Greenlee County v. Webster
Decision Date | 15 May 1923 |
Docket Number | Civil 2040 |
Parties | COUNTY OF GREENLEE, a Corporation, and W. J. COLLINS, as Treasurer of Said COUNTY OF GREENLEE, Appellants, v. FRANK A. WEBSTER, JAMES H. KERBY and GEORGE WEBSTER, as the Administrators of the Estate of REECE R. WEBSTER, Deceased, Appellees |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Graham. W. R. Chambers, Judge. Judgment reversed and cause remanded, with direction that demurrers be sustained.
Mr Claude Hooker, Mr. H. A. Elliott and Mr. Dave W. Ling, for Appellants.
Mr. L Kearney, for Appellees.
The plaintiffs, as the lowest responsible bidders, were on March 17, 1919, given by the defendant county the contract to construct and improve some thirty-three miles of the Clifton-Springerville road, beginning with section 1 and extending to station 1835-31, section 7. The plaintiffs began the work of actual construction immediately thereafter. The county, acting through its board of supervisors and engineer, in the progress of the work, made many alterations in the plans and specifications, resulting in the alteration of the quantity, location and extent of the work as originally estimated and described in the contract. This action grows out of these alterations, or some of them the plaintiffs claiming that they were unreasonable and had the effect of changing the general character of the contract.
The alterations complained of were all made in section 1 of said road, and after such section was completed and paid for as per the certificates of the county engineer, but before the rest of the road was finished, the plaintiffs made out and presented to the county for allowance their verified demand for $28,048.51, as a balance due them on account of such alterations. This demand was presented to the board of supervisors of defendant county on June 7th and disallowed on September 8, 1920.
The complaint, which was thereafter filed, contains 218 pages of printed matter. It is neither possible nor necessary to do more than refer to its contents in a general way, except those portions thereof that have to do with the right to alter the plans and specifications, and define what shall constitute "extra work." Besides setting out bodily in the complaint the specifications, proposal and contract, and making a part thereof by inference the plans, maps and profiles, the plaintiffs have inserted therein in haec verba their demand against the county.
Just what alterations in the plans and specifications were made and what was done to change the general character of the contract cannot be determined from any allegation of the complaint independent of the demand on the defendant county. There is no positive statement or allegation in the complaint as to what change or alteration was made, its extent or locality. Referring to the demand against the county we find it prefaced by a long argument by the plaintiffs, in which it is stated that two changes in the location of the roadbed had been made, and those changes are therein described as follows:
In the specifications furnished prospective bidders the work was classified according to its kind and character, for instance, as "Clearing and Grubbing," "Rock Excavation," "Common Excavation," "Overhaul," "Class A, B, and C Concrete," etc., or twenty-six different items of work and material. The plaintiffs submitted to the defendant county a form proposal containing an estimate of the quantity of each of the twenty-six classifications of work set out in the specifications, wherein they proposed to furnish all necessary machinery and apparatus, and all work and materials to finish the entire project, and to accept as full compensation the amount of the summation of the products of the actual quantities, as finally determined, multiplied by the unit bid prices. In the proposal plaintiffs stated it to be their understanding that the estimated quantities were approximate only, and subject either to increase or decrease, and whichever it might be they proposed to perform all quantities at the unit bid prices. The itemized proposal gave the approximate quantity of each item and the price bid per unit, and the product of these two, as for example:
70,121 cu. yds. excavation (rock) at $1.36 per cu. yd.
1,600 lbs. reinforcing steel at 7 1/2 cent per lb.
including bridge iron, at $90.29 per M.
The product of the twenty-six classifications, by the bid price totaled $236,329.42. This total was not the contract price that plaintiffs were to receive for constructing the road, but was for the purpose of comparing bids. Under the terms of the contract it might be increased or decreased. The particular provisions of the contract involved are the following, found in the specifications:
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