Greenville Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Thomas
| Citation | 352 So.3d 190 |
| Docket Number | 2021-IA-00456-SCT. |
| Decision Date | 08 December 2022 |
| Parties | GREENVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT v. Yolanda THOMAS. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi |
¶1. This appeal comes before the Court on interlocutory appeal involving statutory interpretation. The Greenville Public School District ("GPSD") challenges the sufficiency of the bond amount that Yolanda Thomas posted to perfect her appeal pursuant to the requirements of Mississippi Code Section 37-9-113 (Rev. 2019). GPSD argues that, pursuant to Section 37-9-113, Thomas is required to post bond in an amount equal to the full cost of the hearing transcript. The chancellor ruled that, based on the language of Section 37-9-113 and Mississippi Code Section 37-9-111 (Rev. 2019), Thomas's $200 bond was sufficient to perfect her appeal in the Washington County Chancery Court. This Court affirms the chancellor's decision.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. GPSD opted not to renew the employment of middle-school principal Yolanda Thomas. Thomas unsuccessfully contested nonrenewal through the statutory process, which included a hearing before the school board. See Miss. Code Ann.§ 37-9-109 to -111 (Rev. 2019).
¶3. Following the hearing on June 9, 2020, GPSD and Thomas's counsel discussed the bond amount required by Section 37-9-113(2) necessary to perfect an appeal of GPSD's decision to nonrenew Thomas's employment. GPSD argued that Thomas had to post bond in an amount sufficient to cover the costs of the hearing transcript, which totaled $7,717.90. Thomas disagreed. The parties could not come to an agreement as to what would be a sufficient bond amount.
¶4. On July 20, 2020, Thomas filed a timely notice of appeal from the school board's decision, along with a $200 cash appeal bond, in the Chancery Court of Washington County. Thomas subsequently filed a motion in which she sought a ruling from the chancellor that, pursuant to Section 37-9-113, her $200 cash bond perfected the appeal. GPSD filed a Response in Opposition, along with a Motion to File Correct Bond, or Alternatively, Dismiss Appeal. As summarized by the chancery court, GPSD maintained "that the clear language of [Section] 37-9-113(2) and [Section] 37-9-111(4) establishes that the correct amount of the appeal bond in this nonrenewal appeal is the cost of preparing the hearing transcript, which in this case is $7,717.90." GPSD argued that the appeal should "be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction if [Thomas did] not file an appeal bond in said amount."
(Footnote omitted.) This Court granted the school district's request for interlocutory appeal to address this issue.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6. This Court employs a de novo standard of review for questions of law, jurisdictional questions and issues of statutory interpretation. Aladdin Constr. Co. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 914 So.2d 169, 174 (Miss. 2005); Finn v. State, 978 So.2d 1270, 1272 (Miss. 2008).
DISCUSSION
I. Whether the chancellor erred in his interpretation of the statutory requirements for the cost of a judicial appeal under Section 37-9-113.
¶7. Section 37-9-111(4) states that Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-111(4) (Rev. 2019).
Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-113(2) (Rev. 2019).
¶9. GPSD contends that it is a "bedrock principal" of Mississippi statutes that the appellant must prepay appeal costs, which it claims is equivalent to the cost of the transcript. To support its argument, GPSD relies on language from Section 37-9-113(2) that provides for bond conditioned upon the payment of all costs of appeal. We decline to adopt this interpretation of the statute because the statute plainly does not require Thomas to prepay all costs of appeal. Miss. State & Sch. Emps.' Life & Health Plan v. KCC, Inc., 108 So.3d 932, 936 (Miss. 2013) . Thomas's right to appeal was created by the legislature and is governed by the specific language of the statute. Section 37-9-113(2) merely allows for a bond in an amount that is "conditioned" on the "payment of all of the costs of appeal[.]" The very definition of the word condition refers to a future event. Condition, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("A future and uncertain event on which the existence or extent of an obligation or liability depends[.]"). This Court finds that GPSD's suggested interpretation of Section 37-9-113(2), which would require Thomas's payment of the cost of appeal prior to or at the time of posting bond, is incorrect. GPSD does not point to any other statutory language that would plainly require Thomas to prepay all court costs or costs of appeal.
¶10. GPSD argues that a $200 bond is insufficient to perfect an appeal when the cost of the transcript is more than $200. GPSD relies on Shope v. Winklemann to support its argument that "[n]ot only is the payment of costs a requirement; it is jurisdictional." Shope v. Winkelmann, 328 So.3d 641, 644 (Miss. 2021) (citing Belmont Holding, LLC v. Davis Monuments, LLC, 253 So.3d 323, 328 (Miss. 2018)). Thomas argues that Shope is not applicable to this Court's review because this Court has never held that all costs of appeal must be paid before a chancery court has jurisdiction to review a school board's decision.
¶11. Shope is distinguishable from the present case because it addressed a different type of appeal under different rules. Id. at 643-44. Shope was an appeal from a county court to a circuit court in a medical malpractice case controlled by the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure and Mississippi Code Section 11-51-29 (Rev. 2019). Thomas appeals a decision of a school board for nonrenewal of her employment, perfection of which is controlled by Section 37-9-113. The Court in Shope did not consider the statutes at issue in this case.
¶12. Thomas relies on the procedural history of Board of Trustees of Hattiesburg Municipal Separate School District v. Gates, to support her argument that the assessment of costs occurs "at the end of the proceedings — not prior to the chancellor's review of the school board's decision." See Bd. of Trs. of Hattiesburg Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Gates, 467 So.2d 216, 217 (Miss. 1985). Thomas argues that if this Court had jurisdiction in Gates, in which Peggy Gates only paid the costs of the transcript of the school board's nonrenewal decision after being ordered to do so when she lost her appeal, then the chancellor in the present case must have jurisdiction to consider the merits of this case. Id. at 217. GPSD argues that Thomas's reliance on Gates is erroneous because the issue of whether the cost of the transcript is included in the amount of the bond sufficient to perfect an appeal under Section 37-9-113 was not before the Court in Gates.
¶13. Gates, however, is relevant to the present case because it stands for the proposition that the court assesses court costs at the conclusion of the proceedings. See id. The cost of the transcript, per Section 37-9-111(4), only becomes a court cost in the event a judicial appeal is taken. Until Thomas appealed GPSD's decision to the chancery court, GPSD was responsible for the costs of any transcript prepared. GPSD's interpretation of Section 37-9-113 would have this Court find that the mere act of filing an appeal automatically requires prepayment of court costs by Thomas. This is contrary to caselaw that finds that the assessment of court costs is within the discretion of the chancellor and generally is assessed against the losing party at the end of the proceedings. Fant v. Standard Oil Co., 247 So.2d 132, 133-34 (Miss. 1971) ("it is said that the costs in an equity suit does not follow the result of the...
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