Greeson v. State, 35106
| Decision Date | 13 April 1954 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,No. 35106,35106,2 |
| Citation | 81 S.E.2d 839,90 Ga.App. 57 |
| Parties | GREESON v. STATE |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
Where, as here, there is direct evidence that a defendant on trial in a criminal case was present at the scene of the crime, but no evidence that he participated therein, this is insufficient to support a verdict of guilty where the circumstances are consistent with his contention that his presence was involuntary and that he was not conscious of the fact that the crime was being committed.
Paul Greeson was indicted, tried, and convicted, in the Superior Court of Catoosa County, of burglary. He filed a motion for new trial on the general grounds only, and the denial of this motion is assigned as error.
M. L. Harris, Ringgold, McClure & McClure, Chattanooga, Tenn., for plaintiff in error.
Earl B. Self, Solicitor-Gen., Summerville, for defendant in error.
The evidence in this case demands a finding that C. B. Cline and Edward McNeese broke into a store belonging to S. E. Brown in Catoosa County, and stole several hundred dollars worth of merchandise therefrom, and that the defendant was in the company of these persons from about 11 p. m. on the night in question until after 2 a. m., and that during this time the store was burglarized and a part of the loot hidden in a stretch of woods. The sole question presented is whether, during that period of time, the defendant was capable of forming any intent whatever, since the evidence also demands a finding that there was no intent or conspiracy to do any felonious act prior to 11 p. m. Burglary is defined in Code § 26-2401 as 'the breaking and entering into the dwelling, mansion, or storehouse, or other place of business of another, where valuable goods, wares, produce, or any other article of value are contained or stored, with intent to commit a felony or larceny.' There are no material conflicts as to the facts of this case, and the evidence bearing upon the defendant's physical condition is substantially as follows: He drove his automobile to the Brass Rail during the afternoon of December 9, 1951, and remained there until closing time. He went out once to buy whisky. According to his statement, he and another man drank a fifth and a pint of whisky and a pint of wine, together with some beer. There was testimony that he drank from 12 to 18 cans of beer and a large quantity of whisky. At about 11 p. m. he 'had passed out--just plum drunk.' An employee of the establishment asked C. B. Cline to take him home, and two of them loaded him into the car, as he was unable to stand. As Cline, McNeese, the defendant, and three other persons were riding along, the question arose as to what places had been broken into lately, but there is no evidence that the defendant took any part in the discussion or even heard it. Three persons were left at an eating place. Cline then drove the car to Brown's store, where he and McNeese got out, McNeese broke the window, and they entered and took some flashlights. They did not remember the defendant getting out of the car. They returned to the eating place, Cline doing all the driving, found the other persons had gone, bought some flashlight batteries, returned to the store, and loaded merchandise from it into the automobile. Cline and McNeese had agreed on this after the other persons left the car, but apparently had very little conversation about the matter, and Cline picked the store more or less at random as they drove by. Cline and McNeese went back into the store to load the goods; they 'thought' the opinion the defendant was either drunk or asleep; he fixed the time of that encounter as between 1 and 2 a. m. Cline then drove the defendant home and he walked into the house unassisted, but fell over on the bed with his clothes on; his brother removed his shoes and coat. He was unconscious and in the same position when that brother left the house at 8 a. m., and also at noon when another brother came by. The latter had seen the defendant's automobile at the Brass Rail, and asked the defendant where his car was; the latter answered he supposed it was out in the yard. A few days later he...
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Leonard v. State, 6 Div. 169
...also stated in People v. Mullens, 292 N.Y. 408, 55 N.E.2d 479; Spears v. State, 89 Okl.Cr. 321, 207 P.2d 363; contra, Greeson v. State, 90 Ga.App. 57, 81 S.E.2d 839, 'where the crime is proved.'In State v. Williamson, 42 Conn. 261, 'Merely adding to the number of broken reeds gives no incre......
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Bowers v. State, 59455
...would have justified the act," that is, of being present and not understanding that the vehicle was being stolen. See Greeson v. State, 90 Ga.App. 57, 60, 81 S.E.2d 839; Bridges v. State, 123 Ga.App. 157, 159(1), 179 S.E.2d 685. Compare Treadwell v. State, 129 Ga.App. 573, 574(4), 200 S.E.2......
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Brown v. State, 43614
...439 (46 SE 640); Harris v. State, 19 Ga. App. 741 (2) (92 SE 224); Gentry v. State, 65 Ga. App. 100, 102 (15 SE2d 464); Greeson v. State, 90 Ga. App. 57, 60 (81 SE2d 839). This requires the grant of a new trial, since the motion for a directed verdict was made 3. There is no merit in any of......
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Cochran v. State
...a finding of guilty. Therefore, it was error not to grant this defendant's motion for a new trial on the general grounds. Greeson v. State, 90 Ga.App. 57, 81 S.E.2d 839; Brown v. State, 118 Ga.App. 617, 622(2), 165 S.E.2d 3. At trial, counsel for one defendant asked for a severance and the ......