Green v. Saul
| Decision Date | 08 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | 19-cv-4704 (KAM) |
| Parties | IVORY GREEN, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW SAUL, COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 405(g), Ivory Green ("Plaintiff") appeals the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant"), which found that Plaintiff was not eligible for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("the Act") on the basis that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Plaintiff alleges that she is disabled under the Act and is thus entitled to receive the aforementioned benefits. (ECF No. 1, Complaint.) Plaintiff is alleging disability for the period from August 1, 2014 through August 1, 2016. (Id.; ECF No. 15, Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings ("Pl. Mem.") at 1.)
Presently before the court is Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings, (ECF No. 14, Notice of Motion; ECF No. 15, Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion ("Pl. Mem.")), Defendant's cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings, (ECF No. 16, Cross-Motion; ECF No. 17 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Cross-Motion ("Def. Mem.")), and Plaintiff's Reply (ECF No. 18, Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum of Law ("Pl. Reply").) For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED, Defendant's motion is DENIED, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum and Order.
The parties have submitted a joint stipulation of facts detailing Plaintiff's medical history and the administrative hearing testimony, which the court incorporates by reference. (See generally ECF No. 18-1, Joint Stipulation of Facts ("Stip.").) On December 21, 2015, the Plaintiff filed an application for DIB Benefits. (Pl. Mem. at 1.) On July 21, 2014, Plaintiff inhaled dye from an explosion during an at-work accident. (Stip. at ¶ 2.) Shortly thereafter, plaintiff sought respiratory treatment, and was diagnosed with asthma, allergic rhinitis, obesity, and a hernia. (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 23 60.)
On April 22, 2016, Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (Pl. Mem. at 1.) On February 9, 2018, the ALJ, Paul Greenberg, presided over Plaintiff's video conference. (ECF No. 19, Transcript ("Tr.) at 30.) A vocational expert ("VE"), Susanna Roche, testified at the hearing. (Id. at 56-60.) At thehearing, the ALJ presented Ms. Roche with numerous hypothetical questions. (Id.) The ALJ posed hypothetical questions to Ms. Roche as to whether Plaintiff could perform light exertional work. (Id.) Ms. Roche provided that there were significant limitations on Plaintiff's ability to work, as well as testifying to the limited types of jobs given plaintiff's limitations. (Id.) When the ALJ asked Ms. Roche whether those limited jobs were available, Ms. Roche answered that no jobs were available. (Id.) The ALJ also asked whether there were jobs where an individual would be off task for one hour per day, to which Ms. Roche responded in the negative. (Id.) Lastly, the ALJ inquired whether there were jobs where an individual would be absent from work two days per month and Ms. Roche answered in the negative. (Id.)
In a decision dated August 29, 2018, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at 14.) On October 12, 2018, Plaintiff requested a review of the ALJ's decision. (Id. at 144-145.) On June 14, 2019, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review and adopted the ALJ's decision as the final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security. (Id. at 1-5)
On August 15, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant action in federal court. (See generally ECF No. 1, Complaint ("Compl.").) On November 20, 2019, this court issued ascheduling order. (ECF No. 9, Scheduling Order.) On May 5, 2020, Plaintiff filed her notice of motion and memorandum of law in support of Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings. (ECF Nos. 14 and 15.) On that same day, Defendant filed his cross-motion and memorandum of law in support of Defendant's cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings and in opposition of Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings. (ECF Nos. 16 and 17.) Later that same day, Plaintiff filed her reply memorandum of law. (ECF No. 18.)
Unsuccessful claimants for disability benefits under the Act may bring an action in federal district court seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of their benefits "within sixty days after the mailing . . . of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow." 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). A district court, reviewing the final determination of the Commissioner, must determine whether the correct legal standards were applied and whether substantial evidence supports the decision. See Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 504 (2d Cir. 1998).
A district court may set aside the Commissioner's decision only if the factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence or if the decision is based on legal error.Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 127 (2d Cir. 2008). "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla," and must be relevant evidence that a "reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 420 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted). If there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's factual findings, those findings must be upheld. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Inquiry into legal error "requires the court to ask whether 'the claimant has had a full hearing under the [Commissioner's] regulations and in accordance with the beneficent purposes of the [Social Security] Act.'" Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009). The reviewing court does not have the authority to conduct a de novo review, and may not substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ, even when it might have justifiably reached a different result. Cage v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2012).
To receive disability benefits, claimants must be "disabled" within the meaning of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a), (d). A claimant is disabled under the Act when she is unable to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2000). The impairment must be of "such severity" that the claimant is unable to do his previous work or engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). "The Commissioner must consider the following in determining a claimant's entitlement to benefits: '(1) the objective medical facts [and clinical findings]; (2) diagnoses or medical opinions based on such facts; (3) subjective evidence of pain or disability . . . ; and (4) the claimant's educational background, age, and work experience.'" Balodis v. Leavitt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 255, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1999)).
Pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Commissioner, a five-step sequential evaluation process is used to determine whether the claimant's condition meets the Act's definition of disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. This process is essentially as follows:
[I]f the Commissioner determines (1) that the claimant is not working, (2) that he has a 'severe impairment,' (3) that the impairment is not one [listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations] that conclusively requires a determination of disability, and (4) that the claimant is not capable of continuing in his prior type of work, the Commissioner must find him disabled if (5) there is not another type of work the claimant can do.
Burgess, 537 F.3d at 120 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.152(a)(4).
During this five-step process, the Commissioner must consider whether "the combined effect of any such impairment . . . would be of sufficient severity to establish eligibility for Social Security benefits." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523. Further, if the Commissioner does find a combination of impairments, the combined impact of the impairments, including those that are not severe (as defined by the regulations), will be considered in the determination process. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(2). At steps one through four of the sequential five-step framework, the claimant bears the "general burden of proving . . . disability." Burgess, 537 F.3d at 128. At step five, the burden shifts from the claimant to the Commissioner, requiring that the Commissioner show that, in light of the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience, the claimant is "able to engage in gainful employment within the national economy." Sobolewski v. Apfel, 985 F. Supp. 300, 310 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
Lastly, federal regulations explicitly authorize a court, when reviewing decisions of the SSA, to order further proceedings when appropriate. "The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Remand is warranted where "there are gaps in the administrative record orthe ALJ has applied an improper legal standard." Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Remand is particularly appropriate where further findings or explanation will clarify the rationale for the ALJ's decision. Pratts, 94 F.3d at 39....
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