Greenwood v. Greenwood

• Decision Date: 06 September 1983
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Ann GREENWOOD v. Raymond GREENWOOD.

Page 771

464 A.2d 771

191 Conn. 309

Ann GREENWOOD v. Raymond GREENWOOD.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 12, 1983.

Decided Sept. 6, 1983.

Jon L. Schoenhorn, West Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Michael Graham, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).

John L. Bonee, III, Hartford, for appellee (defendant).

Before SPEZIALE, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, PARSKEY, SHEA and GRILLO, JJ.

SHEA, Associate Justice.

In this action for dissolution of marriage the court, F. Hennessy, J., on March 31, 1981, awarded temporary custody of the minor child of the parties to the plaintiff with right of visitation to the defendant on a one-time basis at the office of a psychiatrist, any further visitation to depend on an evaluation of the initial visitation. On May 1, 1981, the defendant filed a motion for contempt alleging, inter alia, that since March 31, 1981, the plaintiff had refused to cooperate with the psychiatrist, respecting the initial visitation and requesting that the plaintiff be adjudged in contempt. At a hearing on May 19, 1981, attended by her attorney, but in the plaintiff's absence, the court found the plaintiff in contempt and ordered the issuance of a capias mittimus with a cash bond set at $1000. The plaintiff has appealed from the finding of contempt.

In her appeal the plaintiff claims that the court erred in finding her in contempt of the order of March 31, 1981, when (1) the order was not specific as to the time and manner of the performance of its conditions; (2) there was no evidence that plaintiff was aware of the order; and (3) there was no competent evidence that the plaintiff was in violation of the order. It is unnecessary to address any of these issues in disposing of the appeal at this time. We conclude that the appeal should be dismissed under our general supervisory power, as set forth in Practice Book § 3096, conditioned upon the plaintiff's appearing in the trial court forthwith for the purpose of effectuating visitation arrangements.

The essential facts are undisputed. On November 18, 1977, the plaintiff wife, who had commenced this dissolution action, was awarded, O'Sullivan, J., custody of the minor child, Jason, pendente lite, subject to reasonable visitation by the defendant husband. The defendant on January 14, 1978, left this state with Jason, who was then almost two years old, accompanied by a woman with whom the defendant still maintained a relationship at the time of trial. For two years they resided in the vicinity of Washington, D.C. Although the defendant telephoned the plaintiff intermittently, he never revealed his location, making it impossible for her to visit Jason. In January, 1980, however, the defendant did arrange to meet the plaintiff at the Washington airport so that she could visit with Jason. During the visit the plaintiff managed to obtain possession of Jason and returned with him to this state. Since that time she has been in hiding with the child and the defendant husband has been unable to see him.

On April 29, 1980, after the defendant had returned to Connecticut and filed a motion seeking temporary custody of the child, the court, Hennessy, J., modified the previous order of temporary custody by limiting any visitation by the defendant to the control and supervision of the family relations office, directing that the whereabouts of the child not be disclosed and prohibiting either party from removing the child from the state. A family relations officer filed a report recommending that temporary custody of the child remain with the mother without supervised visitation, that an attorney be appointed for the child and that a psychiatrist evaluate the parties and the child. On December 2, 1980, an attorney for the child and a psychiatrist, Walter Borden, were appointed in accordance with this recommendation. The attorney interviewed the parties, as well as their son Jason, and also conferred with other interested persons during January and February, 1981. Borden also was able to conduct psychiatric examinations of the parties, but not of Jason. On March 31, 1981, after the report of Jason's attorney had been accepted, the court issued the visitation order which was the basis for the judgment of contempt from which the plaintiff has appealed.

Before the issuance of the visitation order the plaintiff had arranged that her attorney would leave any messages with her parents, whom she would call periodically in order to receive them. When the court on March 31, 1981, ordered visitation at the office of Borden, her attorney telephoned her parents' home but spoke only with her sister who resided there. He left a message for the plaintiff to call Borden's office to make an appointment on the following day. The plaintiff herself had visited Borden for an examination on March 6, 1981, but she had refused to permit her child to be examined. She telephoned her parents' home and received the message left by her attorney. Despite extensive efforts by the defendant to learn of her whereabouts, she has not been heard from since.

It is quite evident that the plaintiff is determined to frustrate completely any order which might be issued allowing her husband to visit the child. She has reciprocated in kind for her husband's previous kidnapping of their child and keeping him for two years in violation of the initial temporary custody order. She has held the child incommunicado from his father for a period which now exceeds three years. Although she communicated regularly with her attorney regarding the court proceeding until she learned of the visitation order which is the subject of this appeal, from that moment to the present time she has not contacted him. Since neither he nor any member of her family knows where she and the child live, the plaintiff has succeeded in insulating herself from legal process and it is virtually impossible even to communicate with her.

We will not treat a litigant who displays such defiance to court authority with the deference generally accorded to others. This court has often dismissed appeals for contemptuous conduct of an appellant not necessarily related to the merits of the appeal. Nowell v. Nowell, 155 Conn. 713, 229 A.2d 701 (1967) (appeal dismissed nisi appellant's compliance with order for payment of counsel fees on appeal); Bromell v. Bromell, No. 12170 (order of June 22, 1983) (appeal dismissed nisi appellant's compliance with pendente lite orders for custody, support, alimony and counsel fees); Huybrechts v. Huybrechts, No. 10781 (order of February 2, 1982) (appeal dismissed nisi appellant's payment of pendente lite arrearage); see Walsh v. Walsh, No. 10901 (order of November 24, 1981) (appeal stayed indefinitely nisi...