Greenleaf v. Garlock, Inc.
| Decision Date | 26 April 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-1820,Nos. 97-1820,No. 97-1821,97-1821,97-1820,s. 97-1820 |
| Citation | 174 F.3d 352 |
| Parties | Charles GREENLEAF, Jr., Alternate Executor of The Estate of Charles Greenleaf, Sr., Deceased; Naomi Greenleaf, In Her Own Right v. GARLOCK, INC.; Fibreboard Corporation; Celotex Corporation; Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp.; Owens-Illinois Glass Co.; Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.; John Crane-Houdaille, Inc.; A.W. Chesterton; Sepco Corp.; Uniroyal, Inc. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp.; Owens-Illinois Glass Co., Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. Hopeman Brothers, Inc.; Combustion Engineering, Inc.; Anchor Packing Co., Inc.; Armstrong World Industries, Inc.; Green Tweed & Co., Inc.; Melrath Gasket Company, Inc.; Melrath Basket Holding Co., Inc.; Pars Manufacturing Co., Third-Party Defendants. Owens Corning, Appellant,Charles Greenleaf, Jr., Alternate Executor of the Estate of Charles Greenleaf, Sr., Deceased; Naomi Greenleaf, In Her Own Right v. Garlock, Inc.; Fibreboard Corporation; Celotex Corporation; Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp.; Owens-Illinois Glass Co.; Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.; John Crane-Houdaille, Inc.; A.W. Chesterton; Sepco Corp.; Uniroyal, Inc. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp.; Owens-Illinois Glass Co., Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. Hopeman Brothers, Inc.; Combustion Engineering, Inc.; Anchor Packing Co., Inc.; Armstrong World Industries, Inc.; Green Tweed & Co., Inc.; Melrath Gasket Company, Inc.; Melrath Basket Holding Co., Inc.; Pars Manufacturing Co., Third-Party Defendants. Garlock, Inc., Appellant, |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Catherine N. Jasons, Robert N. Spinelli, W. Matthew Reber (Argued), Kelley, Jasons, McGuire & Spinelli, Philadelphia, for Owens Corning Appellant in No. 97-1820.
Fredric L. Goldfein (Argued), David C. Weinberg, Deborah M. Knight, Goldfein & Joseph, Philadelphia, PA, for Garlock, Inc. Appellant in No. 97-1821.
Martin Greitzer (Argued), Lee B. Balefsky, John M. Mason, Greitzer & Locks, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellees.
Before: STAPLETON and ROTH, Circuit Judges, and LONGOBARDI, * District Judge.
Garlock, Inc. ("Garlock") and Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp. ("Owens") appeal the District Court's orders denying their motions to alter or amend a judgment holding them liable for Charles Greenleaf, Jr.'s injuries in this strict liability asbestos products action. We address six of the issues tendered for resolution. Appellants argue that: (1) Pennsylvania's "one satisfaction" rule precludes Greenleaf's entire federal action; (2) issue preclusion prevents relitigation of damages in federal court; (3) the District Court's jury instructions inadequately informed the jurors regarding Pennsylvania law; (4) inflammatory statements by plaintiffs' counsel prejudiced the jury; (5) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of liability on the part of Garlock; and (6) the jury's verdict absolving the non-appearing defendants of liability was against the clear weight of the evidence. 1
We agree with the appellants that issue preclusion prevented relitigation of damages in this action and that a new trial is required to consider the non-appearing defendants' liability. We find appellants' remaining claims unavailing. Accordingly, we will reverse in part and affirm in part the District Court's orders.
Naomi and Charles Greenleaf filed this diversity action in March, 1990, against ten defendants, including Owens and Garlock, both manufacturers of asbestos products. The complaint alleged that occupational exposure to asbestos products produced, or used by, the various defendants had caused Mr. Greenleaf to contract mesothelioma, a cancer caused exclusively by asbestos inhalation. Mr. Greenleaf sought damages for pain and suffering, and Mrs. Greenleaf sought damages for loss of consortium. Appellants filed answers denying responsibility and asserted crossclaims for contribution against all co-defendants.
