Greenier v. Pace, Local No. 1188

• Decision Date: 23 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-CV-121-B-S.,01-CV-121-B-S.
• Citation: 201 F.Supp.2d 172
• Parties: Joseph H. GREENIER, Plaintiff v. PACE, LOCAL NO. 1188, Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

201 F.Supp.2d 172

Joseph H. GREENIER, Plaintiff v. PACE, LOCAL NO. 1188, Defendant

No. 01-CV-121-B-S.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

April 23, 2002.

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Joseph H. Greenier, Stockton Springs, ME, Pro se.

Jonathan S.R. Beal, Esq., Fontaine & Beal, P.A., Portland, ME, Defendant.

ORDER

SINGAL, District Judge.

A former paper mill employee claims that his union discriminated against him on the basis of his disability and cooperated with his employer's discriminatory treatment of him, in violation of federal labor and civil rights laws. He appears pro se. Presently before the Court are Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Docket # 27); Plaintiff's Motions to Object to the Court's Orders of February 20, 2002 (Docket # 34), February 21, 2002 (Docket # 37), and March 7, 2002 (Docket # 40); and Plaintiff's Motion to Object to All Court Orders (Docket # 43). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion to Dismiss; DENIES Plaintiff's Motions to Object to the Orders of February 20, February 21, and March 7; and STRIKES Plaintiff's Motion to Object to All Court Orders.

I. MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the adequacy of the claims in a complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Beegan v. AP, 43 F.Supp.2d 70, 73 (D.Me.1999). The motion to dismiss is not an occasion to prove or disprove the facts in the Complaint. Id. Rather, the Court assumes that all facts alleged in the Complaint are true and makes all reasonable inferences from those facts in Plaintiffs favor. Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996). Because Plaintiff represents himself pro se, the Court must be particularly generous in granting those inferences. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). Dismissal is only proper when it is clear that even if all the facts in the Complaint are true, Plaintiff cannot recover on any viable legal theory. Barrington Cove LP v. Rhode Island Housing & Mortgage Fin. Corp., 246 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.2001).

In what has been characterized as a "seminal pleading case," Winokur v. Office of Court Admin., No. CV 99-2518, 2002 WL 397657, *8 (E.D.N.Y. March 14, 2002), the Supreme Court recently reminded lower courts that, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff need only satisfy the simple requirements of Rule 8(a). Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 998, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)). The Complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiff is not required to plead facts supporting each and every element of his prima facie case. Swierkiewicz, 122 S.Ct. at 997. Rather, he need only plead enough facts to "`give the [D]efendant fair notice of what [his] claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Id. at 998 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957))

The approach that the Supreme Court set forth in Swierkiewicz requires the Court to treat complaints more liberally than recently has been the practice of either this Court or the First Circuit. For example, the First Circuit previously required plaintiffs to "set forth in their complaint `factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery ....'" Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth Coll., 889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.1989) (quoting Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir.1988)). Swierkiewicz makes clear that a complaint that does not address itself to every element of every claim may nevertheless be adequate under Rule 8(a). In addition, where Defendant's improper intent is an essential element of a plaintiff's claim, the First Circuit has insisted upon "specific, nonconclusory factual allegations giving rise to a reasonable inference of ... discriminatory intent." Judge v. City of Lowell, 160 F.3d 67, 75 (1st Cir.1998) (emphasis in original); see also Aulson, 83 F.3d at 3 (faulting plaintiffs for relying on bald assertions and unsubstantiated conclusions of law in setting forth their claims); Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 52-53 (1st Cir.1990) (same). Yet Swierkiewicz clearly indicates that it is not fatal to Plaintiff's case that some of his allegations at this stage may be legal conclusions rather than facts. Swierkiewicz, 122 S.Ct. at 999; see Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir.2002) (reading Swierkiewicz to mean that "[a] complaint that complies with the federal rules of civil procedure cannot be dismissed on the ground that it is conclusory or fails to allege facts.").

