Ledford v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 06 August 2002
• Docket Number: No. 02-5027.,02-5027.
• Citation: 297 F.3d 1378
• Parties: Charles William LEDFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit

297 F.3d 1378

Charles William LEDFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 02-5027.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

August 6, 2002.

Charles William Ledford, of Colorado Springs, CO, pro se.

Robert L. Baker, Attorney, Appellate Section, Tax Division, Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. With him on the brief were Eileen J. O'Connor, Assistant Attorney General; and David I. Pincus, Attorney.

Before CLEVENGER, RADER, and BRYSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Charles William Ledford appeals the United States Court of Federal Claims's order dismissing his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.

I

Mr. Ledford paid no federal income tax for the years 1996, 1997 or 1998. He reported no taxable income in those years because, in his view, the federal income tax does not reach compensation received for personal labor. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which disagrees with this proposition, instituted collection actions and began a criminal investigation of Mr. Ledford.

In an effort to halt the collection proceedings and the investigation of his failure to pay any income tax, Mr. Ledford filed a complaint in the Court of Federal Claims seeking habeas corpus relief, injunctive and declaratory relief, money damages and the refund of federal taxes for 1996, 1997 and 1998. The government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the claims for habeas corpus, injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as the request for damages arising from the IRS's allegedly unlawful tax collection activities and criminal investigation. The government also moved to dismiss the tax refund claim for failure to state a claim, arguing that Mr. Ledford did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements for a tax refund suit in the Court of Federal Claims. After Mr. Ledford failed to file a reply, the court granted the government's motion and entered an order dismissing the complaint. Mr. Ledford then filed a request for reconsideration, which alleged that the court had erred in dismissing his complaint because, inter alia, "the court has never addressed the issue that United States law does not tax compensation for personal labor." He also claimed that the court was bound under res judicata principles to follow a "common law judgment" from the so-called "Common Law Court of the United States of America" that, according to Mr. Ledford, establishes an implied contract between himself and the United States granting him "common law immunity" from taxation. The court denied Mr. Ledford's request for reconsideration and entered an order instructing the clerk not to accept any further filings of any nature from Mr. Ledford. Mr. Ledford now appeals the dismissal of his complaint. We have jurisdiction over an appeal from a final judgment of the Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

II

We review de novo whether the Court of Federal Claims properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction Mr. Ledford's claims for habeas corpus and equitable relief, Massie v. United States, 166 F.3d 1184, 1187 (Fed.Cir.1999), and whether the court properly dismissed the refund claim for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted, Gould, Inc. v. United States, 935 F.2d 1271, 1274 (Fed.Cir.1991).

Turning to Mr. Ledford's request for a writ of habeas corpus, we affirm the dismissal of that claim on two grounds. First, the habeas statute gives federal courts the authority to issue a writ only if the petitioner is "in custody," 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000), and therefore there is a jurisdictional requirement "that the habeas petitioner be `in custody' under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed." Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989). Although he is the subject of a criminal investigation by the IRS, because Mr. Ledford has not alleged that he is currently in custody, habeas jurisdiction does not lie. Second, and equally important, the habeas statute does not list the Court of Federal Claims among those courts empowered to grant a writ of habeas corpus, and the trial court therefore is without power to entertain Mr. Ledford's petition. Thus, we affirm the court's dismissal of the habeas petition.

As the government notes, Mr. Ledford's brief to this court does not appear to challenge the trial court's dismissal of his other claims for relief. Under such circumstances, we would normally consider Mr. Ledford to have waived any arguments asserting jurisdiction under statutes other than the habeas statute. However, because Mr. Ledford is proceeding pro se, we will also review the trial court's dismissal of his requests for injunctive and declaratory relief, damages, and a refund of taxes.

We turn first to Mr. Ledford's request for injunctive and declaratory relief halting the IRS collection proceedings. It is well established that the Court of Federal Claims "has jurisdiction only where and to the extent that the government has waived its sovereign immunity, and any waiver of sovereign immunity `cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.'" Overall Roofing & Constr. Inc. v. United States, 929 F.2d 687, 688 (Fed.Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1969)). In order to establish jurisdiction over these claims, therefore, Mr. Ledford must point to some statute specifically conferring power upon the trial court to grant his desired relief. This he has failed to do-perhaps because no statutory authority exists that would grant the Court of Federal Claims the power to enjoin an IRS collection proceeding. Indeed, aside from a few very limited exceptions not implicated here, 26 U.S.C. § 7421 flatly prohibits any suits "for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax ... in any court by any person." Although Mr. Ledford cites Rule of Procedure 65(d) of the Court of Federal Claims as authority for granting such relief, it is well established that federal rules of civil procedure cannot expand a court's subject matter jurisdiction. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 337-38, 89 S.Ct. 1053, 22 L.Ed.2d 319 (1969). Furthermore, a review of the pleadings indicates that Mr. Ledford bases his entitlement to this relief on his view that the federal tax code does not tax compensation received for personal labor. Mr. Ledford's view of the tax law is mistaken, as the tax code quite plainly defines income to include amounts received in compensation for services rendered. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2000) ("[G]ross income means all income from whatever source derived including (but not limited to) the following items: (1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items...."). Indeed, every court that has...