Rodrigue v. LeGros

• Decision Date: 04 June 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-C-2828,89-C-2828
• Citation: 563 So.2d 248
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: Craig A. RODRIGUE and Martha Rodrigue v. Elery J. LeGROS and Mobil Exploration & Producing North America, Inc.

Page 248

563 So.2d 248

Craig A. RODRIGUE and Martha Rodrigue v. Elery J. LeGROS and Mobil Exploration & Producing North America, Inc.

No. 89-C-2828.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 4, 1990.

Dissenting Opinion

June 19, 1990.

Rehearing Denied June 28, 1990.

Richard S. Vale, Jr., Virgil A. Lacy, III, Blue, Williams, Buckley, Metairie, for Craig Rodrigue, plaintiff-applicant.

Mark A. Lowe, Lafayette, for Mobil Exploration, defendant-respondent.

George D. Ernest, III, Lafayette, for Elery J. LeGros, defendent-respondent.

Norval J. Rhodes, Houma, for Elery J. LeGros, defendant-respondent.

DENNIS, Justice. ^*

In this maritime personal injury case brought in state court pursuant to the savings to suitors clause, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1333(1), we must determine the validity and scope of an indemnity provision in a contract providing for the drilling of an oil well from a vessel in navigable waters. The plaintiff in this action, an employee of the third party defendant-indemnitor, was injured while engaged in his employment as a result of alleged negligence of the defendant-indemnitee that was not related to the contract. The third-party defendant-indemnitor and its insurer argue that the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act, La.R.S. 9:2780, prohibits indemnity in this situation, and they alternatively claim that the fault of the indemnitee must arise out of the contract work for the injury to be considered one "resulting directly or indirectly" from the contract. Because we conclude that application of the Louisiana statute would interfere with the uniform features of the federal maritime law in violation of the federal constitution, and that an injury to an employee engaged in the contract work results from the work for the purposes of this contractual indemnity provision, we reject both of the indemnitor's contentions and affirm the judgment of the courts below.

Facts

Two "R" Drilling Company and Mobil Exploration & Producing Southeast entered into an agreement that Two "R" would provide Mobil with equipment and personnel for the drilling of an oil well from a vessel located on navigable waters in White Lake in Vermilion Parish. Under the contract, Two "R" was to provide a drilling rig and, inter alia, two crew boats and captains. As is standard in the offshore oil industry, the contract contained reciprocal indemnity agreements that sought to make each contracting party ultimately responsible for injuries to its own employees. The section pertinent to this case provided:

To the extent permitted by applicable law, and except as may otherwise be specifically provided herein, Contractor [Two "R"] shall defend, protect, indemnify and save Company [Mobil], its co-lessees and joint interest owners, their respective parent and/or affiliated companies and their respective employees, servants and agents, harmless against any and all claims, demands, causes of action and judgments of every kind and character, including indemnity claims, court costs and attorney's fees, arising directly or indirectly, by law, tort or contract, in favor of any person on account of personal injuries to or death of any employee, servant or agent of Contractor or any sub-contractor of Contractor, or damage to or loss of property of Contractor, any subcontractor, or their respective employees, servants or agents, occurring, growing out of, incident to, or resulting directly or indirectly from the Work, whether such loss, damage, injury, death or liability arises from or is contributed to by the fault or negligence in any form of Company, or its employees, servants or agents, or whether due to the imperfection of any material provided by Company or the premises themselves, whether latent or patent, or for any other cause whatsoever. This indemnification shall not be limited to or by the amounts or kinds of insurance carried by, or required to be carried by, Contractor.

A substantially identical paragraph protected Two "R" from claims by Mobil employees. The contract contained no choice of law clause.

While servicing the drilling rig pursuant to the contract, the Two "R" crewboat M/V PRISCILLA ANN collided with the M/V MISS SUPERIOR 77, a vessel owned and operated by Mobil. As a result of the collision, Craig Rodrigue, the captain of the Two "R" vessel and a Two "R" employee, was injured. The Mobil vessel was not engaged in work related to the drilling involved in the contract between Two "R" and Mobil. For the purposes of this motion for summary judgment, Mobil concedes that Elery LeGros, its employee and the captain of the M/V MISS SUPERIOR 77, negligently caused the collision.

