Green v. Javits

• Decision Date: 23 May 1957
• Citation: 166 N.Y.S.2d 198,7 Misc.2d 312
• Parties: Application of Abner GREEN, individually as Treasurer of the American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born, and on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Respondent, v. Jacob K. JAVITS, as Attorney General of the State of New York, Petitioner.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 198

166 N.Y.S.2d 198

7 Misc.2d 312

Application of Abner GREEN, individually as Treasurer of the

American Committee for the Protection of Foreign

Born, and on behalf of himself and all

others similarly situated, Respondent, v. Jacob K. JAVITS, as Attorney General of the State of New

York, Petitioner.

Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County, Part I.

May 23, 1957.

Order Affirmed Oct. 22, 1957. See 167 N.Y.S.2d 431.

Blanch Freedman and Gloria Agrin, New York City, for respondent.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Jerome O. Glucksman, Long Beach, of counsel), for petitioner.

ARON STEUER, Justice.

The steps leading up to this application had their beginning in an exparte order obtained by the attorney-general to examine respondent pursuant to article 10-A of the Social Welfare Law. Respondent moved to vacate the order on the ground that it was not an organization of the kind contemplated in the statute. Special Term denied the motion but upon appeal the matter was remitted for the purpose of a hearing 'to determine whether there is reason to believe' respondent 'is, or purports to be, or has been or purported to be a charitable organization within the meaning of article 10-A of the Social Welfare Law.' Green v. Javits 1 A.D.2d 342, 149 N.Y.S.2d 854. Accordingly that issue was referred to the late Hon. Denis O'Leary Cohalan to hear and report thereon. The testimony was completed but the unfortunate death of the learned referee intervened before a report could be rendered. The parties thereupon stipulated that the Special Term could make the determination upon the record of the testimony and the exhibits.

At the outset the record is conclusive that respondent is engaged in the same type of activity and has conducted its affairs in the same way from the date of its organization up to the present time. So that there is no distinction between the past and the present and the effective date of the statute saw no change. It is true that at an annual meeting resolutions are adopted which are considered as statements of policy. These resolutions deal with particular situations and instances which respondent deems call for correction or action. These, of course, differ from year to year and indicate immediate objectives but throughout the purpose and general method of procedure has remained the same.

Respondent states that its purposes are fourfold--first to defend itself. By this is meant that respondent has been under attack as a subversive organization and some of its energies are necessarily devoted to resisting that attack. This is really not a purpose, though it doubtless consumes time of its executives. Its second purpose is declared to be informational--it publishes various periodicals which call attention to the immigration laws, to various situations arising in connection with deportation and denaturalization proceedings and a service for lawyers interested in such proceedings calling attention to recent decisions in this field. It also provides for lectures on this subject. Its third field is described as legislative which is agitating for repeal of laws on these subjects to which it objects. Lastly, what it describes as concern with the administration and application of existing laws. This consists of supplying counsel to people threatened with proceedings of this nature if they ask for counsel; assisting their counsel if they are attorneys not supplied by the respondent and will accept such assistance; and, seeking moral support for the respondents in these proceedings through publicity. Of 350 deportation cases in which respondent interested itself it supplied counsel in 47. It also maintains a bureau where people in the difficulties referred to can seek advice. The aid described is given to all who apply but the overwhelming majority of those who do apply are people whose stay here is endangered because of Communist affiliations. The respondent does seek to be selective in the sense that it gives the greatest attention and aid to proceedings which it believes to be test cases.

The question is whether such an organization is charitable within the definition of the Social Welfare Law. The definition given by the statute ( § 481): 'Any benevolent, philanthropic, patriotic, or eleemosynary person or one purporting to be such.' It excludes ( § 482-a) religious organizations and institutions operated by or in connection with religious organizations, educational institutions, fraternal, patriotic, social and alumni organizations which do not solicit outside their membership, and certain others of no application here.

In its general sense charity is any act done without expectation of profit which alleviates the condition of the handicapped or unfortunate, or tends to forward the progress of mankind. This definition or one of similar import is occasionally found in judicial decisions. See collection of authorities in Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, Mass., 539, at page 556 et seq. But it is comparatively rare. That is because the court is concerned with the precise meaning intended by a particular statute, will or other instrument. In this connection the definition given by the courts in interpreting the internal revenue laws can be of title assistance.

As a...