Schaal v. Apfel
| Decision Date | 23 January 1998 |
| Citation | 134 F.3d 496 |
| Parties | 149 A.L.R. Fed. 679, 55 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 128 Rita SCHAAL Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kenneth S. APFEL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee. 1 Dockets 96-6212, 96-6316. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Carolyn A. Kubitschek, Lansner & Kubitschek, New York City (Irwin M. Portnoy, Newburgh, NY, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Karen G. Fiszer, Assistant Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration, New York City (Arthur J. Fried, General Counsel, Social Security Administration; Barbara L. Spivak, Chief Counsel--Region II, on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee.
Before: ALTIMARI, WALKER, and CABRANES, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-appellant Rita Schaal appeals from an order and judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York upholding the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security that she was not entitled to Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") disability benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (the "Act"). 2 She also appeals from an order and judgment of the district court denying her motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). We conclude that it is not clear what legal standard the administrative law judge ("ALJ") applied in weighing the medical opinion of plaintiff's treating physician, and that the ALJ failed to provide a required statement of valid reasons for discounting the treating physician's opinion. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the district court insofar as it upheld the Commissioner's decision to deny SSI benefits and we remand to the district court with instructions to enter a judgment remanding the case to the Social Security Administration ("SSA") in order that an ALJ may reweigh the evidence under the correct legal standard. In view of our disposition of the case, we need not act upon the appeal from the denial of appellant's Rule 60(b) motion.
Plaintiff filed a pro se application with the SSA for SSI disability benefits on August 14, 1990. She initially alleged disability resulting from allergies and painful varicose veins. This application was denied, reconsidered, and denied again. At plaintiff's request a hearing was then held on December 21, 1990, before an ALJ, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.1400. On February 8, 1991, the ALJ ruled that plaintiff was not eligible for SSI benefits because she was not "disabled" for purposes of the Act.
Plaintiff requested that the ALJ's decision be reviewed by the SSA's Appeals Council, which granted review and vacated the ALJ's decision on the ground that the ALJ had failed to meet his "special duty to assist a pro se claimant and to inquire into and explore all relevant facts" (citing Echevarria v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 685 F.2d 751, 755 (2d Cir.1982)). Specifically, although plaintiff had said she was being treated by a physician, the ALJ made no effort to obtain medical records from this physician. The case was remanded to the ALJ for further proceedings. However, because repeated attempts to contact plaintiff were unsuccessful, her case was dismissed pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.1457. Subsequently, plaintiff requested that the dismissal of her case be reviewed. She was granted a new hearing before the same ALJ, who conducted the hearing on June 6, 1993, during which plaintiff was represented by counsel.
The ALJ heard plaintiff's testimony regarding her condition and also reviewed medical treatment notes and reports by various physicians. Plaintiff testified that she was 39 years old, that she had attended high school through the twelfth grade, but that she "had difficulty learning" and attended "special classes" where she was taught sewing. She further testified that she suffered from "a lot of pain in [her] legs" that prevented her from walking very far, as well as asthma and allergies that sometimes made breathing difficult. According to the "Disability Report" that she filed with the SSA, she had held a job as a garment "sewer" for six months in 1984 but otherwise had not been employed during the preceding 15 years. She testified at the hearing that she had lost her job as a sewer because her allergies, which were triggered by dust, caused her to choke and vomit on the garments.
The medical evidence considered by the ALJ included the following: Plaintiff had been examined by Dr. Ravi Ramaswami on September 13, 1990, who found that she suffered from "mild varicosities bilaterally" and "mild chronic obstructive pulmonary disease." In December 1990, plaintiff began receiving treatment at the Mid-Hudson Family Health Institute's Kingston Family Practice Center ("Mid-Hudson"). A Mid-Hudson "physical examination" report dated December 3, 1990 indicated "tortuous varicosities" in her left leg and "lesser varicosities" in her right leg. Otherwise, the report indicated that plaintiff was "comfortable, [and] in no distress." Medical treatment notes from a subsequent visit to Mid-Hudson on January 16, 1991 noted controlled asthma, varicosities, and "chronic stable anxiety." The notes also recorded that surgery for plaintiff's varicosities was "pending." Plaintiff was hospitalized for surgical "excision of multiple varicosities" in her left leg in February 1991.
On December 10, 1992, plaintiff was examined by Dr. Reuben Mokotoff, who concluded that she "does not appear to have a true allergy" but that "she has breathing problems" that "sound more like post-infectious asthma." He also found "superficial varicosities" in her right leg. His medical report indicated that she was 5'6" tall and weighed 250 pounds at that time. On a form labeled "Medical Assessment of Ability to Do Work-Related Activities (Physical)," Dr. Mokotoff indicated that plaintiff's lifting and carrying capacity was unimpaired. He found that plaintiff's capacity for standing and walking was limited but could not quantify the number of hours that she would be able to stand or walk during a typical work day. Dr. Mokotoff also recommended a neurological examination because plaintiff exhibited some loss of sensation in her right leg. On February 1, 1993, the ALJ requested a neurological consultation by Dr. Stanley Mandell, which took place on March 30, 1993. Dr. Mandell found no "evidence of a structural lesion in the central or peripheral nervous system." He also indicated that plaintiff's capacities for lifting, carrying, standing, and walking were unimpaired.
