Greene v. Willis

• Decision Date: 03 June 1926
• Docket Number: Nos. 6129, 6130.,s. 6129, 6130.
• Citation: 133 A. 651
• Parties: GREENE et al. v. WILLIS et al. (two cases).
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

133 A. 651

GREENE et al.

v. WILLIS et al. (two cases).

Nos. 6129, 6130.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 3, 1926.

On mtoion for rehearing. Motion denied. For former opinion, see 132 A. 545.

Flynn & Mahoney, of Providence, for appellants.

Benjamin W. Grim, of Providence, for appellees.

SWEETLAND, C. J. After opinion previously filed in the above-entitled cases, they are before us again upon the motion of the appellants Greene for a rehearing. The ground upon which rehearing is sought is that, although both the appellants Greene and the appellees Willis preferred their respective petitions for the adoption of the minor, Mildred M. Lohr, to the municipal court of the city of Providence, the decree of that court in each case should now be set aside, because that court was without jurisdiction.

Section 1, c. 288, G. L. 1923, provides, with reference to a petition for the adoption of children, that:

"The court of the town in which the child to be adopted resides shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of such petition."

The appellants now claim that the minor, Mildred M. Lohr, did not at the time of the filing of these petitions reside in Providence.

The terms "reside" and "residence," when used in statutes, have different meanings in different connections. They may refer to a temporary personal existence, or dwelling, in a certain place, or they may refer to a person's legal residence, and be regarded as synonymous with domicile. In State ex rel. Goldsworthy v. Aldrich, 14 R. I. 171, it was held that the provision of the state Constitution requiring the "residence" of an elector in the town or city in which he claims a right to vote means having a "domicile" there, and does not refer to the place of his actual abode. This is the meaning usually given to these words in statutes regulating probate jurisdiction in matters of administration or guardianship, and this is the interpretation which should be given tot the word "reside" in the provision relating to adoption.

The domicile of a minor child during his father's lifetime is that of the father. Upon the father's death the domicile of the infant ordinarily follows that of the mother, if the mother survives the father. In such circumstances, after the death of the mother, the domocile of the child will remain that of the mother until changed by some competent authority. From the record of the evidence presented by the appellants Greene, it appears that the father of Mildred M. Lohr died...