Greenbelt Consumer Services, Inc. v. Acme Markets, Inc., 264

• Decision Date: 18 July 1974
• Docket Number: No. 264,264
• Citation: 272 Md. 222,322 A.2d 521
• Parties: GREENBELT CONSUMER SERVICES, INC. v. ACME MARKETS, INC.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 222

272 Md. 222

322 A.2d 521

GREENBELT CONSUMER SERVICES, INC. v. ACME MARKETS, INC.

No. 264.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 18, 1974.

Michael A. Schuchat, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Robb Ross Hendrickson, Baltimore (J. Cookman Boyd, Jr., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and O'DONNELL, JJ.

DIGGES, Judge.

This action, here on certiorari to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, originated in the District Court of Maryland when the respondent and sublessor, Acme Markets, Inc., filed its statement of claim, which was designated as 'an action of Contract-Landlord/Tenant,' against the petitioner and sublessee, Greenbelt Consumer Services, Inc. By this suit, the landlord is not attempting to recover possession of the property, but rather $12,000 (amended to $15,000 in the Circuit Court) in unpaid rent alleged to be due it by the tenant who had already vacated the subleased premises located at 107 Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia.

The basic and only issue to be determined here is whether the District Court, and, therefore, the Circuit Court on appeal, lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this fundamental sense to resolve the dispute presented.

The District Court was created in 1971 following the ratification by the citizens of this State of an amendment to Art. IV, § 1 of the Maryland Constitution. The limits of that court's jurisdiction were established simultaneously by the inclusion of § 41A in this same article, which in part provides, '(t)he District Court shall have the original jurisdiction prescribed by law.' ¹ In response to these constitutional mandates, the General Assembly enacted what is now codified as §§ 4-201, 4-401 and 4-402 and the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Code (1974) ² which pertains to the civil jurisdiction of the newly established court. These sections provide:

' § 4-201. Extent of jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the District Court extends to every case which arises within the state or is subject to the state's judicial powers, and which is within the limitations imposed by this title or elsewhere by law. Exercise of this jurisdiction is subject to the restrictions of venue established by law.'

' § 4-401. Exclusive original jurisdiction.

Except as provided in § 4-402, and subject to the venue provisions of Title 6, the District Court has exclusive original jurisdiction in:

(1) An action in contract or tort if the debt or damages claimed do not exceed $5,000 (2) An action of replevin regardless of the value of the thing in controversy;

(3) A case of attachment on original process, if the sum claimed does not exceed $5,000;

(4) An action involving landlord and tenant, distraint, or forcible entry and detainer, regardless of the amount involved;

(5) A grantee suit brought pursuant to Article 21, § 14-109 of the Code; and

(6) A petition for injunction relating to the use, disposition, encumbrances, or preservation of property: (1) claimed in a replevin action, until seizure under the writ, or (2) sought to be levied upon an action of distress, until levy and any removal.'

' § 4-402. Exceptions.

(a) Equity cases.-Except as provided in § 4-401, the District Court does not have equity jurisdiction.

(b) Land title cases.-The District Court does not have jurisdiction to decide the ownership of real property or of an interest in real property.

(c) Declaratory judgment cases.-The District Court does not have jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment.

(d) Concurrent jurisdiction cases.-Except in a case under paragraph (2), (4), (5), or (6) of § 4-401, the plaintiff may elect to file suit in the District Court or in a trial court of general jurisdiction, if the amount in controversy exceeds $2,500.

(e) Jury trial.-(1) In a civil action in which the amount in controversy exceeds $500, a party may demand a jury trial pursuant to the Maryland District Rules.

(2) Except in a replevin action, if a party is entitled to and demands a jury trial, jurisdiction is transferred forthwith and the record of the proceeding shall be transmitted to the appropriate court. In a replevin action, if a party is entitled to and demands a jury trial, the District Court may conduct a hearing on the show cause order prior to issuing the writ, enforce an injunction issued by it in the action, and issue, renew, and receive returns upon the writ of replevin. The action shall be transmitted to the appropriate court only after the writ has been returned, stating that the property sought has been seized or eloigned; and the time for filing a notice of intention to defend has expired.'

