellees, the appellant filed his complaint in Circuit Court alleging unlawful breach of his contract and seeking the balance due on his contract for the current school term.

Evidence was adduced before the trial court that a bottle of alcoholic beverage was transported from appellant's car by a ninth grade student to the school cafeteria refrigerator at appellant's request. Later in the day the bottle was removed from the refrigerator and placed in appellant's car by the same student as directed by appellant. This was one of the four written accusations. Appellant admitted the incident; however he denied that the bottle contained any alcohol. The bottle was introduced by appellant as an exhibit and it is labeled a 'WHISKEY SOUR MIX' and is non-alcoholic with no liquor stamp. Appellant's...