Green v. United States

• Decision Date: 20 July 1973
• Docket Number: No. 73-8079,73-8095.,73-8079
• Citation: 157 US App. DC 40,481 F.2d 1140
• Parties: Lawrence I. GREEN, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent. Gary A. HOPKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

157 US App. DC 40, 481 F.2d 1140 (1973)

Lawrence I. GREEN, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.

Gary A. HOPKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.

Nos. 73-8079, 73-8095.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

July 20, 1973.

Lawrence I. Green, pro se.

Gary A. Hopkins, pro se.

Before LEVENTHAL and ROBINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Green and Hopkins are before us seeking leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis. Each petitioner contends that the District Court erred in denying his pro se motion for modification or reduction of his sentence or other sentencing relief which would allow him to participate immediately in some variety of work release program.¹ Although naturally somewhat lacking in clarity and precision, the pro se petitions filed in the District Court and in this court assert a "constitutional right to be rehabilitated" derived, not from the Constitution, but from 18 U.S.C. § 4082.² Each petitioner contends that he is presently ineligible for work release because of his lengthy sentence, and that the District Court's refusal to reduce his sentence and order work release constitutes a denial of his "constitutional" rights. Although we deem petitioners' contentions frivolous, we take this opportunity to comment briefly since we have recently received many similar pro se petitions asserting a constitutional right to be rehabilitated pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4082.

A motion for the reduction of sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is addressed to the sound discretion of the District Court.³ Rehabilitation is certainly a salient goal of the criminal justice system,⁴ but a recently convicted offender is not always the best judge of the optimum path to rehabilitation.

The work release legislation permits the Attorney General to authorize a prisoner "as to whom there is reasonable cause to believe he will honor his trust ... to ... work at paid employment or participate in a training program in the community on a voluntary basis while continuing as a prisoner of the institution or facility to which he is committed ...."⁵ Both the literal terms and legislative history⁶ of Section 4082(c) make it clear that the decision as to whether or not to authorize work release is one dependent on an exercise of discretion by the Attorney General. Although Congress recognized in amending Section 4082 in 1965 that work release may, in some instances, be a valuable rehabilitative tool,⁷ it did not establish an absolute legal right to immediate work release such as is urged by petitioners.⁸

Since we find petitioners' contentions that the District Court erred in denying their motions frivolous, the motions before us for leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis are denied.

So ordered.

1 Green was convicted by jury of manslaughter, and sentenced on April 2, 1971, to a term of three to nine years. Hopkins pled guilty to one count of three separate indictments charging three separate armed robberies. In Crim. No. 911-72, he pled guilty to assault with intent to kill while armed; in Crim. No. 920-72 to robbery; and in Crim. No. 924-72 to attempted robbery. On November 16, 1972, Hopkins was sentenced to an effective term of five to fifteen years on these three counts.

2 Green's motion in the District Court was styled a "Motion for Modification or a Reduction of Sentence. Pursuant to Rule 35, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Title 18, Section 4082, U.S.C." Hopkins' motion was styled a "Motion for Reduction in Sentence (Work Release Rehabilitation Program) Under Title 18, Section 4082, U.S.C."

3 See, e.g., United States v. Krueger, 454 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir.1972); United States v. Williams, 446 F.2d 486, 488 (5th Cir.1971); United States v. Jones, 444 F.2d 89, 90 (2d Cir.1971); United States v. Brown, 428 F.2d 1191, 1193 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 941, 91 S.Ct. 238, 27 L.Ed.2d 245 (1970).

4 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949).

5 18 U.S.C. § 4082(c) provides in its entirety as follows:

The Attorney General may extend the limits of the place of confinement of a prisoner as to whom there is reasonable cause to believe he will honor his trust, by authorizing him, under prescribed conditions, to—

(1) visit a specifically designated place or places for a period not to exceed thirty days and return to the same or another institution or facility. An extension of limits may be granted only to permit a visit to a dying relative, attendance at the funeral of a relative, the obtaining of medical services not otherwise available, the contacting of...