Green v. State

Decision Date30 October 2002
Docket NumberNo. CA CR 02-234.,CA CR 02-234.
Citation87 S.W.3d 814,79 Ark. App. 297
PartiesBelinda L. GREEN v. STATE of Arkansas.
CourtArkansas Court of Appeals

William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by: Don Thompson, Clint Miller, Deputy Public Defenders, little Rocke, for appellant.

Mark Pryor, Att'y Gen., by: Clayton K. Hodges, Ass't Att'y Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

JOHN F. STROUD, JR., Chief Judge.

Appellant, Belinda Green, was charged with second-degree domestic battering, a felony, and was tried by the court. At the conclusion of the case, the trial court reduced the charge and found her guilty of the offense of third-degree domestic battering, a misdemeanor. On appeal, she contends that "the circuit court erred in denying [her] motion to dismiss the charge of second-degree domestic battering and erred in finding her guilty of third-degree domestic battering because the State failed to introduce substantial evidence that [she] committed either second-degree or third-degree domestic battering." We disagree and affirm.

At the trial of this case, Deputy K. Adams, a deputy with the Pulaski County Sheriffs Department, testified that he responded to a call involving a house alarm. He said that when he arrived at the residence, he could hear arguing in the back bedroom between one female voice and one male voice. He said that he knocked on the front door several times before anyone answered, but that finally Johnny Green answered the door. Deputy Adams said that when Johnny Green came to the door, he stepped outside and closed the door behind him as if he did not want the officer to know what was going on inside. Adams said that he observed that Johnny Green's hand was cut and that blood was dripping from it. Adams stated that based upon the circumstances, he entered the residence. He said that he put appellant and Johnny Green in separate rooms and that he did not observe any injuries on appellant. He stated that he made a decision that a crime had been committed and arrested appellant.

Jake Bowden, a patrol deputy for the Pulaski County Sheriffs Department, testified that he responded to the call with Deputy Adams. Recounting essentially the same testimony as Adams, he said that he also heard two people arguing inside the house. In addition, he stated that appellant was cooperative and that she told him that she had cut Johnny Green with scissors. He testified that appellant was intoxicated, and that she told him that she cut Johnny Green with the scissors because she was afraid that he was going to batter her.

After Bowden's testimony, the deputy prosecuting attorney informed the court that Johnny Green was present, but that the State had chosen not to call him because it believed he might perjure himself. Defense counsel then moved for a directed verdict at the close of the prosecution's case, stating in pertinent part, "[T]hey haven't proven beyond a reasonable doubt that she intentionally committed any crime. And if she did commit a crime, they haven't shown that it wasn't in self defense. I'm asking for a directed verdict on those grounds." The motion was denied.

In her defense, appellant testified that she was forty years old; that she had been with Johnny Green for eighteen years; and that they had an eighteen-year-old daughter. She denied telling Officer Bowden that she had cut Johnny Green because she was afraid that he would hurt her. She said instead that she kept telling the officer that she did not cut Johnny Green and that she did not know how he got cut.

After appellant testified, defense counsel renewed his motion to dismiss:

The State has rested and we renew all our motions on the directed verdict of the State. The State doesn't have any proof that she committed the crime. They haven't presented any proof that she committed a crime. They didn't see any crime occur. They tried to offer in hearsay evidence to prove a crime has occurred. They took statements from her without reading her Miranda rights. They wouldn't let her leave before she gave any statement, so I am going to ask the Court to find her not guilty because they didn't prove the allegation.

The trial court stated that it was "going to reduce this to a misdemeanor" and sentenced appellant to serve one year of probation and pay a $100 fine and court costs.

A motion to dismiss, identical to a motion for a directed verdict in a jury trial, is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Walker v. State, 77 Ark.App. 122, 72 S.W.3d 517 (2002). On appeal of the denial of a motion for dismissal, the sufficiency of the evidence is tested to determine whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Id. Circumstantial evidence is substantial if it is of sufficient force to compel a conclusion beyond mere suspicion or conjecture. Id. Only the evidence supporting the guilty verdict need be considered, and that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. Id.

Subsections (b) and (c) of Rule 33.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure set forth the manner in which motions for dismissal in a nonjury trial are to be made:

(b) In a nonjury trial, if a motion for dismissal is to be made, it shall be made at the close of all of the evidence. The motion for dismissal shall state the specific grounds therefor. If the defendant moved for dismissal at the conclusion of the prosecution's evidence, then the motion must be renewed at the close of all of the evidence.

(c) The failure of a defendant to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at the times and in the manner required in subsections (a) and (b) above will constitute a waiver of any question pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict or judgment. A motion for directed verdict or for dismissal based on insufficiency of the evidence must specify the respect in which the evidence is deficient. A motion merely stating that the evidence is insufficient does not preserve for appeal issues relating to a specific deficiency such as insufficient proof on the elements of the offense. A renewal at the close of all of the evidence of a previous motion...

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21 cases
  • Nelson v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • January 21, 2004
    ...verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. See Ark. R.Crim. P. 33.1(b) (2003); see also Green v. State, 79 Ark.App. 297, 87 S.W.3d 814 (2002). We need only consider the evidence supporting the guilty verdict, and we view that evidence in the light most favorable......
  • Hughes v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • June 17, 2015
    ...and we affirm. A motion for a directed verdict or dismissal is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, Green v. State, 79 Ark. App. 297, 87 S.W.3d 814 (2002). When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, we look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Darrough v.......
  • Bell v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • June 20, 2007
    ...substantial evidence. A motion for a directed verdict or dismissal is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Green v. State, 79 Ark.App. 297, 87 S.W.3d 814 (2002). The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, ......
  • Houston v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • June 18, 2003
    ...Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003). This rule applies to bench trials as well as to jury trials. Green v. State, 79 Ark.App. 297, 87 S.W.3d 814 (2002). In her brief, appellant recounts the events at trial, noting that she raised two arguments in her directed-verdict At th......
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