Plaintiff submitted a questionnaire completed by Dr. Mark Jobson, who apparently began treating her at the Mid-Hudson clinic on October 29, 1992. Dr. Jobson completed this questionnaire on May 28, 1993. The questionnaire consisted of a series of questions, followed by spaces for "yes" or "no" check marks. This was the same format used in the forms filled out by Drs. Mokotoff and Mandell, except that instead of requesting a separate written explanation of the "yes" or "no" answers, Dr. Jobson's questionnaire simply asked whether as a general matter the physician's diagnosis was "confirmed by medical signs and findings established by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques." By checking "yes" on the form Dr. Jobson indicated that plaintiff was disabled based on objective medical findings, that she would have trouble working six hours per day without intermittent breaks, that she would have to alternate between sitting and standing, and that it would be reasonable to expect that her symptoms would result in frequent absences from the workplace. By checking "no" he indicated that she would not have to lie down and rest during an eight-hour work day and that there was no manifestation of "increased nervousness, depression or anxiety."
On July 27, 1993, having heard and weighed the above evidence, the ALJ again ruled that plaintiff was not disabled. Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ's decision, and along with this request submitted to the Appeals Council Dr. Jobson's treatment notes. The Appeals Council denied review on November 9, 1993. The following day, plaintiff submitted additional evidence, including a note from Dr. Jobson stating that based upon his current examination of plaintiff and his review of her prior medical records, it was his view that she was "totally disabled and has been disabled, for the past 3 years, since 1990." The Appeals Council again denied review, and the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner on December 30, 1993.
Plaintiff then filed this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Thomas J. McAvoy, Chief Judge ) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and submitted additional evidence from a psychologist, Dr. Wilson Meaders. Dr. Meaders' treatment notes described plaintiff's depression and history of abusive relationships. On a form labeled "Psychiatric Report (Employment)" he indicated that plaintiff "has intense social phobia that makes work impossible."
Chief Judge McAvoy referred the case to Magistrate Judge Gustave J. DiBianco, who on October 17, 1995 issued a Report and Recommendation upholding the Commissioner's decision. This Report and Recommendation was adopted in full by Chief Judge McAvoy, who therefore dismissed the action and entered judgment for the Commissioner on June 11, 1996.
Plaintiff then filed a motion for relief from the district court's judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). With this motion, plaintiff submitted evidence that on March 22, 1996, the Commissioner had ruled on a separate application for SSI benefits filed by plaintiff on September 15, 1995. In ruling upon this second application for benefits, the Commissioner had found that as of October 10, 1993, but not before, plaintiff was disabled due to an "anxiety-related disorder." 3
On August 7, 1996, prior to filing her Rule 60(b) moti...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Gladden v. Commissioner of Social Sec.
... ... Callahan, No. 98-6229, 199 F.3d 1321 (table), 1999 WL 1012761. at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 14, 1999); Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d at 62; Carroll v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 705 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983). 9 ... B. Standard of Review ... at 346-47; Halloran, v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d at 32; Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d at 134; Clark v. Comm'r, 143 F.3d at 118; Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d at 503. 17 ... The Commissioner's "treating physician" regulations were approved by the Second Circuit in ... ...
-
Diaz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
... ... 42 U.S.C. 405(g); Tejada v. Apfel , 167 F.3d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Johnson , 817 F.2d at 986); accord Brault , 683 F.3d at 447. Second, the court must decide whether the ... See, e.g., Kohler , 546 F.3d at 265 (regulation); Schaal v. Callahan , 933 F. Supp. 85, 93 (D. Conn. 1997) (SSR). In such a case, the court may remand the matter to the Commissioner under sentence four of ... ...
-
Cruz v. Colvin
... ... Astrue , 708 F.3d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 2013); Rosa v. Callahan , 168 F.3d at 77; Tejada v. Apfel , 167 F.3d at 773-74. 8 "[F]actual issues need not have been resolved by the [Commissioner] in accordance with what we conceive to be the ... Barnhart , 362 F.3d at 32; Shaw v. Chater , 221 F.3d at 134; Clark v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 143 F.3d at 118; Schaal v. Apfel , 134 F.3d at 503. 13 Page 23 When a treating physician provides a favorable report, the claimant "is entitled to an express recognition ... ...
-
Craven v. Apfel
... ... Shalala, 1995 WL 812857 at *4 ... A court's review of the Commissioner's final decision is limited to determining whether there is "substantial evidence" in the record to support such determination. E.g., Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d at 77; Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir.1998); Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d at 46; Rivera v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir.1991); Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d at 1038; Dumas v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1550 (2d Cir.1983); Fernandez v. Apfel, 97 Civ. 6936, 1998 WL 603151 at *7 (S.D.N.Y ... ...
-
Case survey
...to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.’” Schaal v. Apfel , 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998), quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). (2) The definition of disability is the same for purposes of receiving Social Securit......
-
Administrative review issues
...duty to develop the factual record, regardless of whether the claimant is represented by legal counsel.” Id. , citing Schaal v. Apfel , 134 F.3d 496, 505 (2d Cir. 1998); Pratts v. Chater , 94 F.3d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1996). (3) Due to the non-adversarial nature of a benefits proceeding, the ALJ......
-
Issue Topics
...the clinical findings were inadequate, it was the ALJ’s duty to seek additional information from the doctor sua sponte. Schaal v. Apfel , 134 F.3d 496, 505 (2d Cir. 1998), citing Perez v. Chater , 77 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1996). In Perez , the Second Circuit held that “the ALJ generally has ......
-
Assessment of disability issues
...was no per se legal error where the ALJ considers physical demeanor as one of several factors in assessing credibility. Schaal v. Apfel , 134 F.3d 496, 502 (2d Cir. 1998). However, such observations should be assigned only limited weight. Id. , citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c) (3). See also Mo......