Greene v. State
| Decision Date | 08 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 820, Sept. Term, 2017,820, Sept. Term, 2017 |
| Parties | Anthony GREENE v. STATE of Maryland |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Katherine P. Rasin and Paul DeWolfe, Baltimore, MD, submitted on brief, for Appellant.
Daniel Jawor and Brian E. Frosh, Baltimore, MD, submitted on brief, for Appellee.
Panel: Eyler, Deborah S., Meredith, Paul E. Alpert (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Alpert, J.Anthony Greene, appellant, was convicted in two separate trials by a jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County of drug related crimes. In the first trial, a jury convicted him of possession of cocaine. In the second trial, a jury convicted him of possession of clonazepam, possession of alprazolam, and two counts of possession of oxycodone.1 Appellant appeals from both cases, raising two questions, which we have rephrased slightly:
For the following reasons, we shall affirm the judgments.
The facts of each particular trial are not in issue, for the two questions appellant raises concern legal issues. To answer the questions raised, we shall provide an overview of the procedural facts followed by greater detail in the discussion section below.
On March 17, 2016, appellant was charged in a 13–count indictment with various offenses involving alleged drug dealing on five different dates. Specifically, appellant was charged as follows:
); and possession of hydromorphone (Dilaudid )
On June 29, 2016, appellant filed a written motion to dismiss the first six counts of the indictment against him, arguing, among other things, that the State had failed to bring him to trial on those counts in a timely manner, and therefore, the court should dismiss his case because the State had violated his constitutional rights to a speedy trial and due process. Appellant focused on the fact that the State had twice nol prossed and re-charged those counts before the March 17th indictment. The State filed a written motion opposing appellant's motion, arguing that it had acted in good faith in nol prossing and re-charging the counts, and there were no constitutional violations.
On July 14, 2016, a hearing was held on appellant's motion. Appellant specifically stated at the hearing that his speedy trial and due process arguments apply only to the first six counts in the March 17, 2016 indictment. Based on the record and argument, the court found no bad faith by the State and ruled that any delay was not of constitutional dimension. The court denied the motion, ruling that there had been no violation of appellant's speedy trial or due process rights. On August 18, 2016, the circuit court granted appellant's motion to sever the charges, holding that they were not mutually admissible at one trial.
On September 6, 2016, appellant was tried on the charges alleging illegal drug activity on July 13, 2015 (counts 2 through 4). He was ultimately convicted of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. After the court granted appellant's motion for a new trial, he was re-tried on December 19, 2015, and, as stated above, he was found guilty of simple possession of cocaine.
On September 8, 2016, appellant was tried on the charges alleging illegal drug activity on January 11, 2016 (counts 8 through 13). As stated above, he was convicted of four simple possession counts: possession of clonazepam, possession of alprazolam, and two counts of possession of oxycodone.
Appellant was sentenced on June 26, 2017 in both trials. He filed a direct appeal for review in our court the following day. We shall provide additional facts below to answer the questions raised.
Appellant argues on appeal that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the charges that alleged criminal conduct on July 13, 2015, because the State failed to bring his case to trial in a timely manner in violation of his speedy trial and due process rights. As to his speedy trial claim, appellant specifically argues that the delay between the date of his arrest and the start of his first trial, a delay of 14 months, was of constitutional dimension and that the balancing of the four factors in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) weigh in favor of dismissal. The State disagrees and counters that because it had acted in good faith in nol prossing and re-charging those counts, the triggering date was the day of the last indictment: March 17, 2016. The State then argues that the delay between that date and the date when the circuit court denied his motion, a delay of four months, was not of constitutional dimension. The State also argues that appellant's due process argument is without merit because appellant failed to show actual prejudice or that the State had caused the delay with the intent to gain a tactical advantage over him.
We review the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds by conducting a de novo constitutional analysis. Glover v. State , 368 Md. 211, 220, 792 A.2d 1160 (2002) (citations omitted). See also Jules v. State , 171 Md. App. 458, 481–82, 910 A.2d 553 (2006) (citing Glover , supra ), cert. denied , 396 Md. 525, 914 A.2d 769 (2007). Nonetheless, we defer to the trial court on the findings of historical facts, unless clearly erroneous. Glover , 368 Md. at 220–21, 792 A.2d 1160 (citations omitted). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous, not when the fact is "weak, shaky, [or] improbable," but rather when it has "no evidentiary basis whatsoever[.]" State v. Brooks , 148 Md. App. 374, 399, 812 A.2d 342 (2002). See also Figgins v. Cochrane , 403 Md. 392, 409, 942 A.2d 736 (2008) () (quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial[.]" U.S. Const. Amend. VI. This right is applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Klopfer v. North Carolina , 386 U.S. 213, 222–23, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). We apply the balancing test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Barker , supra , to determine whether a defendant's constitutional speedy trial right has been violated. State v. Kanneh , 403 Md. 678, 687, 944 A.2d 516 (2008) (citation omitted). The four factors of a Barker analysis consist of the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and any prejudice to the defendant because of the delay. Divver v. State , 356 Md. 379, 388, 739 A.2d 71 (1999) (citation omitted). Id. at 394, 739 A.2d 71 (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted).
The initial Barker factor "is actually a double enquiry." Doggett v. United States , 505 U.S. 647, 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992).
[T]o trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay ... since, by definition, he cannot complain that the government has denied him a ‘speedy’ trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness.
Id. at 651–52, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (citation omitted). "If the accused makes this showing, the court must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim." Id. at 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (citation omitted). The length of delay for speedy trial analysis is measured from the earlier of the date of arrest, filing of indictment, or other formal charges, to the date of trial. United States v. Marion , 404 U.S. 307, 320–21, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). See also In re Thomas J. , 372 Md. 50, 73, 811 A.2d 310 (2002) () (quoting Divver , 356 Md. at 388–89, 739 A.2d 71 ).
In United States v. MacDonald , 456 U.S. 1, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held that "the Speedy Trial Clause has no application after the Government, acting in good faith, formally drops charges." MacDonald , 456 U.S. at 7, 102 S.Ct. 1497. "Once charges are dismissed, the speedy trial guarantee is no longer applicable." Id. at 8, 102 S.Ct. 1497 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court stated that any undue delay after the Government, acting in good faith, dismisses charges must be scrutinized under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, not the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 7, 102 S.Ct. 1497. The Supreme Court reasoned as follows, why a dismissal of...
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