Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 January 1992
• Docket Number: 91-C-0860,Nos. 91-C-0859,s. 91-C-0859
• Citation: 593 So.2d 634
• Parties: Michael J. GREEN, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. INDUSTRIAL HELICOPTERS, INC.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 634

593 So.2d 634

1992 A.M.C. 1426

Michael J. GREEN, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. INDUSTRIAL HELICOPTERS, INC.

Nos. 91-C-0859, 91-C-0860.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 17, 1992.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 20, 1992.

Nicholas Gachassin, Jr., Gachassin, Hunter & Sigur and Mary Ann Olson, Lafayette, for applicant.

Karl W. Bengtson, Shelton and Legendre, Lafayette, and Charles Sonnier, and Fred W. Davis, Sonnier, Hebert, Cabes & Hebert, Abbeville, for respondent.

CALOGERO, Chief Justice.

The narrow question presented in this case is whether Louisiana Civil Code article 2317 ¹, which imposes strict liability for injury causing things in one's custody, is applicable in a case cognizable in admiralty but brought in a Louisiana state court pursuant to the "savings to suitors" clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as amended.

Originally, the court of appeal held that plaintiff could recover under La.C.C. art. 2317 for an injury in a helicopter crash at sea. Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc., 560 So.2d 684 (La.App. 3d Cir.1990). We granted writs and remanded to the third circuit court of appeal to determine whether the decision was in conflict with another out of the same circuit, Duhon v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 554 So.2d 1270 (La.App. 3 Cir.1989), writ denied, 559 So.2d 1360 (La.1990), and if so, to determine which decision is correct. Upon remand, the court of appeal found its original decision, ² that recovery was available under Article 2317, inconsistent with Duhon, supra, and that Duhon was correct. Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc., 576 So.2d 1183 (La.App. 3d Cir.1991). We granted writs once more to examine that determination.

For the reasons which follow we reverse the court of appeal and hold that Article 2317 applies as a supplement to the remedies available under the general maritime law in this maritime personal injury case, since Article 2317 does not impermissibly conflict with the substantive general maritime law.

Plaintiff, Michael J. Green was employed as an offshore oil meter technician for Southern Petroleum Labs ("Southern"). Southern contracted with Industrial Helicopters, Inc. ("Industrial") to carry workers from Louisiana shore sites to offshore platforms. Doug Wright was employed by Industrial as a helicopter pilot. There occurred an emergency helicopter landing on the high seas approximately 150 miles off the Louisiana coast. Plaintiff's lawsuit, filed in the Fifteenth Judicial District Court, State of Louisiana, named as defendants the pilot of the aircraft, Wright, and the pilot's employer, Industrial.

Wright picked up the plaintiff in Milton, Louisiana. From there plaintiff was to be taken to his worksite in the Gulf of Mexico from which he was later to be returned to Milton. En route to the worksite, the pilot refueled at an Exxon platform located 140 miles off the coast of the State of Louisiana. After refueling and soon after taking off from the Exxon platform, mechanical failure caused the pilot to make an emergency landing in the Gulf. The helicopter's governor had malfunctioned. Workers on the nearby Exxon platform assisted in the rescue of plaintiff and the pilot. Plaintiff suffered injuries in the emergency landing and in the rescue.

Generally, federal maritime jurisdiction is invoked whenever an accident occurs on the high seas and in furtherance of an activity bearing a significant relationship to a traditional maritime activity. Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986); Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 93 S.Ct. 493, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972). The United States Supreme Court has stated that although a helicopter is not a "traditional maritime conveyance", when it is used to ferry passengers from an island to the shore or vice versa it is engaged in a function traditionally performed by waterborne vessels. Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 217, 106 S.Ct. at 2492.

The United States Constitution grants to federal district courts jurisdiction in all "cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." U.S. Const. art. III, section 2, Rodrigue v. Legros, 563 So.2d 248, 251 (La.1990). State courts, however, have concurrent jurisdiction by virtue of the "savings to suitors" clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789. ³ This case, although within the federal admiralty jurisdiction, is brought in state court pursuant to the savings clause.

