Green v. State

• Decision Date: 13 May 1980
• Docket Number: No. F-78-523,F-78-523
• Citation: 611 P.2d 262
• Parties: George GREEN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

Page 262

611 P.2d 262

George GREEN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.

No. F-78-523.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

May 13, 1980.

An appeal from the District Court, Kay County; Lowell Doggett, Judge.

GEORGE GREEN, appellant, was convicted of the offense of Rape in the First Degree; was sentenced to fifty (50) years' imprisonment, and appeals. The sentence is MODIFIED to thirty (30) years' imprisonment, and the judgment and sentence is otherwise AFFIRMED.

Kevin J. Murphy, Ponca City, for appellant.

Jan Eric Cartwright, Atty. Gen., William S. Flanagan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Andrew Wilcoxen, Legal Intern, for appellee.

OPINION

CORNISH, Presiding Judge:

The 52-year-old appellant was convicted of Rape in the First Degree in the District Court of Kay County, Case No. CRF-77-234. Punishment was set at fifty (50) years' imprisonment.

The incident giving rise to this appeal occurred on Thanksgiving Day, November 25, 1977. The prosecutrix was living with her two small children while her husband was working out of state. The appellant, a former co-employee of her husband, lived in a garage apartment behind the residence of the prosecutrix. About 4:30 p. m. he went to her house where they talked and watched television.

The prosecutrix testified that the appellant, who had been drinking, made advances toward her during the course of the evening. She testified this was offensive to her, but she nevertheless allowed the appellant to remain in her company. About 11:30 p. m. after the children were put in bed, the appellant demanded sex with the prosecutrix. When she resisted, she was hit several times, her sweater ripped, and her bra and jeans torn. Fearing further harm, the prosecutrix did not scream for help and, in fact, she pulled her jeans and pants down when told to do so by the appellant. After being raped twice, the prosecutrix dressed herself and her children and walked to the police station.

I

The first question for consideration is whether the District Attorney's comments in closing argument erroneously made reference to the appellant's failure to testify. The applicable statute, 22 O.S.1971, § 701, ¹ provides that a defendant's failure to testify shall not be mentioned at trial, but if commented upon by counsel is a ground for a new trial. The prosecutor's statements complained of in this appeal are:

". . . Mr. Murphy said the case is so weak that it doesn't merit a defense. Well, I told you and I promised you when I got up here that I would argue and answer their defense. I haven't heard their defense. Haven't heard any defense. The only thing that I have heard from them is, 'Well, there wasn't any force used.' Or, 'She submitted with consent,' or 'She put herself in a bad situation where he could take advantage of her.' Haven't heard any defense yet."

Later, discussing the discrepancy in the testimony as to when the prosecutrix left her house and walked to the police station, the prosecutor told the jury the "time specifically is within the grasp of the defendant, if he wanted you to know exactly when she went to the police station, but he didn't want to tell you that."

It is well settled in Oklahoma that it is permissible for a prosecutor to say that the evidence presented by the State is uncontradicted and unrefuted, Coots v. State, Okl.Cr., 560 P.2d 592 (1977); Bennett v. State, Okl.Cr., 546 P.2d 659, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940, 96 S.Ct. 2658, 49 L.Ed.2d 392 (1976). Comment on reasonable inferences drawn from the failure of the defense to contradict the State's evidence is also allowed, McDonald v. State, Okl.Cr., 553 P.2d 171 (1976). However, it is error for the prosecutor to comment, either directly or indirectly at any stage of the trial, upon a defendant's failure to take the stand. Runnels v. State, Okl.Cr., 562 P.2d 932 (1977).

We have carefully reviewed the closing arguments of both parties. We think the statement by the prosecutor that he had not heard any defense may be considered analogous to a comment that the evidence was uncontradicted and was, therefore, permissible. When the challenged remarks are read in context, they appear to be a comment on the defense counsel's closing argument rather than on the appellant's failure to take the stand.

On the other hand, the statement that the appellant was able but unwilling to tell the jury when the prosecutrix went to the police station is unquestionably not within the scope of permissible comment. However, we fail to see how this statement was prejudicial because the defense counsel had remarked earlier in his closing argument, "I assure you that it was on my advice and my assistance that Mr. Green did not testify today."

II

The appellant next alleges that the prosecutor's remarks during closing argument pertaining to the failure of the prosecutrix to make an outcry assumed facts not in evidence and were so inflammatory as to deny the appellant a fair trial. The complained of argument, to which defense counsel objected at trial, is as follows:

". . . I don't think that any of you would have run out of that house and left your two children there with that defendant in the house. She didn't make an outcry. How much of an outcry can you get out before somebody really clobbers you, and at midnight on Thanksgiving Day, who is going to hear you? How many of you would have thought of making an outcry at that point? You know, it's not a question of you making an outcry, and then beating it out of the house because you still have the two children there. You have got to make an outcry and defend yourself until help comes, until a neighbor gets there. Everyone of you at sometime or another in your life have been sitting in your house and thought you heard somebody scream. You have heard an unusual noise outside, and you say, 'What is that?' And you listen to see if it happens again, and it didn't happen again. And you may even have thought about it for awhile, the rest of that evening, until the morning papers came out and you could check the papers to see if something happened to your neighbor. That has happened to every one of you. So if she had cried out and her neighbor, the closest one across the street, no, well, the closest one had a driveway between and he was to the next door, one way or the other, but they were at work. The closest practical neighbors were across the street. If she had made her cry out, and if they had of heard her, if they had happened to still have been up watching television and not asleep already, and if their windows were open and their air conditioner was not on, and they would have heard her and they would have said, 'What's that?' And then not heard anything else because she would have been out cold or dead at that point, and the neighbor never would have come for help. And presuming that this was an alert neighbor sitting on his front porch watching the stars come up, and he immediately dashed across the street, how much help is going to get to her before he takes that step or two to close the distance between them and does a job on her? Or snatches up one of the babies as a hostage." (Emphasis added)

This Court agrees with the State that it is the general rule that the right of argument contemplates a liberal freedom of speech and that the range of argumentation is wide. Hence, both sides may discuss fully from their standpoints the evidence and inferences and deductions arising therefrom. Deason v. State, Okl.Cr., 576 P.2d 778 (1978), and Battle v. State, Okl.Cr., 478 P.2d 1005 (1970). However, that right does not permit the prosecutor to bolster his argument by implications which are unsupported by competent evidence offered at trial. Bryant v. State, Okl.Cr., 585 P.2d 377 (1978).

We find the closing argument in the instant case was outside the record and was prejudicial. There is no evidence that the appellant threatened to kill or harm the prosecutrix if she screamed. Nor does the record reflect that the appellant intended to injure or hold hostage the victim's two and three-year-old children. It was highly impermissible for the prosecutor to go outside the record for the purpose of appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury, Polk v. State, Okl.Cr., 561 P.2d 558 (1977). Still, in light of the evidence, the improper remarks cannot be said to have determined the verdict.

III

Refusal to give the appellant's requested instructions numbers 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 is the...