Greenland v. City of Des Moines
| Decision Date | 20 November 1928 |
| Docket Number | 39216 |
| Citation | 221 N.W. 953,206 Iowa 1298 |
| Parties | W. H. GREENLAND, Appellant, v. CITY OF DES MOINES, Appellee |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Des Moines Municipal Court.--FRANK B. HALLAGAN, Judge.
Action at law for damages for injury to plaintiff's automobile caused by an accident on West Ninth Street in the defendant city. At the close of the evidence, there was a directed verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff has appealed.
Affirmed.
A. J Myers and Oscar Strauss, for appellant.
Charles Hutchinson, F. T. Van Liew, and Theodore F. Mantz, for appellee.
On the night of October 1, 1927, the plaintiff's son was operating the automobile in question upon the streets of Des Moines. At about midnight, he was traveling northerly on West Ninth Street. This street has an intersection with School Street, the latter being an east and west street. This intersection is irregular in shape, because of a "jog" in West Ninth Street at the north line of School Street. The location of West Ninth Street as it extends north from School Street lies 28 feet farther west than its location south of School Street, if extended northerly from such School Street. In short, there is a westerly "jog" of 28 feet in West Ninth Street at its intersection with School Street.
The driver of the automobile was not familiar with this condition, and was driving on West Ninth Street for the first time. It was a dark night, and was either misty or raining. The wind shield was covered with rain or mist. The "wiper" thereon (not automatic) was not used. For the purpose of better vision, the driver opened the door, and extended his head outside, for the purpose of avoiding the obstruction to vision by the wind shield. He was driving 18 or 20 miles an hour, and without any slowing down, drove across School Street and into and over the curb. His final collision was with a telephone pole that was situated in such parking on the north side of School Street. The claim is that the larger damage to the car was the result of this final collision.
The specifications of negligence are: (1) The failure to have lights, or other signals, at the northeast corner of the intersection, sufficient to warn approaching drivers; (2) the permitting of the telephone pole to remain in its location at such northeast corner, and especially the permitting of said pole to remain after it had ceased to be used for its original purpose; (3) the failure to place a light or signal upon such pole, adequate to warn approaching motorists.
I. We inquire first whether any of the alleged negligent acts of the city could be deemed the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. It is not claimed that the location of the telephone pole operated in any manner to deceive or mislead the driver of the automobile, so as to cause him to depart from the pavement. Nor is it claimed that the pole was so located as to present any menace to the safety of motorists traveling upon the pavement. The location of the pole beyond the curb upon School Street was in no sense the proximate cause of the accident, even though it may have contributed to the enhancement of plaintiff's injury. Nor did the pole, as located, necessarily constitute a nuisance, as contended. The statute expressly authorizes the location of telephone poles upon and along the public streets. Section 5904, Code of 1927. As a matter of common knowledge and observation, it may be said that, in the practical exercise of this authority, such telephone poles are located in the parking, and outside of the line of travel. Such was the location of the telephone pole in question. It may be taken as a matter of common knowledge, and observation also, that only a part of the width of a street is devoted to motor travel or traffic. Such traffic is confined to the paved space...
To continue reading
Request your trial