Greener v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.

• Decision Date: 27 December 1993
• Parties: , 863 P.2d 784 Glenn GREENER, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, Defendant and Respondent. S034084.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 539

25 Cal.Rptr.2d 539

6 Cal.4th 1028, 863 P.2d 784

Glenn GREENER, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, Defendant and Respondent.

S034084.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Dec. 27, 1993.

Thomas D. Kolpacoff and Paul I. Palant, South Lake Tahoe, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Richard W. Younkin, San Rafael, and Thomas J. McBirnie, San Francisco, for defendant and respondent.

BAXTER, Justice.

We granted review in this case to consider whether a superior court has: (1) personal jurisdiction over the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, and (2) subject matter jurisdiction over an action to declare provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act (Lab.Code, § 3200) ¹ invalid and enjoin enforcement of those provisions. The Court of Appeal held that the superior court had jurisdiction.

We conclude that the superior court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I THE SUPERIOR COURT ACTION

The Legislature amended sections 4903 and 5710 in 1991. (Stats.1991, ch. 934, § 14; id., ch. 116, § 32.) The amendments terminated the power of the Board to make awards of, and allow liens for, attorney fees to applicant representatives who are not attorneys, and to award fees to unlicensed attorneys for representation of an applicant in a deposition taken by an employer or insurer. Appellants, who have graduated from law school and hold Juris Doctor degrees, but are not members of the State Bar, are "Hearing Representatives" who represent applicants seeking workers' compensation benefits. ² They initiated this action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the Sacramento County Superior Court. The complaint named the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (Board) as defendant and sought a declaration that the bills amending the statutes, which had not yet become effective The complaint sought a declaration that the bills were invalid because they had been adopted in violation of the open and public hearing requirements of Government Code section 9029 et seq.; denied equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution; and violated the separation of powers provisions of article III, section 3 of the California Constitution. ³ A separate count sought an injunction "prohibiting the amendment from taking effect."

were invalid under provisions of both the federal and state Constitutions.

The Board, in a "special appearance," moved to quash service of summons and to dismiss the action on the ground that the superior court lacked jurisdiction over it and the subject matter of the action. It asserted in support of the claim that section 5955 conferred jurisdiction only on the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court because the action concerned claims for workers' compensation benefits. The Board argued that controversies regarding benefits could be resolved only by the Board, whose rulings could not be reviewed by the superior court.

The superior court granted the motion to quash service of summons and dismiss in a minute order which also denied, for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter, plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs appealed from that order. Noting that the dismissal order was not appealable since it was not signed by the court (Code Civ.Proc., § 581d), the Court of Appeal treated the appeal as one from the order granting the motion to quash service of summons. (Code Civ.Proc., § 904.1, subd. (c).) The Court of Appeal then reversed the order. That court reasoned that the action did not challenge an order of the Board, and did not ask the superior court to interfere with the duties of the Board, since the Board had no duty to act under an invalid statute.

II THE JURISDICTIONAL QUESTION

1. Personal jurisdiction.

The Board argues that the Legislature, exercising the plenary power granted it by article XIV, section 4, of the California Constitution, has conferred exclusive jurisdiction over it on the Court of Appeal and this court. It relies for this proposition on that part of section 5955 which provides that only these courts may "restrain, enjoin, or interfere with the appeals board in the performance of its duties...."

We do not agree. The Board confuses personal jurisdiction with subject matter jurisdiction. The workers' compensation law nowhere states that the Board is not subject to suit in the superior court. Section 5955 provides only that the superior court may not entertain an action which seeks to restrain, enjoin, or interfere with the Board in its performance of duties created under that law. The Board is an entity present in this state that is subject to suit as a "public entity" pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 416.50. Personal jurisdiction is not determined by the nature of the action, but by the legal existence of the party and either its presence in the state or other conduct permitting the court to exercise jurisdiction over the party. Subject matter jurisdiction, by contrast, is the power of the court over a cause of action or to act in a particular way. (See generally Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 109 P.2d 942; 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Jurisdiction, § 9, p. 374.) ⁴

None of the cases relied on by the Board supports a conclusion that in limiting the types of claims that may be heard in a court, the Legislature has thereby withheld personal jurisdiction over the agency from that court.

