Greene Cnty. Juvenile Office v. D.G.R. (In re J.A.R.)
| Decision Date | 20 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. SD32446,No. SD32444,No. SD32445,SD32444,SD32445,SD32446 |
| Parties | IN THE INTEREST OF: J.A.R., D.K.R., and A.E.R., children under seventeen years of age, GREENE COUNTY JUVENILE OFFICE, Respondent, v. D.G.R., Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
(consolidated)
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENE COUNTY
AFFIRMED
D.G.R. ("Father") appeals from judgments terminating his parental rights to his children, J.A.R., D.K.R., and A.E.R. (collectively the "Children"). The trial court concluded that Father abandoned and neglected the Children,1 that he failed torectify conditions that led to the Children coming into care,2 and that termination of Father's parental rights was in the best interest of the Children. On appeal, Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support these findings. Because at least one ground for termination and the best interest finding were supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.
Appellate review of termination of parental rights ("TPR") cases "is guided by established principles:
The trial court's decision to terminate parental rights will be sustained on appeal unless there is no substantial evidence to support the judgment, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. In our review, we are mindful that the juvenile court was in a superior position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and that it was free to believe all, part, or none of the witnesses' testimony. Furthermore, the standard of proof may be satisfied even though the trial court has contrary evidence before it or evidence in the record might support a different conclusion. In our review, we consider all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the judgment below, and we will reverse only when we firmly believe that the judgment is wrong."
In re L.R.S., 213 S.W.3d 161, 164 (Mo.App. 2007) (citation and some quotation marks omitted). See also In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d 793, 815 (Mo. banc 2011).
Accordingly, we are not free to credit evidence or inferences that favor the terminated parent. To the contrary, we must ignore these. In re B.J.K., 197 S.W.3d 237, 247 (Mo.App. 2006); In re C.M.B., 55 S.W.3d 889, 895-96 (Mo.App.2001). Further, when evidence "poses two reasonable but different inferences, this Court is obligated to defer to the trial court's assessment of the evidence." C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d at 815.3
The gravity of TPR issues does not lessen, but actually heightens, appellate deference to the judge who actually heard and saw the witnesses. "'Greater deference is granted to a trial court's determinations in custody and adoption proceedings than in other cases.'" Id. (quoting In re S.L.N., 167 S.W.3d 736, 741 (Mo.App. 2005)).4
We describe and summarize evidence as we must view it under the binding standards described above.
Father, a California resident, was having difficulty providing for the Children. In July 2010, he sent the Children to Missouri to live with a couple whom theChildren viewed as their maternal grandparents. Father said he intended to leave California and move to Missouri within a few weeks. In the months that followed, Father repeatedly promised to visit the Children but failed to follow through on his promises. Around November 2010, the Children began to live with their mother5 in Springfield.
In March 2011, the Children came to the attention of the Children's Division due to Mother's intoxication and failure to supervise the Children. An investigator contacted possible custodians, including Father, but he did not have suitable housing for the Children or the ability to get them from Missouri. The Children were taken into protective custody.
The Children remained in care and, consistent with the case goal of reunification, a treatment plan was prepared and ordered into effect for Father. Among other things, the court expected Father to obtain and maintain suitable housing.
Shortly after the Children came into care, Father advised the Children's caseworker that he had housing and was employed but provided no verification. He said he was coming to Missouri in the near future. At that time, the Children wanted to be reunited with Father in Missouri.
Father remained in contact with the Children's caseworker but made little progress on his treatment plan. The caseworker offered to initiate a request under the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children ("ICPC") so that Father could get services in California, but Father declined, stating that he intended to move toMissouri sometime between September and November 2011. Father could have, but did not, work his treatment plan while in California.6
Early on, Father maintained contact with the Children by telephone. The Children initially enjoyed and looked forward to those calls. During the calls, Father typically disparaged Mother and promised visits that never occurred. Each time Father broke a promise, the Children felt very disappointed and let down. As time progressed, the Children preferred not to talk to Father because they "didn't even want to hear it any more." Sometime prior to March 2012, the Children had lost trust in Father and the phone calls were discontinued at the Children's request. At no point did the Children ever ask to call Father. Father was encouraged to writeletters to the Children but he typically failed to do so, sending only two letters the entire time the Children were in care.
Father provided financial support for the Children in 2010 and 2011, but not in 2012. He sent $3,000 for the Children in July 2011, but Father took back $450 five months later, then had another $2,000 used to pay some of Father's fines. Father was capable of working and reported that he was working much of the time the Children were in care.
In March 2012, Father came to Missouri to attend a permanency hearing and to make preparations to move here that month or the next. Father arrived several days later than he said he would, then cut the trip short and skipped the hearing,7 after which the court changed the Children's case goal to adoption and found no exceptions to the statutorily required filing of TPR petitions. By the end of the next month, Father had not moved to Missouri and the Juvenile Office had filed the underlying cases.
In June 2012, Father announced that he intended to remain in California. Unbeknownst to the Children's caseworker, Father had signed a one-year lease for a residence in California, listing the residents as one adult and three children. The Children's caseworker requested an ICPC home study, which later was denied due to, among other reasons, Father's stated intent to move to Missouri.
In late September 2012, a few days prior to the TPR trial, Father abruptly moved to Missouri without any notice to the Children's caseworker. Father was unemployed and living in his vehicle.
At the TPR trial, the court heard evidence that the Children had not seen Father since July 2010. The Children, then 11, 12, and 13 years old, all felt neglected because Father never followed through on his promises and failed to put forth effort on their behalf. None of the Children wanted to see Father or be reunified with him. A.E.R. felt abandoned by Father and feared that Father would get back together with Mother and beat her again. D.K.R. was very vocal in his disappointment with Father and wanted nothing to do with him.
Reunification was not a possibility at the time of trial or in the near future because Father could not support the Children, Father had no suitable home for the Children, the Children did not want to be reunified with Father, and family therapy would be needed before even supervised visitation could be considered. The Children's caseworker, while sympathetic to Father, conceded that his situation was little improved and that reunification could take "a very long time" given Father's lack of progress.
The Children's Division and the Children's guardian ad litem (GAL) recommended termination of Father's parental rights. Father attended the TPR trial but elected not to testify.
The trial court found three grounds for TPR: abandonment, neglect, and failure to rectify. Noting the Children's antipathy to Father, the court also found and concluded that TPR would be in the Children's best interest. Father's parental rights were terminated and these appeals followed.
Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support all three TPR grounds found by the court. We first address Father's opposition to the finding of neglect, as our disposition of that point obviates the need to address his challenges to the findings of abandonment and failure to rectify.
Neglect is the "failure to provide, by those responsible for the care, custody, and control of the child, the proper or necessary support, education as required by law, nutrition or medical, surgical, or any other care necessary for the child's well-being." In re J.M.T., 386 S.W.3d 152, 157 n.4 (Mo.App. 2012) (internal quotation and citation omitted); § 210.110(12). Neglect also has been defined as "the failure to perform the duty with which a parent is charged by law and conscience." Id.
Here, the evidence indicated that Father failed to provide for the Children's needs, including their need for a suitable home. The Children came into care in part due to Father's inability to meet their needs. The Children had been in care for a year and a half as of the TPR trial, yet Father was in no better position to provide for their needs than at the start of the case. He had not contributed to the Children'scare and support for at least nine months preceding the trial. Father's history of support payments in 2010 and 2011 show that Father knew he was obligated to support the Children and had the ability to do so. When given the opportunity to explain his actions or his situation at the TPR...
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