It is well settled that by virtue of the savings clause "a state, 'having concurrent jurisdiction, is free to adopt such remedies, and to attach to them such incidents as it sees fit' so long as it does not attempt to make changes in the substantive maritime law." (citations omitted) Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 221, 106 S.Ct. at 2494. As a general proposition, "[a] maritime claim brought in the common law state courts ... is governed by the same principles as govern actions brought in admiralty, i.e., by federal maritime law." Powell v. Offshore Navigation, Inc., 644 F.2d 1063, 1065 n. 5 (5th Cir.1981), See also T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law Sec. 4-1 at 123 (1987) [hereinafter, Schoenbaum]. Since the general maritime law is not a "complete or all inclusive system," a federal court may adopt state statutory law and common law principles as the federal admiralty rule. Schoenbaum, supra, Sec. 4-1 at 123. State law and regulations may also supplement federal maritime law when "there is no conflict between the two systems of law, and the need for uniformity of decision does not bar state action". Id. at 123.

The U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the difficulty in defining the interplay of state law and federal maritime law, and has stated: "if one thing is clear it is that the source of law in saving-clause actions cannot be described in absolute terms." Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 at 373, 79 S.Ct. 468 at 480, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959). Indeed, as Justice Dennis of this court has commented, "[d]espite [a] multitude of cases involving maritime situations, the Court has developed no clear test for determining when such application is appropriate and when it violates the Constitution." Rodrigue v. Legros, 563 So.2d at 253. The question whether La.C.C. art. 2317 applies under these circumstances is a res nova issue in this court. Nor has the U.S. Supreme Court directly addressed whether strict custodial liability may be part of the general maritime law, nor expressly authorized Louisiana's supplementation in that fashion for cases properly within Louisiana courts' jurisdiction and tried in those courts. ⁴

The process of determining the applicability of state law in cases within the admiralty jurisdiction has been described as:

one of accommodation, entirely familiar in many areas of overlapping state and federal concern, or a process somewhat analogous to the normal conflict of laws situation where two sovereignties assert divergent interests in a transaction as to which both have some concern. Kossick [v. United Fruit Co.], supra [365 U.S. 731] at 738 [81 S.Ct. 886 at 892, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) ].

Thus, state law may be applied where the state's interest in a matter is greater than the federal interest. This principle, applying the state rule in a matter within the admiralty jurisdiction when the state interest outweighs the federal interest, has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 80 S.Ct. 813, 4 L.Ed.2d 852 (1960) (allowed City of Detroit to impose the requirements of its smoke control regulations on vessels coming to the city, even though vessel owners met federal standards); Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 61 S.Ct. 687, 85 L.Ed. 903 (1941) (allowed state survival action to supplement maritime law); Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit, 264 U.S. 109, 44 S.Ct. 274, 68 L.Ed. 582 (1924) (allowed state court to compel arbitration under arbitration provision of maritime contract reasoning that since it was a valid clause under admiralty law, it was proper to substitute a different and more effective remedy); Cf. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 81 S.Ct. 886, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (the U.S. Supreme Court utilized an interest balancing approach but concluded that the need for a uniform rule regarding contracts required allowing the federal rule to prevail).

Louisiana has a strong interest in applying its own law in this case: Plaintiff is a Louisiana resident, Industrial a Louisiana corporation, the pilot a Louisiana resident, and the helicopter was stored in a Louisiana hangar. The contract of carriage between plaintiff's employer and defendants was confected in Louisiana. The mission started in Louisiana and was to end in Louisiana. Plaintiff and defendants, more likely than not, expected to be governed by Louisiana law.

Moreover, La.C.C. art. 2317 embodies a strong social policy to place liability with the owner or custodian of an injury causing thing. This type of liability is not imposed exclusively on helicopter or aircraft owners. Article 2317 liability is imposed on owners and custodians of any thing which, because of an unreasonably dangerous condition, causes injury to another. Also, in the personal injury area states have much freedom to provide redress for their citizens.

In Daigle v. Coastal Marine, Inc., 488 So.2d 679, 681 (La.1986) we stated:

When congress is silent on a particular question, there is no bar to application of a state statute to its own citizens on the high seas. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 61 S.Ct. 924 [85 L.Ed. 1193 (1941) ], reh. den. 313 U.S. 599, 61 S.Ct. 1093 (1941). Louisiana can extend the protection of LSA--C.C. art. 2315 to its constitutional limits in personal injury actions involving Louisiana residents where Louisiana has a strong interest in the transaction and there is no conflict with federal law. (citation omitted).

Accordingly, a Louisiana state court should respect Louisiana law unless there...