Greene v. Willis

• Decision Date: 29 March 1926
• Docket Number: Nos. 6129, 6130.,s. 6129, 6130.
• Citation: 132 A. 545
• Parties: GREENE et ux. v. WILLIS et ux. (two cases).
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

132 A. 545

GREENE et ux.

v. WILLIS et ux. (two cases).^*

Nos. 6129, 6130.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 29, 1926.

George A. Willis and wife and Horatio B. V. Greene and wife both instituted proceedings in municipal court to adopt a minor child. The petition of George A. Willis and wife was granted, and the other denied. Horatio B. V. Greene and wife appealed from these decrees to the superior court, where they were reversed, whereupon George A. Willis and his wife filed their bill of exceptions in each case, and each case was certified to the Supreme Court. On motion of George A. Willis and wife that the superior court be directed to dismiss the appeals for want of jurisdiction. Motion granted.

Flynn & Mahoney, of Providence, for appellants.

Benjamin W. Grim, of Providence, for appellees.

SWEETLAND, C. J. Each of the above-entitled cases is an appeal from a decree of the municipal court of the city of Providence, brought to this court upon the bill of exceptions of the appellees filed after a decision of the superior court in which that court reversed the decree of the municipal court.

Each case is before us at this time upon the motion of the appellees that the superior court be directed to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the superior court was without jurisdiction to try and determine said appeal, and that this court is without jurisdiction to pass upon said bill of exceptions.

Since these motions question the jurisdiction of this court and of the superior court, in accordance with our well-settled practice we will pass upon that question before considering the bills of exceptions upon which the cases were brought here. McKenna v. McKenna, 69 A. 844, 29 R. I. 224; Hadfield v. Cushing, 86 A. 897, 35 R. I. 306.

It appears that one Mildred M. Lohr is a child about 11 years of age; that both of her parents are dead; that the appellee Louise I. Willis is a sister of the child's deceased father, and that the appellant Katherine J. Greene is a sister of the child's deceased mother. Mrs. Willis, joining with her husband, the other appellee, petitioned the municipal court that they be permitted, in accordance with the provisions of the statute, to adopt said child. Later, Mrs. Greene joining with her husband, the other appellant, also petitioned the municipal court that they be permitted to adopt said child. Both of said petitions being pending in the municipal court, they were, for the convenience of the parties, heard together.

Said court on June 5, 1924, entered a decree granting the petition of the appellees Willis, and also a decree denying that of the appellants Greene. Thereafter, within, 40 days of their entry, the appellants Greene, by a claim of appeal filed in each case, appealed to the superior court from the entry of each decree. These appeals were heard before a justice of the superior court sitting without a jury. Said justice filed his decision reversing the decree of the municipal court in each case, whereupon the appellees filed their bill of exceptions in each case, and each case was certified to this court.

The grounds upon which the appellees now claim that the superior court and this court are without jurisdiction in the premises are that, as to the decree of the municipal court granting the Willis petition, the appellants had no right of appeal under the statute, and that, as to the appeal from the decree entered upon the Greene petition, the appeal was entirely ineffective to bring the question of the adoption of Mildred M. Lohr before the superior court or before this court, as there was a judgment of the municipal court upon the matter of the adoption of Mildred M. Lohr from which no valid appeal has or can now be taken. Which judgment has become final and conclusive, and binding upon the superior court and upon us.

We will first consider the motion of the appellees with reference to the appeal from the decree of the municipal court granting the petition of the appellees. Although a recognized precedure under the civil law, the adoption of children was unknown in the common law of England. It came into the law of this state solely by virtue of the statute. It has been generally held that statutes providing for the adoption of children, being in alteration of the common law. am to be strictly construed. Purinton v. Jamrock, 80 N. E. 802, 195 Mass. 187, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 926. Although, as against the interests of the child, the proceedings must be strictly in accordance with the statute, it has been held in some cases that such statutes should be given a liberal construction in order to support a decree of adoption which was for the benefit of the adopted child, when the jurisdiction of the court entering the decree has been later attacked on the ground that some statutory provision has not been precisely complied with. Sewell v. Roberts, 115 Mass. 262, at page 275. We find no case, however, in which exact compliance with a statutory provision prescribing the persons who may appeal from a decree granting adoption has not been insisted upon. Gray v. Gardner, 18 A. 286, 81 Me. 554.

In their reasons of appeal in each case the appellants Greene have apparently relied upon the general provisions regulating appeals from probate courts. They have alleged themselves to be persons aggrieved by the decree of the municipal court entered upon the respective petitions. In this allegation the appellants are in error. This court has said that a person "aggrieved" by a decree of the probate court, to whom a right of appeal therefrom has been given by statute, is solely one having a substantial grievance; i. e., the denial of some personal or property right, or the imposition upon him of a burden or obligation. Tillinghast v. Brown University, 52 A. 891, 24 R. I. 179; Hadfield v. dishing, 86 A. 897, 35 R. I. 306. With reference to the general provision relating to appeals from decrees of probate courts, these appellants are in substantially the same situation as was the appellant in McKenna v. McKenna, 69 A. 844, 29 R. I. 224. In that case a brother had petitioned that the probate court place his sister, a person of full age, under guardianship. His petition was denied, and he took an appeal to the...