To the extent that the Court is unable to reconcile pre-existing First Circuit precedent with the Supreme Court's holding in an intervening case, the Court must follow the dictates of the Supreme Court. Cf. Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 230 F.3d 461, 467 (1st Cir.2000) ("[P]rior circuit precedent will yield to a contrary decision of the Supreme Court....") Therefore, the Court must review the Complaint guided not by the narrow question of whether it contains facts that, if true, could satisfy every element of an employment discrimination claim, but rather by the broader question of whether the Complaint contains enough information to put Defendant on notice of the nature of Plaintiff's claims

Ordinarily, in assessing Plaintiff's allegations, the Court may only consider facts listed in the Complaint.¹ Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). If it takes into account facts in documents other than the Complaint, it must convert the Motion to Dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Id. However, a narrow exception exists "for documents the authenticity of which [is] not disputed by the parties; for official public records; for documents central to the [Plaintiff's] claim; or for documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint." Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993). Here, Defendant attached several documents to its Motion to Dismiss, including correspondence between defense counsel and Plaintiff and records of two proceedings before the Maine Human Rights Commission (MHRC) and one proceeding before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).

Applying the Watterson exception, the Court will consider only two of the documents that Defendant submitted: (1) a charge of disability discrimination dated December 8, 1999, that Plaintiff submitted to the MHRC (See Def.'s Mot. to Dism. at Attach. C(5) (Docket # 27)); and (2) the related right-to-sue letter issued to Plaintiff on March 14, 2001 (See id. at Attach. C(8) (Docket # 27)). Plaintiff's Complaint sufficiently refers to these two documents, and they are central to his claim that Local 1188 retaliated against him for asserting his federal rights. Furthermore, Plaintiff apparently does not challenge their authenticity: in fact, he submitted the MHRC charge himself in support of one of his earlier motions.² (See Mot. to Amend at Ex. A (Docket # 22).) These two documents, in conjunction with the Complaint construed liberally in Plaintiff's favor, describe the following course of events.

B. Background

Plaintiff Joseph Greenier has been a member of the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Worker's International Union ("PACE") since 1974 and a member of Defendant PACE, Local No. 1188 ("Local 1188") since 1982. Greenier began working for Champion International/International Paper ("Champion") sometime prior to 1989. The collective bargaining agreement covering his employment prohibited discrimination against any employee. His worker's compensation records, personnel records, and pre-employment records, to which Local 1188 officials had access, reflected that he had both physical and mental disabilities.³ Because of these disabilities, Champion assigned him to light-duty jobs.

In February and March 1997, Greenier informed the mill manager that he was experiencing harassment and discrimination at the mill. The Complaint does not specify the nature of the discrimination. A few months later, Champion representatives made two allegations of criminal conduct against Greenier, which he claims were for the purpose of harassing him. On May 15, 1997, Champion personnel accused Greenier of taking property and threatened to terminate him, and on December 5, 1997, Champion and Local 1188 filed a police report containing unspecified false allegations against him.

At some point during 1997, Champion terminated Greenier's employment. The Complaint describes the ensuing events somewhat incompletely. However, it appears that Greenier grieved his termination, and the dispute proceeded to arbitration, at which Local 1188 represented him. Although Greenier was dissatisfied with the representation, in part because Local 1188 allowed Champion to select the arbitrator, he apparently prevailed. The arbitrator directed that he be allowed to return to work.

To Greenier's dismay, Duane Lugdon, Greenier's International Union Representative, refused to file a grievance or undertake court action to enforce the arbitrator's decision. Seven months passed. Finally, on April 8, 1999, Greenier participated in a meeting, the purpose of which was to plan Greenier's return to work. At the meeting, a Champion human resources manager appeared skeptical that Greenier suffered from disabilities as he claimed. He joked to Local 1188 officials, "Joe [Greenier] thinks he's disabled," and refused to provide Greenier with the name of Champion's "ADA coordinator." (See Compl. at ¶ 20 (Docket # 1).)

On April 13, 1999, Greenier returned to work at the Champion mill. In early May 1999, Greenier's then-attorney sent a letter to Champion's attorney, Local President Jeffrey Snowman, and Lugdon alerting them to ongoing discrimination and retaliation against Greenier at the...