In Loustalot v. Superior Court (1947) 30 Cal.2d 905, 186 P.2d 673, the issue was whether the superior court had jurisdiction in habeas corpus to review a contempt order of the Industrial Accident Commission (IAC), the predecessor to the Board. We did not hold that the superior court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Board. We held only that, on the facts of that case, an order granting habeas corpus would have the effect of annulling an order of the IAC, and thus would interfere with an order of the IAC in contravention of the exclusive review jurisdiction of that body. Loustalot was, therefore, a subject matter jurisdiction case.

The same is true of Sexton v. Atchison etc. Ry. Co. (1916) 173 Cal. 760, 161 P. 748. There the plaintiff sought to restrain the defendant railroad from providing free transportation to members of the railroad commission and its employees, as defendant was required to do by sections 11 and 17 of the Public Utilities Act. (Stats.1915, ch. 91, §§ 11 & 17, pp. 121 & 126.) The railroad and members of the railroad commission were named as defendants. The defendants demurred to the complaint. No challenge to personal jurisdiction over the railroad commission (or its members) was at issue. Considering a jurisdictional limitation similar to section 5955, we held only that the injunction sought was beyond the power of the superior court.

No personal jurisdiction issue was raised in Hickey v. Roby (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 752, 77 Cal.Rptr. 486, also a case involving superior court jurisdiction in matters relevant to Public Utility Commission functions. In that case the Public Utilities Commission had intervened. American Drug Stores, Inc. v. Stroh (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1446, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, affirmed a judgment entered on the granting of a demurrer without leave to amend in an action against the director of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control. The challenge made by the demurrer was to the subject matter jurisdiction of the superior court. The court held that the "action seeking a judgment which will interfere with the agency's prospective disciplinary orders is beyond the jurisdiction of the superior court, ..." (10 Cal.App. 4th 1446, 1452, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, italics added.)

The trial court erred, therefore, in granting the Board's motion insofar as it claimed lack of personal jurisdiction.

2. Subject matter jurisdiction.

We note initially that the procedure by which the Board sought to raise its challenge to the jurisdiction of the superior court over plaintiffs' action was improper. A motion to quash service of summons lies on the ground that the court lacks personal, not subject matter, jurisdiction over the moving party. (Code Civ.Proc., § 418.10.)

A challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of a court is properly brought by demurrer to the complaint (Code Civ.Proc., § 430.10, subd. (a); see, e.g., Santiago v. Employee Benefits Services (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 898, 214 Cal.Rptr. 679; Miller v. R.K.A. Management Corp. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 460, 160 Cal.Rptr. 164). It may also be raised by a motion to strike (Code Civ.Proc., §§ 435, 437); motion for judgment on the pleadings (Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co. (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 917, 122 Cal.Rptr. 470); motion for summary judgment (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c; Hisel v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 969, 238 Cal.Rptr. 678; United States Borax & Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 406, 213 Cal.Rptr. 155); or in an answer (Horney v. Guy F. Atkinson Co. (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 923, 190 Cal.Rptr. 18).

The challenge may not, however, be made in a "special appearance" by a motion to quash service of summons. The only situation in which a motion to quash service of summons has been approved as a procedure by which to challenge the sufficiency of the complaint is in unlawful detainer, where a demurrer is unavailable. (See Delta Imports, Inc. v. Municipal Court (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 1033, 1035-1036, 194 Cal.Rptr. 685.) ⁵

We do not, and indeed may not, approve the use of a motion to quash as an alternative to a demurrer, nor do we accept the assumption of the Board that by making its challenge by motion to quash and dismiss it avoided making a general appearance in the action. Notwithstanding a "special appearance" designation on a motion to quash, if the movant seeks relief on any basis other than lack of personal...