Greenlee v. Hardin

• Decision Date: 21 April 1930
• Docket Number: 28544
• Citation: 157 Miss. 229,127 So. 777
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: GREENLEE v. HARDIN

127 So. 777

157 Miss. 229

GREENLEE v. HARDIN

No. 28544

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 21, 1930

Division A

1. BILLS AND NOTES. Notes. What law governs. Parties dating note in Florida and making it payable there, in absence of evidence to contrary, "located" contract in Florida and subjected it to laws thereof.

The statement in the date line of the note that it was executed in Florida was only prima-facie evidence that it was actually executed there, rather than in Mississippi, but it was strong evidence that parties intended thereby for note to be governed by law of that state, where payment was to be made and this fact removed presumption that parties intended note to be governed by law of Mississippi.

2. HUSBAND AND WIFE. Married woman's note. Validity. Laws of another state.

Married woman held not liable on note dated and made payable in Florida and governed by its laws.

HON. S F. DAVIS, Judge.

APPEAL from circuit court of Sunflower county HON. S. F. Davis Judge.

Action by Otis A. Hardin against Mrs. Mattie Greenlee. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and rendered.

Judgment reversed.

Moody & Johnson, of Indianola, for appellant.

The note is void under the laws of Florida.

A married woman's notes, under the Constitution and laws of Florida, are void, and afford no basis for a common-law suit; Hodges v. Price, 18 Fla. 342; Virginia Carolina Chemical Co. v. Fisher et al., 58 Fla. 377, 386, 50 So. 504, text 507; American Insurance Co. v. Avery and Wife, 60 Ind. 566; Hall v. Forman, 114 So. 560, 563.

If performance is to be made, in another jurisdiction, the parties may justly be presumed as referring to its law as the standard, both of validity and construction.

Shacklett v. Polk, 51 Miss. 378.

Want of capacity invalidates a contract if not in accordance with the laws of the place of performance, even though want of capacity would not invalidate it under the law of the place where made.

Dalton v. Murphy, 30 Miss. 59, 64; Harrison v. Pike Brothers & Company, 48 Miss. 46, 56.

The contract may be dated in one place, signed in another, and delivered in a third, but the date is prima-facie the place of contract, where the place of delivery does not appear.

8 C. J., page 88, sec. 147; Ib., p. 1000, sec. 1303, and p. 1002.

As the record discloses that the note was made in Florida, and as it was payable in that state, then no question of conflict between lex loci contractus and lex loci solutionis is presented.

5 R. C. L. 934.

The validity and interpretation of personal obligations executed and to be performed in one state will be governed by the laws of that state when sought to be enforced in the courts of another state.

Dzialnski v. Bank of Jacksonville, 23 Fla. 346, 2 So. 696; Mattair v. Card, 18 Fla. 761; Ballard v. Lipman, 32 Fla. 481, 14 So. 154; Conner et al. v. Elliot, 85 So. 164, 165.

Forrest G. Cooper and Earl T. Thomas, both of Indianola, for appellee.

The maker of the note lived in Mississippi, she executed the contract in Mississippi and agreed to pay the same at the office of the payee.

Appellee concedes that matters connected with the performance of contract are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance, but that matters respecting the remedy, matters bearing upon the execution, the capacity of the parties to contract, the interpretations and the validity of the contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made.

18 A.L.R. 1516; Scudder v. Union National Bank, 23 L.Ed. 245; Voight v. Brown, 42 Hun. (N.Y.) 392; Liverpool, etc., v. Phenis, 32 L.Ed. 788; 18 A.L.R. 1533; Houston v. Keith, 56 So. 336, 100 Miss. 83.

Even if the note is governed by the laws of Florida it was not void nor was it given for an illegal consideration.

It is not contrary to the law of Florida for a married woman to acquire real estate.

Micou v. McDonald (Fla.), 46 So. 291; Citizens' Bank & Trust Company v. Smith (Fla.), 121 So. 900.

The note was executed in Mississippi.

It is true that the prima-facie presumption is that a note is executed where it is dated, as stated in 8 C. J., pages 1000 and 1002, but this prima-facie presumption is met when the record shows that it was made at the home of the plaintiff in Mississippi.

The presumption is never to be indulged that parties intended in making their contract to violate the law; and if there be two laws with reference to either of which they may contract and the contract accords with one of the laws it must presumed that the parties so intended because they had their election to mould the contract according to either law, and as the law presumes in favor of a contract and not against it the presumption must be that the parties had in view the law which will give full effect to their contract.

Storey on Conflict of Laws (8 Ed.), sec. 280, p. 376; Andrews v. Pond, 38 U.S. 65, 13 Peters 65, 10 L.Ed. 61; Dicey on Conflict of Laws, page 549; Minor on Conflict of Laws, section 171; Wharton on Conflict of Laws, secs. 401, 427E, 427H and 4271; Pickering v. Fisk, 6 Vt. 102; Baer Bros. v. Terry, 105 La. 479, 29 So. 886; Brown Bros. v. Freeland, 34 Miss. 181; Mortgage Company v. Jefferson, 69 Miss. 770, 30 Am. St. R. 587, and Commercial Bank v. Auze, 34 Miss. 662.

Argued orally by J. M. Talbot for appellee.

OPINION

Smith, C. J.

The appellee sued the appellant on a promissory note, alleging the execution of the note by the appellant, payable to Taylor-Alexander Company, Incorporated, and that the appellee was the holder thereof in due course. The appellant pleaded the general issue, and gave notice thereunder that the consideration for the note was the agreement of the payee to sell the appellant land in Florida, with reference to which representations of such a fraudulent character were made by the payee as rendered the note void.

The appellee introduced the note in evidence, proved what a reasonable attorney's fee for the collection would be, and rested.

The appellant then proved that she was married before and at the time of the execution of the note; that she lived in Mississippi; that the Taylor-Alexander Company is a corporation under the laws of Florida, with its principal office at Winterhaven, Florida. She then offered to prove the matters set up in her notice under the general issue, but on objection by the plaintiff was not permitted to do so.

Both parties requested a directed verdict; the request of the appellant was refused, but that of the appellee was granted; and there was a verdict and judgment accordingly.

The appellant complains: First, of the refusal of the court below to grant her request for a directed verdict, and the granting of the request therefor by the appellee; and, second, the exclusion of the evidence offered by her in support of the matters set up in her notice under the general issue.

The ground of the appellant's request for a directed verdict is that the validity of the note is governed by the laws of Florida, in which state a note executed by a married woman is void. Under the laws of Mississippi a married woman may execute a valid promissory note, but the law of Florida is to the contrary. In that state a married woman's promissory note imposes no personal obligation on her; but under some circumstances, not here in evidence, her separate estate may be applied in equity to the payment thereof.

The note reads as follows:

"Winterhaven, Florida, April 27, 1925.

"Twelve months after date without grace I promise to pay to the order of Taylor-Alexander Company, a corporation under the laws of the State of Florida, Five Hundred Dollars, No cents Dollars, at the office of Taylor-Alexander Company, Inc., for value received, with interest from date at the rate of six per cent per annum until paid."

The note being dated at Winterhaven, Florida, appears prima-facie, to have been executed in Florida; and as it is also payable to, and at the office of, a Florida corporation, the principal office of which is in Florida, we must hold that it is also payable in Florida. If the note was executed in Florida, and is payable there, it is, of course, governed by the laws of that state. But counsel for the appellee say that it appears by necessary implication, from the evidence hereinbefore referred to, that it was, in fact, executed in Mississippi. ...