Greenawalt v. Sun City West Fire District, No. CIV-98-1408-PHX-ROS (D. Ariz. 1/15/2003)
| Decision Date | 15 January 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV-98-1408-PHX-ROS.,CIV-98-1408-PHX-ROS. |
| Parties | Howard Paul Greenawalt, Plaintiff, v. Sun City West Fire District, an Arizona Fire District; et al., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
This action arose out of the termination of Plaintiff firefighter, Howard Paul Greenawalt, by Defendant Sun City West Fire District ("District"). Plaintiff filed a four count Complaint alleging violations of due process, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wrongful discharge, and breach of contract. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant on February 10, 2000 that was reversed and the case remanded by the Ninth Circuit. Defendant now moves for summary judgment on all remaining counts, arguing that any employment contract made by a prior board of the District fails to bind any successor board. Plaintiff responds that (1) the motion fails procedurally; (2) the law of the case doctrine precludes consideration of the motion; and (3) the successor board doctrine applies only to direct personal service contracts. Alternatively, Defendant moves for dismissal on the due process claims for failure to state a claim. For the reasons stated below, both Defendant's Motions are denied.
This is a federal question and supplemental jurisdiction case arising from an employment termination. The parties agree that Arizona law governs the state law claims.
On May 29, 1998, Plaintiff brought this action against his former employer, Sun City West Fire District,1 in the Maricopa Superior Court, alleging (1) violation of due process; (2) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) public policy wrongful discharge; and (4) breach of contract. On July 31, 1998, Defendant removed the case to this Court (Doc. #1), and on August 3, 1998, Defendant filed its Answer. (Doc. #3).
On May 21, 1999, Defendant filed a Summary Judgment Motion (Doc. #49) and accompanying Statement of Facts (Doc. #50), requesting summary judgment on all claims because Plaintiff constituted an "at-will" employee. On July 8, 1999, Plaintiff responded to this Motion. (Doc. #68 and Doc. #69). On July 16, 1999, Plaintiff filed a Supplementation of Record. (Doc. #70). Defendant replied on July 30, 1999. (Doc. #73).
On January 6, 2000, the parties stipulated to dismissal of Plaintiff's wrongful termination claim. Next, the Court granted summary judgment on the three remaining claims in its February 10, 2000 Order, finding that Plaintiff constituted an at-will employee. (Doc. #99). Plaintiff appealed this Order to the Ninth Circuit, which reversed and remanded, holding that a question of fact existed over Plaintiff's at-will status. (Doc. #121).
After remand, the Court issued a second Rule 16 Scheduling Order on April 22, 2002 that granted additional time for discovery, as well as set new dates for filing motions in limine, trial memoranda of law, and a joint pretrial order. (Doc. # 130). However, this Order failed to address dates for filing dispositive motions. Therefore, the original October 22, 1998 Rule 16 Scheduling Order date of June 15, 1999 for filing dispositive motions remains in effect. (Doc. #12). Consequently, Defendant filed a Motion to Amend Rule 16 Scheduling Order on September 6, 2002. (Doc. #163). Plaintiff responded to this Motion to Amend on September 12, 2002, arguing that substantial prejudice precludes such an amendment. (Doc. #168). Defendant filed no Reply.
On August 16, 2002, Defendant moved for summary judgment on the three remaining claims, arguing that Plaintiff cannot establish that a valid enforceable employment contract existed at the time of his termination because any employment contract made by a prior board of the District fails to bind any successor board. (Doc. #152). Plaintiff responded that (1) the motion fails procedurally; (2) the law of the case doctrine precludes consideration of the motion; and (3) the successor board doctrine applies only to direct personal service contracts. (Doc. #165). Defendant filed a Reply on September 26, 2002, in which it incorporated by reference its Motion to Amend the Rule 16 Schedulingorder. (Doc. #173).
Defendant also filed on July 26, 2002 a Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Due Process Claims. (Doc. #145). However, Defendant failed to file a statement of facts ("SOF"). On August 28, 2002, Plaintiff filed a Response. (Doc. #160). Defendant replied on September 16, 2002. (Doc. #169). On that same date, Defendant filed its SOF. (Doc. #170). Interpreting Defendant's filing of its SOF as untimely, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike on October 4, 2002. (Doc. #174). Plaintiff responded on October 11, 2002. (Doc. #175). Defendant filed no reply.
In 1981, Arizona created the Defendant Fire District pursuant to the provisions of Title VII of the Arizona Revised Statutes to provide fire protection and emergency medical services to Sun City West. (Def.'s May 21, 1999 Statement of Facts "1999 SOF" ¶ 1) (Doc. #50). An elected District Board administers the Defendant Fire District. A.R.S. § 48-803. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 48-805, the District Board determines the compensation payable to district personnel and employs necessary personnel to carry out District functions.
On April 5, 1993, and again on January 14, 1994, the District Board sent Plaintiff letters offering Plaintiff employment. (Def's 1999 SOF ¶¶ 1-4). Plaintiff contends that the language contained in these letters welcoming Plaintiff into "our family" created an employment contract wherein he could only be terminated for cause. At the time these letters were sent to Plaintiff, the District Board consisted of the following members: James Maley, Robert Shaw, Raymond White, Frank Hamblet, and Charles Frankel. (Def.'s August 16, 2002 SOF ¶ 1) (Doc. #153).
In support of his claims, Plaintiff also relies heavily on the "Statement of Policy, Fire District of Sun City West," which the District Board amended and adopted in August of 1995. (DeC's 2002 SOF ¶ 2; Complaint ¶ 15). The members of the District Board at that time remained the same as listed above. (Def.'s 2002 SOF ¶ 2).
On January 9, 1997 F. Lee Paul replaced Frank Hamblet on the District Board. (Def.'s 2002 SOF ¶ 3). Five months later, Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment on May 30, 1997. (Complaint —16).
A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents. viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-26 (1986); Jesinger v. Nev. Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). Substantive law determines which facts are material, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. In addition, the dispute must be genuine, that is, "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, U.S. at 248.
A principal purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. Summary judgment is appropriate against a party who "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of `proof at trial." Id. at 322; see Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1994). The moving party need not disprove matters on which the opponent has the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
Furthermore, the party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party's] pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Brinson v. Linda Rose joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Rule 1.10(1)(1), Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona ("Any party opposing a motion for summary judgment must . . . set[] forth the specific facts, which the opposing party asserts, including those facts which establish a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment in favor of the moving party."). There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party; if the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. However, because "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, . . . [t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor" at the summary judgment stage. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)); see Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995).
A court may not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief." Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 813 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Buckley v. Los Angeles, 957 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1992)); see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). "The federal rules require only a `short and plain statement of the claim showing...
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