Torres Ocasio v. Melendez

• Decision Date: 16 September 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 02-2379(SEC).,CIV. 02-2379(SEC).
• Citation: 283 F.Supp.2d 505
• Parties: Nydia Ines TORRES OCASIO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ciprian MELENDEZ, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

283 F.Supp.2d 505

Nydia Ines TORRES OCASIO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ciprian MELENDEZ, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV. 02-2379(SEC).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

September 16, 2003.

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Homero González-López, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Juan M. Frontera-Suau, Ana M. Margarida-Julia, Dept. of Justice, Federal Litigation Division, Celina Romany-Siaca, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

CASELLAS, District Judge.

The case before us arises from the allegedly discriminatory transfer of Plaintiff from her position as Temporary Manager with the Right to Work Administration (RWA). Plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated against on the basis of her political affiliation, and has brought suit against several individual Defendants, in both their personal and official capacities, under Sections 1983 and 1985 of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds (Docket ## 17 and 18). First, they argue that all claims against them, in their official capacities should be dismissed pursuant to their Eleventh Amendment immunity. Next, they argue that all claims against them in their personal capacity should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, because Plaintiffs have failed to meet the heightened pleading standard for civil rights cases established by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Judge v. City of Lowell, 160 F.3d 67 (1st Cir.1998), and has not shown that their claims survive Defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity. Lastly, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' causes of action under Section 1985 should also be dismissed due to Plaintiffs' failure to adequately plead a conspiracy to discriminate against them on the basis of a classification protected by Section 1985.

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, have filed an opposition to said motions (Docket # 26), and Defendants have duly replied to said opposition (Docket # 29). Having reviewed all the parties' filings, as well as the relevant case law, Defendants' motions will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Claims Against Defendants in Their Individual Capacity

Plaintiffs have brought suit against Ciprián Meléndez, María del Carmen Fuentes, Victor Rivera, Myrna Crespo Saavedra and Sila María Calderón, in their official capacities. However, the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

U.S. Const. Am. XI. Although the Eleventh Amendment literally seems to apply only to suits against a State by citizens of another State, the Supreme Court has consistently extended the scope of this Amendment to suits by citizens against their own State. See Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955, 962, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001); see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890). Even though the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is not a state, it enjoys the protection of the Eleventh Amendment. See Jusino Mercado v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 214 F.3d 34 37 (1st Cir.2000); Ortiz-Feliciano v. Toledo Dávila, 175 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 1999); Futura Development v. Estado Libre Asociado, 144 F.3d 7,12-13 (1st Cir. 1998); Culebras Enterprises Corp. v. Rivera Ríos, 813 F.2d 506, 516 (1st Cir.1987); Ramírez v. Puerto Rico Fire Services, 715 F.2d 694, 697 (1st Cir.1983).

The Eleventh Amendment bar extends to governmental instrumentalities, which are an arm or "alter ego" of the State. See Ainsworth Aristocrat Int'l Pty. Ltd. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 818 F.2d 1034, 1036 (1st Cir.1987); Ochoa Realty Corp. v. Faría, 618 F.Supp. 434, 435 (D.P.R.1985); Pennhurst State School Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-281, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977); Ursulich v. Puerto Rico National Guard, 384 F.Supp. 736, 737-738 (D.P.R. 1974). In addition, the Eleventh Amendment also protects state officials in their official capacity. The rationale behind this extension of the Eleventh Amendment protection is that a claim against a state official in his or her official capacity for monetary relief is an action for the recovery of money from the State. Ford Motor v. Dept. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 65 S.Ct. 347, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Hence, a claim against a state official for monetary relief is, in essence, a claim against the State.

Furthermore, the Civil Rights Act provides a cause of action against "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law..." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). "The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails." Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992) citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-257, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978).

Therefore, Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action against persons who violate an individual's civil rights under color of state law. Not everyone, though, is a person under Section 1983. For example, the Supreme Court has held that a municipality is not a person within the meaning of Section 1983. Monroe v Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). Similarly, the United States and federal agencies are not persons within the meaning of Section 1983. Accardi v. United States, 435 F.2d 1239 (3d Cir.1970); LaRouche v. City of New York, 369 F.Supp. 565 (S.D.N.Y.1974); Hoffman v. HUD, 519 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir.1975). And, most importantly to the case at bar, states, its instrumentalities, and its officials when sued in their official capacity, are not persons under Section 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); Cheramie v. Tucker, 493 F.2d 586 (5th Cir.1974). Therefore, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not apply to these Defendants' actions.

Plaintiffs have brought Civil Rights Act claims for money damages against the individual Defendants in their official capacity. Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, as discussed above, and pursuant to the definition of "person" under the Civil Rights Act, Plaintiffs' causes of action for money damages under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act against Defendants Ciprián Meléndez, María del Carmen Fuentes, Victor Rivera, Myrna Crespo Saavedra and Sila María Calderón, in their official capacities, will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. However, we must remember that claims for prospective equitable relief against a state and state officials in their official capacity are not prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment under the well-known doctrine expounded in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). Therefore, the claims against the individual Defendants in their official capacity, seeking prospective equitable relief, will survive.

Claims Against the Individual Defendants in Their Personal Capacity

Plaintiffs also bring claims under Section 1983 against the same Defendants named above, but in their personal capacity.¹ The Court believes that these claims should be split in two groups: 1) claims against María del Carmen Fuentes and Myrna Crespo Saavedra; and 2) claims against Ciprián Meléndez, Victor Rivera and Sila María Calderón. But, first, let us consider the standard of review applicable to this motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

Standard of Review

Defendants claim that all actions against them in their personal capacity fail to state a claim under the heightened pleading standard for Section 1983 cases set by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Judge v. City of Lowell, 160 F.3d 67 (1st Cir.1998). However, there is some disagreement in this Circuit on whether the standard set in Judge has been abrogated by the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002). Even though Swierkiewicz was a case dealing specifically with heightened pleading standards in the context of a Title VII claim for employment discrimination and not in a Section 1983 case involving qualified immunity, it is reasonable to think that its holding might be extensive to the present case. Even though the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has indeed acknowledged and applied the holding in Swierkiewicz in the context of an employment discrimination action brought under Title VII, the specific question of the effect of Swierkiewicz on Section 1983 cases involving a qualified immunity defense has yet to be addressed by the First Circuit Court. Gorski v. New Hampshire Department of Corrections, 290 F.3d 466 (1st Cir.2002). However, this Court has held, at least once, that, absent specific guidance from the First Circuit on this issue, it is reluctant to conclude that Swierkiewicz abrogated the holding in Judge with respect to Section 1983 cases. Data Research Corp. v. Rey Hernández, 261 F.Supp.2d 61 (D.P.R.2003). On the other hand, two of our sister District Courts from the First Circuit have already interpreted Swierkiewicz in a very broad manner, and...