Greenhaven Corp. v. Hutchcraft & Associates, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 May 1984
• Docket Number: No. 2-982A300,2-982A300
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court
• Parties: GREENHAVEN CORPORATION, an Indiana Corporation, Walter L. Green, William A. Mann, Joseph Goldsmith Construction, Inc., Muncie Federal Savings & Loan Association, Lawrence Walsh, Treasurer of Delaware County, and Jack Donati, Auditor of Delaware County, Appellants (Defendants Below), v. HUTCHCRAFT & ASSOCIATES, INC., Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

Page 283

463 N.E.2d 283

GREENHAVEN CORPORATION, an Indiana Corporation, Walter L Green, William A. Mann, Joseph Goldsmith Construction, Inc. Muncie Federal Savings & Loan Association, Lawrence Walsh Treasurer of Delaware County, and Jack Donati, Auditor of Delaware County, Appellants (Defendants Below), v. HUTCHCRAFT & ASSOCIATES, INC., Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 2-982A300.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

Second District.

May 3, 1984.

J. David Haynes, Muncie, for appellants.

Darrel K. Peckinpaugh, Muncie, for appellee.

SHIELDS, Judge.

Greenhaven Corporation (Greenhaven) appeals from an adverse judgment in favor of Hutchcraft & Associates, Inc. (Hutchcraft). The trial court awarded Hutchcraft $4,000 in its action on account for services and denied Greenhaven's counterclaim for negligent preparation of architectural plans.

We remand with instructions to the trial court to reduce the amount of the judgment after which the judgment, as reduced, is affirmed.

In August 1978, Hutchcraft, a professional architectural corporation, entered into an oral contract with Greenhaven to provide plans for renovating Walnut Corners, a building owned by Greenhaven. Hutchcraft submitted to Joseph Goldsmith (Goldsmith) Greenhaven's representative and general contractor on the project, preliminary plans calling for two exits from the top floor of the building. Goldsmith requested the plans be altered to provide only one exit from the top floor.

With knowledge the Office of the State Fire Marshall (Fire Marshall) might not approve the plans, as modified, Goldsmith began construction on Walnut Corners. In June 1979, Greenhaven notified Hutchcraft it had stopped the project and no longer needed Hutchcraft's services. At that time Hutchcraft had completed 95-97% of the work it had agreed to perform. Thereafter, Greenhaven refused to pay Hutchcraft the unpaid balance ($4,000) of the invoiced amount of $9,000 which Hutchcraft claimed it was owed. Hutchcraft filed a Notice of Intent to Hold Mechanic's Lien, and subsequently filed this action. The Fire Marshall has yet to approve the building for occupancy.

Greenhaven argues the trial court's judgment is contrary to law and contrary to the evidence. We disagree. On review, we will not set aside a judgment where the trial court has made findings of fact and conclusions of law unless it is clearly erroneous. Husted v. Gwin, (1983) Ind.App., 446 N.E.2d 1361.

The question of an architect's duty to prepare plans and specifications conforming to applicable building codes and ordinances appears to be one of first impression in Indiana. However, we find the following principles instructive.

There is implied in every contract between an architect and his employer an agreement that plans and specifications prepared by the architect will be suitable for the purpose for which they are prepared. Nave v. McGrane, (1910) 19 Idaho 111, 113 P. 82. This implied agreement includes the architect's duty to draw plans and specifications that conform to building codes, zoning codes and other local ordinances. Krestow v. Wooster, (1978) Fla.App., 360 So.2d 32. However, it is also generally held that an architect's duties to his employer depend upon the agreement he has entered into with that employer. Cobb v. Thomas, (1978) Tex.Civ.App., 565 S.W.2d 281; Mississippi Meadows, Inc., v. Hodson, (1973) 13 Ill.App.3d 24, 299 N.E.2d 359. Thus, if an architect and his employer agree that plans be prepared so as not to conform to applicable codes and ordinances, ¹ the architect no longer has a duty to provide conforming plans. The rule is generally stated:

"Where an architect is employed generally to draw the plans and specifications for a building of a given style and dimensions, he may recover for his services upon a compliance with the terms of his employment even though the building planned is one which the employer cannot erect at the place at which it was his purpose to erect it, but if the architect knows the place where it is intended to erect the building he must know the building restrictions of that particular place and must draw the plans and specifications accordingly or else forfeit his right of recovery for his services. So, the architect cannot revover for his plans and specifications where the building, if erected in accordance with them, would violate the building ordinances of the place at which it is to be erected unless he has been directed by the owner to so prepare them."

6 C.J.S. Architects Sec. 31 (1975) (emphasis added). See Nave v. McGrane, (1910) 19 Idaho 111, 113 P. 82; Bott v. Moser, (1940) 175 Va. 11, 7 S.E.2d 217; Bebb v. Jordan, (1920) 111 Wash. 73, 189 P. 553.

The trial court found:

"2. That plaintiff submitted drawings and that a representative of Greenhaven, namely Mr. Goldsmith, having observed said drawings, requested that alterations be made designing a building not requiring a second exit from the top floor; that said request was complied with and a second set or final plans were submitted to Mr. Goldsmith."

There is evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding Hutchcraft's original plans conformed to the Fire Marshall's Code, i.e., the plans called for two remote exits from the top floor, and that Goldsmith requested the plans be changed to provide only one exit. Therefore, Hutchcraft did not have a duty to draw plans conforming to the Fire Marshall's Code because it modified the plans at Goldsmith's request and direction.

However, although Hutchcraft did not have a duty to provide conforming plans, it was bound to perform with reasonable care the duties for which it contracted, Seiler v. Levitz Furniture Co., (1976) Del., 367 A.2d 999, and is liable for failing to exercise professional skill and reasonable care in preparing plans and specifications according to its contract. Smith v. Goff, (1958) Okl., 325 P.2d 1061. See generally, 6 C.J.S. Architects Sec. 27. Cf. Lukowski v. Vecta Educational Corp., (1980) Ind.App., 401 N.E.2d 781 (if architect owed duty to prepare plans and specifications with degree of competence...