Greene v. United States, 17-1623C

• Decision Date: 05 April 2018
• Docket Number: No. 17-1623C,17-1623C
• Parties: KATORIA GREENE, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Claims Court

KATORIA GREENE, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.

No. 17-1623C

United States Court of Federal Claims

April 5, 2018

ORIGINAL

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

Pro se, RCFC 12(b)(1); RCFC 12(b)(6); Subject-Matter Jurisdiction; Failure To State A Claim; Money-Mandating Source Of Law; In Forma Pauperis; Habeas Corpus; Breach Of Contract.

Katoria Greene, Tallahassee, FL, plaintiff pro se.

Isaac B. Rosenberg, Trial Attorney, Steven J. Gillingham, Assistant Director, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, Chad A. Readier, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GRIGGSBY, Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff pro se, Katoria Greene, brought this action challenging her federal criminal conviction and subsequent sentence to incarceration by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia and alleging, among other things, breach of contract claims against the United States. See generally Compl.; Am. Compl. The government has moved to dismiss this matter for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC"). See generally Def. Mot. Plaintiff has also moved to proceed in this matter in forma pauperis. See generally Pl. Mot. to Proceed In Forma Pauperis.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court: (1) GRANTS the government's motion to dismiss; (2) GRANTS plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis; and (3) DISMISSES the complaint.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND¹

A. Factual Background

In this action, plaintiff pro se, Katoria Greene challenges her federal criminal conviction and subsequent sentence to incarceration by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia and she alleges, among other things, breach of contract claims against the United States. See generally Compl.; Am. Compl. Plaintiff's complaint and amended complaint are difficult to follow. But, it appears that plaintiff seeks to contest the validity of her guilty plea, and to challenge her criminal conviction and subsequent sentence to incarceration. See generally Compl.; Am. Compl. Plaintiff also appears to allege that she has entered into an adhesion contract and a maritime contract with the government.² See Compl. at 2; see also Pl. Resp. at 2. As relief, plaintiff seeks, among other things, $10 million in monetary damages and certain injunctive relief related to her criminal case. See Compl. at 5; Am. Compl. at 9.

1. Background

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Federal Correctional Institution located in Tallahassee, Florida. See Compl. at 2; Def. Mot. at 2. On August 12, 2014, a federal grand jury seated in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia entered a five-count indictment against plaintiff for theft of government property, aggravated identity theft, and fraud, arising from plaintiff's theft of checks from the United States Department of the Treasury (the "Treasury") and unauthorized possession of over 1,000 social security numbers. See generally Indictment, Greene, No. 1:14-CR-00030-WLS-TQL-1 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 12, 2014), at Entry No. 3.On December 17, 2014, plaintiff pled guilty to three of the five counts in the indictment. Def. Mot. at 1-2; see also Greene, No. 1:14-CR-00030-WLS-TQL-1 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2014), at Entry Nos. 27-28. And so, plaintiff was sentenced to 120 months in prison and ordered to pay restitution to the Treasury on July 15, 2015. Def. Mot. at 2; see also Greene, No. 1:14-CR-00030-WLS-TQL-1 (M.D. Ga. July 15, 2015), at Entry No. 44.

2. Plaintiff's District Court Litigation

Following her sentence to incarceration, plaintiff filed an action seeking to vacate her sentence in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia on July 18, 2016. Greene, No. 1:14-CR-00030-WLS-TQL-1 (M.D. Ga. July 18, 2016), at Entry No. 51. This case was pending before the district court at the time that plaintiff commenced this action. See, e.g., id. at Entry No. 98.

On August 10, 2017, plaintiff, proceeding under the name "Tirzah El-Bey," filed another civil action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida challenging her criminal conviction and subsequent sentence to incarceration. El-Bey v. United States, No. 4:17-cv-364 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2017), at Entry No. 3. At the time plaintiff commenced this action, this case was also pending before the district court. The district court dismissed plaintiff's case on November 20, 2017. Id. at Entry No. 8.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff commenced this action on October 25, 2017. See generally Compl. On October 25, 2017, plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. See generally Pl. Mot to Proceed In Forma Pauperis.

On November 16, 2017, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. See generally Am. Compl. On December 15, 2017, the government filed a motion to dismiss this matter, pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). See generally Def. Mot.

On February 6, 2018, plaintiff filed a response and opposition to the government's motion to dismiss. See generally Pl. Resp. On February 9, 2018, the government filed a reply in support of its motion to dismiss. See generally Def. Reply.

These matters having been fully briefed, the Court resolves the pending motions.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Pro Se Litigants

Plaintiff is proceeding in this matter pro se, without the benefit of counsel. And so, the Court applies the pleadings requirements leniently. Beriont v. GTE Labs., Inc., 535 F. App'x 919, 925-26 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). When determining whether a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, this Court affords more leeway under the rules to pro se plaintiffs than to plaintiffs who are represented by counsel. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (holding that pro se complaints, "however inartfully pleaded," are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"); Matthews v. United States, 750 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2014). But, there "is no duty on the part of the trial court to create a claim which [the plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleadings." Lengen v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 317, 328 (2011) (brackets existing) (internal quotation omitted).

In addition, while "a pro se plaintiff is held to a less stringent standard than that of a plaintiff represented by an attorney, . . . the pro se plaintiff, nevertheless, bears the burden of establishing the Court's jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Riles v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010) (citing Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). And so, the Court may excuse ambiguities, but not defects, in the complaint. Colbert v. United States, No. 2014-5029, 2015 WL 2343578, at *1 (Fed. Cir. May 18, 2015); see also Demes v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 365, 368 (2002) ("[T]he leniency afforded pro se litigants with respect to mere formalities does not relieve them of jurisdictional requirements.").

B. RCFC 12(b)(1)

When deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, this Court must assume that all undisputed facts alleged in the complaint are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. United States, 464 F.3d 1325, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also RCFC 12(b)(1). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction, and she must do so by a preponderance of the evidence. Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988). And so, should the Court determine that "it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, it must dismiss the claim." Matthews v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 274, 278 (2006).

In this regard, the United States Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction and "possess[es] only that power authorized by Constitution and statute." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Specifically, the Tucker Act grants the Court jurisdiction over:

[A]ny claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Tucker Act is, however, "a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages. . . . [T]he Act merely confers jurisdiction upon [the United States Court of Federal Claims] whenever the substantive right exists." United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). And so, to come within the jurisdictional reach and waiver of the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages. Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005). If the Court finds that the alleged source of law is not money-mandating, the Court must dismiss the claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. RCFC 12(b)(1); Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1173.

Specifically relevant to this matter, it is well-established that "the Tucker Act does not grant the Court of Federal Claims subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce the federal criminal code," or to grant relief sounding in a writ of habeas corpus. Canuto v. United States, 651 F. App'x 996, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see, e.g., Ledford v. United States, 297 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 379 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("The court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims whatsoever under the federal criminal code . . . ."); Cooper v. ...