Greer v. J. T. Fargason Grocer Co.

• Decision Date: 12 January 1935
• Parties: GREER v. J. T. FARGASON GROCER CO.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 443

77 S.W.2d 443

GREER v. J. T. FARGASON GROCER CO.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

January 12, 1935.

Error to Circuit Court, Shelby County; H. W. Laughlin, Judge.

Action by J. H. Greer against the J. T. Fargason Grocer Company. Judgment was entered dismissing the suit, and plaintiff appeals in error.

Affirmed.

Lee Owens and Hugh Magevney, both of Memphis, for plaintiff in error.

Edward B. Klewer, of Memphis, for defendant in error.

SWIGGART, Justice.

To the plaintiff's action for damages for personal injuries, the defendant pleaded a written agreement, signed by the plaintiff, releasing the defendant from any and all actions, claims, or demands for any damage, loss or injury sustained in consequence of the accident described in the declaration.

Plaintiff's replication to this special plea averred that the consideration for the release was paid him for the sole purpose of compensating him for the damage to his automobile; that at the time of the execution of the release neither party knew that plaintiff had sustained the injuries described in his declaration, which were internal in character; and that in the execution and acceptance of the release "nothing more was in the contemplation of the parties than to make a settlement for known damages, that is to say, a settlement for property damage to plaintiff's automobile."

The circuit court sustained the defendant's demurrer to the replication, the judgment reciting: "The court is of the opinion that the defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's replication and amended replication should be sustained because the court holds that the release given on the 11th day of February, 1930, was a release in the defendant's favor of all the matters and things set out in the plaintiff's declaration herein, and the court being of the opinion that if there was any mistake of fact which brought about the execution of said release that this court is without jurisdiction to try said issue and holds that the plaintiff's exclusive remedy is by suit in chancery to reform said release, and that this suit be dismissed, which is accordingly ordered."

This action of the circuit court is assigned as error on plaintiff's appeal in the nature of a writ of error.

The release is in terms general and all-inclusive, and the construction given it by the trial court cannot be reasonably disputed. The facts pleaded in the replication are therefore material only as tending to establish the plaintiff's right to have the written release reformed so as to make it conform to the true agreement reached by the parties. Unless it can be so reformed, the facts pleaded in avoidance could not be established in the evidence, because in direct contradiction of the terms of the written instrument and incompetent under the parol evidence rule. Equitable actions to reform a written instrument furnish exceptions to that rule of evidence, required by policy and expediency. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, vol. 2, § 858; Perry v. Pearson, 1 Humph. (20 Tenn.) 431.

The question determinative of the appeal is, therefore, whether the circuit court, as a court of law, has jurisdiction to reform a written instrument pleaded by the defendant in bar of an action for damages, when the basis of the reformation rests upon a mutual mistake of the parties, without fraud.

This court has twice denied that the circuit court may exercise such jurisdiction. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 167 Tenn. 421, 424, 70 S.W.(2d) 361; Tennessee Hoop Co. v. Templeton, 151 Tenn. 375, 270 S. W. 73.

The...