Greenville County v. Stover

• Decision Date: 07 November 1941
• Docket Number: 15324.
• Parties: GREENVILLE COUNTY v. STOVER.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

17 S.E.2d 535

198 S.C. 240

GREENVILLE COUNTY v. STOVER.

No. 15324.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

November 7, 1941

Stephen Nettles, J. G. Leatherwood, and C. S. Bowen, all of Greenville, for appellant.

Wilton H. Earle, of Greenville, for respondent.

BAKER Justice.

The factual foundation for this action may be gathered from the following cases: Ex parte Hart (In re: Bowen), 186 S.C. 125 195 S.E. 253; Ex parte Greenville County (Appeal of Bowen et al.), 190 S.C. 188, 2 S.E.2d 47, and Ex parte Hart et al (Appeal of Bowen et al.), 190 S.C. 473, 2 S. E.2d 52. See also, Greenville County v. Stover, et al. (Greenville County v. Bowen et al.), 192 S.C. 31, 5 S.E.2d 461.

The transcript of record contains a "Stipulation" reading as follows: "There is a companion case of Greenville County against W. E. Bowen, which was tried along with this case and the same verdict and judgment rendered. The issues were identical. Notice of Intention to Appeal was also served in the Bowen case and it is agreed that the latter shall abide the decision of the Supreme Court in the Stover case, that is to say, if the Stover case is reversed, then, for like reason, the Bowen case shall be reversed; if the Stover case shall be affirmed, then, for like reason, the Bowen case shall be affirmed."

The agreed "Statement" in the transcript of Record is in part:

"This action was instituted in the Court of Common Pleas for Greenville County by the service of a Summons and Complaint (date not appearing in the record), and was an action for money had and received in the sum of Three Thousand ($3,000.00) Dollars. Subsequently an Amended Complaint was served bearing date January 25, 1940. By the Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant had received the sum of money aforesaid under orders of Honorable T. S. Sease, Judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, which orders were alleged to be null and void in that no notice was given Greenville County and Greenville County was not made a party to said proceedings.

"Within due time the defendant filed his Answer setting up the following defenses: (1) The Court was without jurisdiction of the action in that same was instituted by the County Attorney without lawful authority; *** (6) ratification by plaintiff of orders of Judge Sease, and waiver of all defects therein, by payment of said money with full knowledge of all facts; *** (8) defendant received, and plaintiff paid, the money herein involved in good faith, in the belief that same rightfully belonged to defendant; and (9) set-off for services rendered by defendant to plaintiff, reasonably worth the sum of Three Thousand ($3,000.00) Dollars, and equaling the demand of plaintiff.

"The cause came on for trial before His Honor William H. Grimball, Presiding Judge, and a jury, on January 30, 1941. At the conclusion of all the testimony, plaintiff made a motion for a directed verdict in its favor; and the defendant made a motion for a directed verdict in his favor. The motion of the defendant was refused and the motion of the plaintiff was granted, the Court directing a verdict for the plaintiff for the full amount sued for, with interest, to-wit: $3,657.50.

"Thereafter, a motion was made by the defendant for a new trial, which motion was refused."

This appeal is from the order of the trial judge directing a verdict in favor of plaintiff-respondent, and from his order refusing a new trial; and raises the following issues: (1) Was the action instituted without lawful authority? (2) Can money paid under a mistake of law by a municipal corporation or body politic be recovered? (3) Will an action lie to recover money had and received in the absence of bad faith in receiving such money? (4) Was the defendant-appellant entitled to a directed verdict on his plea of set-off on the testimony before the court?

In the view we take of this case, it can be conceded, without so deciding, that there is no merit in the first three issues. The fourth issue is meritorious.

Upon a trial of the case on its merits, the respondent introduced in evidence the entire record in the matter of Ex Parte W. E. Bowen and D. B. Stover, for extra compensation, which was a proceeding had before Honorable T. S. Sease, Judge of the 7th Judicial Circuit, when he issued his orders of June 2, 1937, and June 3, 1937 (afterwards declared invalid in Ex parte Hart et al., 190 S.C. 473, 2 S.E.2d 52) wherein he ordered the Greenville County Supervisor, Board of County Commissioners and County Treasurer to pay to appellant the sum of $3,000 on account, as extra compensation in accordance with the 1937 Greenville Supply Act, 40 St. at Large, p. 1071, and specifically by virtue of and in accordance with the authority of Section 33 of said Act. We will later herein refer to this section.

In introducing this record, which was done without objection on the part of appellant, the respondent did not undertake to limit the purpose of its introduction, and in stating to the Court and jury what the record contained, had this to say: "Also in these papers is the testimony that was taken before Judge Sease, six pages taken by Mr. Gilbert, the court stenographer, in which it seems that Mr. Bowen testified, Mr. Stover testified, Mr. J. Wilbur Hicks testified, Mr. Harold Major, of Anderson and Mr. Donald Russell of Spartanburg."

The petition in that proceeding was a joint one by appellant and W. E. Bowen, setting forth that they were the duly appointed, qualified and acting county attorneys for Greenville County; that since their appointment and the taking over of the duties of county attorneys there had been instituted against the County of Greenville nine separate suits and other proceedings by (then) present and former public officials of said county, seeking the recovery of alleged unpaid salaries and fees alleged to be due them by the County for over a period of years; that various defensive pleadings had been filed by them as the said county's attorneys, and over a period of five months they had given their undivided time and attention to the handling of such actions; that appearances had been made in the County Court and in the Court of Common Pleas, and one appearance before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the details of these appearances being set out in the petition; that when petitioners were appointed and took over the duties of county attorneys none of these fee and back salary actions were contemplated, and that the greater portion of their time and a large amount of study was required in the preparation and handling of such matters; that the Greenville Legislative Delegation, realizing the amount of time and work necessary in the proper handling of said actions, provided for such an amount or amounts as extra compensation for petitioners as may be fixed by a Circuit Judge upon application, and payment thereof to be made at such time or times as may be ordered by said Circuit Judge; that it was in the contemplation of the Legislative Delegation that petitioners should receive compensation on account, and at the termination of all litigation; "that your petitioners feel that the sum of $3,000.00 each on account in the premises is reasonable."

Upon this petition, a hearing was had before Judge Sease, at which time Mr. W. E. Bowen testified in detail as to the work he and Mr....