The respondent here contends, as it did with success in both the District Court and the Circuit Court, that although the sum it demands exceeds the $5,000 limitation imposed by § 4-401(1) upon the jurisdiction of the District Court, nevertheless suit must be brought in that court because under § 4-401(4) the District Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to consider claims for rent such as Acme's. In support of this, the respondent urges that the wording of the latter subsection clearly demonstrates that the General Assembly intended that all disputes arising between a landlord and his tenant, which grow out of this relationship, be originally instituted in the District Court without regard to either the amount involved, or whether the property is located within or without this State. We do not agree.

The principles which guide us in construing legislative enactments have been consistently applied by this Court for many years. Of these, the cardinal rule requires that the legislative intent be discovered and carried out. This purpose must be discerned from the words the Legislature chose to employ unless there exists an ambiguity or obscurity, in which case we need to look elsewhere. M.T.A. v. Balto. Co. Revenue Auth., 267 Md. 687, 695, 298 A.2d 413 (1973). This is so, in the absence of a constitutional defect, even if we believe the policy of the statute to be unwise, harsh or unjust. Flanagan v. Flanagan, 270 Md. 335, 337-338, 311 A.2d 407 (1973). Thus, in construing statutory language, we consider the words utilized in their natural and ordinary significance. However, if the phraseology employed has a doubtful meaning, this Court will examine the legislative intent so as to determine 'the objectives and purposes of the enactment and the consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another . . ..' Md. Medical Service v. Carver, 238 Md. 466, 478, 209 A.2d 582, 589 (1965). Furthermore, if necessary in doing so, we will examine all parts of all pertinent legislative enactments which shed light on what is the true legislative purpose. M.T.A. v. Balto. Co. Revenue Auth., supra; Hunt v. Montgomery County, 248 Md. 403, 414-415, 237 A.2d 35 (1968); Amalgamated Ins. v. Helms, 239 Md. 529, 535-536, 212 A.2d 311 (1965).

With these principles in mind, we first look to the words of the statute itself to ascertain, if possible, what actions the General Assembly intended to encompass in § 4-401(4), one of the subsections which give the District Court exclusive original jurisdiction. In doing so, we note that while what is meant by 'an action involving landlord and tenant' may be subject to some reasonable dispute, it is crystal clear what was contemplated by specifying actions involving 'forcible entry and detainer' and 'distraint'.

' Forcibly entry and detainer' are those actions which may be brought under the authority of two British statutes, 15 Rich. 2, c. 2 and 8 Henry 6, c. 9, both of which essentially are still in force in Maryland (Alexander's British Statutes (Coe's ed. 1912) 196, 188; Roth v. State, 89 Md. 524, 43 A. 769 (1899); Clark v. Vannort, 78 Md. 216, 219, 27 A. 982 (1893)), by one who seeks to recover possession of his premises from another who has either forcibly entered and detained them, or has peacefully entered and then forcibly detains the property. These rights of action have been modified by Code 1974, § 8-402(b) of the Real Property Article to include a remedy by which a landlord may recover possession of leased premises from a tenant 'Holding over' without force and by delineating the procedure for bringing any one of them. ³

Distraint itself was not an action at common law but a remedy. A. Thomas, Procedure in Justice Cases 115 (1906). However, Ch. 915 of the Acts of 1965 (now codified as Code 1974, §§ 8-301 to 8-332 of the Real Property Article) both declared it to be an action at law and set forth the procedure to be followed in employing it. Obviously, § 4-401(4) refers to these provisions of the code when it utilizes the words 'an action involving . . . distraint.'

Acme does not contend that its suit is either one for forcible entry and detainer or one for distraint. Instead, it relies on the phrase 'an action involving landlord and tenant' to support the District Court's jurisdiction in this case. However, although what legal action or actions the Legislature contemplated by the use of this phrase is not as clear as what actions it intended by the use of the other two, we believe, nevertheless, the answer to the respondent's contention can still be found, to a substantial extent, in the words of the statute itself. That this is so can perhaps be best understood if we first point out what the law does not say. Section 4-401(4) does not speak of 'an action involving a landlord and a tenant'; nor does it read 'an action involving the landlord-tenant relationship.' We believe that the Legislature consciously chose not to employ either of these wordings for the reasons which follow.

If the statute was written in accord with the first variation, the District Court's jurisdiction would be practically limitless. We say this, as under this first paraphrase, any action between a landlord and a tenant, no matter its scope or the amount involved, would have to be brought in the District...