Two months after filing their federal action, the Greenleafs filed a state action in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas against five Pennsylvania defendants alleging identical claims. Unfortunately, Mr. Greenleaf died from mesothelioma soon thereafter, and Mrs. Greenleaf pursued his federal and state claims as executrix of his estate. In July, 1991, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation stayed Greenleaf's federal action and transferred it, along with other pending federal asbestos related personal injury actions, to Judge Weiner in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
While the federal action was stayed, Greenleaf pursued her state action, which proceeded to a reverse bifurcated trial in January 1995. Under this format, damages were considered in Phase I and liability in Phase II. The jury returned a Phase I verdict assessing damages of $151,870 for the estate, and $37,500 for loss of consortium. Greenleaf filed a motion for additur. Prior to commencement of Phase II, however, Greenleaf settled with the two non-bankrupt Pennsylvania defendants and executed releases in their favor. The record does not disclose the settlement terms. Pursuant to Greenleaf's request, the Court of Common Pleas marked the state action "settled, discontinued and ended" on January 24, 1995.
Two years later, Greenleaf reactivated this federal action. Appellants filed motions for summary judgment contending that Pennsylvania's "one satisfaction" rule barred relitigation of Greenleaf's asbestos claims in federal court, and alternatively that issue preclusion prevented relitigation of damages. The District Court denied both motions. Once again, trial proceeded in a reverse bifurcated format. Owens and Garlock were the only defendants to appear and actively participate in the trial. 2 The jury's Phase I verdict fixed damages at $250,000 for the estate and $1.6 million for loss of consortium. Greenleaf's trial presentation in Phase II focused primarily upon establishing their liability for Mr. Greenleaf's injuries. Appellants also presented evidence to prove the nonappearing defendants' liability on their crossclaims. The jury's Phase II verdict found Owens and Garlock exclusively liable for those damages and absolved all non-appearing defendants of liability for Greenleaf's injuries.
Appellants filed separate post verdict motions requesting judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial, remittitur, and modification of the judgment. These motions asserted numerous grounds for relief including claims that Greenleaf's prior state settlement had preclusive effect upon this subsequent federal action, and that a new trial was required on appellants' crossclaims regarding the nonappearing defendants' liability. Owens and Garlock appeal from the District Court's orders denying these motions.
Appellants claim that Pennsylvania's "one recovery" rule barred Greenleaf's entire action, and alternatively, that Pennsylvania's doctrine of issue preclusion estopped Greenleaf from relitigating damages in federal court. To determine the preclusive effect of Greenleaf's prior state action we must look to the law of the adjudicating state. See Huck v. Dawson, 106 F.3d 45, 48 (3d. Cir.1997); O'Leary v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1062, 1064 (3d Cir.1991); Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 116 (3d Cir.1988). We must give the acts of Pennsylvania's courts the same full faith and credit in federal court that they would enjoy in Pennsylvania's courts. See Gregory, 843 F.2d at 116 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738). Because the District Court's application of these doctrines solely involves questions of law our review is plenary. See Huck, 106 F.3d at 48; O'Leary, 923 F.2d at 1065.
Under Pennsylvania law:
A plaintiff who is injured at the hands of more than one tort-feasor may sue and recover a judgment against any one or all of the tort-feasors and may attempt to collect the damages awarded by the judgment against any one or all of them. However, although a plaintiff may obtain a judgment against several tort-feasors for the same harm, he or she is entitled to only one satisfaction for that harm.
Brandt v. Eagle, 412 Pa.Super. 171, 602 A.2d 1364, 1367 (Pa.Super.Ct.1992) (en banc) (citing Thompson v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209, 192 A. 107 (Pa.1937)); see Franklin Decorators, Inc. v. Kalson, 330 Pa.Super. 140, 479 A.2d 3 (Pa.Super.Ct.1984). "[T]he 'one satisfaction' rule bars a subsequent suit against another tortfeasor only where the prior proceedings can reasonably be construed to have resulted in a full satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim." Frank v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G. of W. Germany, 522 F.2d 321, 324-26 (3d Cir.1975). Full satisfaction may arise from a settlement with less than all tortfeasors. See id. at 326. Determining whether a plaintiff has been fully satisfied through a settlement, however, involves a highly factually sensitive analysis of Frank, 522 F.2d at 326 (quoting Blanchard v. Wilt, 410 Pa. 356, 188 A.2d 722 (Pa.1963)). The party asserting "one satisfaction," therefore, has the burden to provide the court with record evidence of the circumstances surrounding the settlement. The record in this case, however, contains virtually no evidence relating to Greenleaf's state settlement. Because appellants have failed to carry their burden, we cannot conclude that Greenleaf's federal action was barred by Pennsylvania's one satisfaction rule. 3
Under Pennsylvania law, issue preclusion applies where:
(1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the one presented in the later action;
(2) there was a final judgment on the merits (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party...
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