Rodrigue brought suit against Mobil and LeGros. He alleged that the collision was caused solely by the negligence of Mobil and its employee LeGros. Mobil thereupon filed a third-party demand against Two "R" and its insurer, in which it sought indemnity and defense from Two "R" and its insurer pursuant to the provisions of the drilling contract. Two "R" filed a cross-claim seeking reimbursement of the maintenance and cure it had paid to Rodrigue. Both companies filed motions for summary judgment. After several hearings, the trial court ultimately denied Two "R" 's motion and dismissed its cross-claim with prejudice, and it rendered judgment in favor of Mobil requiring Two "R" to indemnify Mobil and to pay the costs and legal fees incurred by Mobil in defending the suit. Two "R" appealed suspensively, and the court of appeal affirmed. The appeals court found that the contract language required Two "R" to indemnify Mobil for Rodrigue's claim even though Mobil's employee was not engaged in work under the contract at the time of the accident. Rodrigue v. LeGros, 552 So.2d 703 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1989). Upon Two "R" 's application, we granted writs. 556 So.2d 1272 (La.1990).

What Law Governs

The parties concede, and the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently held, that a contract for oil and gas drilling aboard a vessel on navigable waters is a maritime contract. Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527 (5th Cir.1986); Corbitt v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 654 F.2d 329 (5th Cir.1981); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Mobile Drilling Barge Mr. Charlie, 424 F.2d 684 (5th Cir.1970); but see Lewis v. Glendel Drilling Co., 898 F.2d 1083 (5th Cir.1990) (applying the rule but questioning its persuasiveness). Suits on maritime contracts arise under the federal admiralty jurisdiction and thus call for the application of substantive federal maritime law. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 81 S.Ct. 886, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961); The Orleans, 11 Pet. 175, 9 L. Ed. 677 (1837); T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law Sec. 3-10 (1987). Since they are ancillary to the maritime obligations created by the contracts, indemnity agreements contained in these contracts are likewise governed by maritime law absent a valid choice of law clause. Angelina Cas. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 876 F.2d 40 (5th Cir.1989); Stoot v. Fluor Drilling Servs., 851 F.2d 1514 (5th Cir.1988); Lefler v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 785 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir.1986); Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., supra; Corbitt v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., supra; Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Mobile Drilling Barge Mr. Charlie, supra. Except for those in towage contracts, see Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 75 S.Ct. 629, 99 L.Ed. 911 (1955), indemnity provisions in maritime contracts are valid and enforceable. Sun Oil Co. v. Dalzell Towing Co., 287 U.S. 291, 53 S.Ct. 135, 77 L.Ed. 311 (1932); Lefler v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra. Two "R" urges, however, that Louisiana's strong interest in enforcing the Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act, La.R.S. 9:2780, requires that the Act be applied to invalidate the indemnity provision in this contract. We must therefore determine whether the state statute may be applied in derogation of the substantive maritime law.

Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution grants to the federal courts jurisdiction in all "cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." This constitutional language has been construed to provide the federal government not only judicial competence to decide maritime cases, but also the power to determine, whether by statute or judicial decision, what the substantive maritime law shall be. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959); T. Schoenbaum, supra, Sec. 3-1; G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty Sec. 1-16 (2d ed. 1975); D. Robertson, Admiralty and Federalism 136 (1970). In Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 38 S.Ct. 501, 62 L.Ed. 1171 (1918), the Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether a seaman could bring a common law negligence action based upon New York law against his employer, rather than being relegated to a maritime law action for maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness. In holding that New York law could not apply, the Court made explicit the rule that had been implicit in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. 1086 (1917):

[N]o state has power to abolish the well-recognized maritime rule concerning measure of recovery, and substitute therefor the full indemnity rule of the common law. Such a substitution would distinctly and definitely change or add to the settled maritime law; and it would be destructive of 'the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the states with each other or with foreign states.'

247 U.S. at 382, 38 S.Ct. at 503, 62 L.Ed. at 1176, quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, supra.

The Court went on to hold in later cases that the constitutional policy of uniformity in maritime law even prevented Congress from calling for the application of state workers' compensation laws by federal statute. Washington v. W.C. Dawson Co., 264 U.S. 219, 44 S.Ct. 302, 68 L.Ed. 646 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co....