Greenfield v. Galaviz

• Decision Date: 12 January 2022
• Docket Number: CIV-21-839-R
• Parties: CHARLES LEE GREENFIELD, Plaintiff, v. COLLEN GALAVIZ, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

CHARLES LEE GREENFIELD, Plaintiff, v. COLLEN GALAVIZ, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV-21-839-R

United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma

January 12, 2022

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

SUZANNE MITCHELL, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff an Oklahoma state prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C § 1983. Doc. 1.^[1] United States District Judge David L Russell referred the matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 3. The undersigned recommends dismissal of the action without prejudice for failure to state a claim as his claims are barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

I. This Court's screening of the complaint.

This Court must review Plaintiff's complaint to determine if it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A, 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable legal basis or contains fanciful factual allegations. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1108 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). In making this determination, a court may sua sponte consider an affirmative defense “when the defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and no further factual record is required to be developed.” Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Fratus v. DeLand, 49 F.3d 673, 674-75 (10th Cir. 1995)).

The Court must accept Plaintiff's allegations as true and construe them, along with any reasonable inferences, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). The Court “review[s] the complaint for plausibility; that is, to determine whether the complaint includes enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting KT & G Corp. v. Att'y Gen., 535 F.3d 1114, 1134 (10th Cir. 2008)). A complaint fails to state a plausible claim when it lacks factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citation omitted). In other words, legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). When a complaint includes “well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. The Court liberally construes Plaintiff's complaint because Plaintiff is pro se. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam); Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. That said, the Court should not serve as an advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.

II. This Court must dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.

Plaintiff sues Colleen Galaviz and Rebecca Hill, Oklahoma County Assistant District Attorneys; the State of Oklahoma; and Oklahoma County Judge Amy Palumbo. He alleges:

[d]ue process violation last minute amendments changing information on indictment, false ruling slander, statutory violation conviction on formal charge and alternative.

Doc. 1, at 6. He states he is a “convicted and sentenced” state prisoner who received a life sentence and “is appealing.” Id. at 3.^[2] He asks that the Defendants be prosecuted for perjury, “sanctioned hard, ” fined, be fired, and “never work for the ADA again.” Id. at 8.^[3]

A. Plaintiff's claims fail under Heck v. Humphrey.

The Court must dismiss any claim that, if resolved in Plaintiff's favor, “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.” See Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dep't, 195 F.3d 553, 557 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). In other words, where success in a prisoner's § 1983 action “would implicitly question the validity of conviction . . . the litigant must first achieve favorable termination of his available state, or federal habeas, opportunities to challenge the underlying conviction or sentence.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 (2004). Heck's “favorable termination” rule applies regardless of the form of remedy sought. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-48 (1997) (holding that a claim for monetary and declaratory relief challenging the validity of procedures used to deprive a prisoner of good-time credits is not cognizable under § 1983); Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (explaining that “a state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)-no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)-if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration”).

Liberally construing Plaintiff's claims, the undersigned finds that success on these claims “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, ” so Plaintiff's action cannot proceed “until the conviction has been overturned.” See Beck, 195 F.3d at 557, 558 n.3 (applying Heck, 512 U.S. at 487); see also Ramos v. Shepherd, 415 Fed.Appx. 48, 48-49 (10th Cir. 2011) (Dismissal under Heck was proper, where plaintiff “allege[d] the sheriff's deputy gave perjured testimony, and that the remaining defendants improperly failed to bring the perjured testimony to the court's attention.”); Carr v. Lister, No. CIV-20-551-C, 2020 WL 6588730, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 2, 2020) (internal citations omitted) (“[A] favorable judgment on [the plaintiff's] claims that [the defendant's] ‘selective' and ‘vindictive' prosecutorial actions violated his rights to equal protection and due process, and his right to be free from double jeopardy, implies the invalidity of his convictions . . . .”), adopted, 2020 WL 6587056 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 10, 2020).

The undersigned recommends Plaintiff's complaint alleging due process violations is therefore barred and should be dismissed under Heck.

B. Plaintiff's claims otherwise fail under Younger v. Harris.

To the extent Plaintiff challenges the validity of his conviction, this Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims under the Younger doctrine. A federal district court must abstain under Younger when three conditions are met:

First, there must be ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings. Second, the state court must offer an adequate forum to hear the federal plaintiff's claims from the federal lawsuit. Third, the state proceeding must involve important state interests, matters which traditionally look to state law for their resolution or implicate separately articulated state policies.

Taylor v. Jaquez, 126 F.3d 1294, 1297 (10th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff states he is appealing his conviction in the state courts, which he has not shown provide an inadequate forum. Indeed, “Younger requires only the availability of an adequate state-court forum, not a favorable result in the state forum.” Winn v. Cook, 945 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2019). And the State of Oklahoma possesses a strong interest in administering its criminal justice system. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986) (recognizing the States' “powerful” “interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference”).

There are narrow exceptions to Younger abstention. But “federal injunctive relief against pending state prosecutions [is] appropriate [o]nly in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown . . . .” Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971). And “it is the plaintiff's heavy burden to overcome the bar of Younger abstention by setting forth more than mere allegations of bad faith or harassment.” Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 885, 889 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Neither Plaintiff's complaint nor the record of his criminal proceedings implicates an exception to Younger abstention. Based on the record, the undersigned cannot conclude Plaintiff will face irreparable injury if the Court abstains. See also Winn, 945 F.3d at 1258 (“[T]he only injury that arises from delaying dismissal of the charges (until state remedies are exhausted) is that the defendant must go through a trial and appeal, which is not the sort of injury that satisfies the Younger exception; in particular, the process of proceeding through a trial and appeal does no damage to the right to a speedy trial.”).

Because the three conditions requiring abstention under Younger exist, and in the absence of “extraordinary circumstances, ” the undersigned determines abstention is “non-discretionary” and “[this] court is required to abstain.” Chapman v. Oklahoma, 472 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Crown Point I, LLC v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n, 319 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003)).

III. Recommendation and notice of right to object.

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss this case for failure to state a claim without prejudice.

The undersigned advises Plaintiff of his right to file an objection to this report and recommendation with the Clerk of this Court on or before February 2, 2022, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). The undersigned further advises Plaintiff that failure to make a timely objection to this report and recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both...