Gregg v. Hedges' Guardian

• Decision Date: 27 June 1928
• Parties: Gregg v. Hedges' Guardian et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

227 Ky. 268

Gregg v. Hedges' Guardian et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Decided June 27, 1928.

1. Deeds. — In action to set aside deed from 81 year old widower to daughter on day preceding grantor's death on ground of undue influence and mental incapacity of grantor, evidence held to sustain chancellor's decree setting aside deed.

2. Deeds. — Relationship of 81 year old grantor and grantee as father and daughter, and fact that deed was given on day preceding grantor's death, and circumstances showing that grantee lived with grantor, keeping house for him and looking after him, placed burden on her to show that will was made at time when grantor had sufficient mental capacity and that conveyance was free from undue influence on her part.

Appeal from Bourbon Circuit Court.

TALBOTT & WHITLEY for appellant.

DENIS DUNDON for appellees.

GENE LAIR, Guardian ad litem.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE WILLIS.

Affirming.

This is an action to set aside a deed on the grounds of undue influence and mental incapacity.

John W. Jameson made the deed in question to his daughter, June Jameson Gregg, conveying real property in Paris, Ky. It was attacked by another daughter and four grandchildren, descendants of deceased daughters, some of whom were infants, and the chancellor canceled the conveyance. Mrs. Gregg has appealed, insisting that the deed was valid.

It appears that John W. Jameson was a widower about 81 years old, and the appellant had lived with him for about 2 years, keeping house for him and looking after him. He was a veterinary surgeon and pursued the practice of his profession until the beginning of his last illness, which was of short duration. The deed was executed and recorded on April 23, 1926, and early the next morning the doctor died. There is evidence that he was in a dying condition before he made the deed, and was so far gone that he was not mentally competent to make a deed. It was shown by a number of witnesses that Dr. Jameson was a man of strong will and firm mind when well, and showed no partiality among his children or grandchildren. There is other testimony to the effect that he had become estranged from his daughter, Mrs. Rumpler, and had expressed on two occasions, at least, that he intended to give his property to Mrs. Gregg. It is shown that Mrs. Gregg entertained a hostile feeling toward her sister, Mrs. Rumpler, and had an aversion to Walter Hedges, her brother-in-law and father of the two Hedges children. Before the death of Mrs. Hedges, she and her husband had lived with Dr. Jameson, and after her death Mr. Hedges and the two children remained there until requested by Dr. Jameson to leave. The attitude of the doctor towards Mrs. Rumpler and Mr. Hedges had been cordial until the appellant came to live with him. It thus appears that he developed a hostile attitude towards the very relatives that the appellant disliked. It is clearly inferable from the proof that these late aversions of Dr. Jameson were instigated, or at least inspired, by Mrs. Gregg. It is also shown that Mrs. Gregg had Dr. Jameson to sign papers transferring to her all of his insurance, but when the matter was explained to him he said that such was not his wish. Yet he did transfer to her one paid-up policy of $1,500 which he considered would compensate her for what she had done for him. She took her father on long trips in her automobile, and for months before his death she was practically alone with him and in his full confidence. When she learned of the seriousness of his last illness, she had an attorney prepare the deed in question, arranged for the attendance of a notary public and two witnesses, and obtained the opinion of the attending physician that her father was yet capable of making a deed. The physician testified that his opinion was predicated on the assumption that the making of the deed was but the execution of a fixed purpose formed when he was well and entertained for some time, but that it was doubtful whether he possessed, when the deed was made, the power to originate and execute such a purpose. The transcript is large, consisting of several volumes, and the briefs are quite extensive. It would serve no useful purpose to detail all the facts and circumstances developed by the record, or discuss at length the various conflicting contentions. It is sufficient to say that there was substantial evidence to sustain the decree of the chancellor, and the preponderating effect thereof was not overthrown by the proof for appellant.

The relationship of the parties to the transaction, the proximity of the deed's execution to the death of the doctor, and the surrounding circumstances, cast upon the appellant the burden of showing that the deed to her was made at a time when the grantor had sufficient mental capacity to perform an act of such importance, and that in doing so he was free from undue influence on her part. Hoeb v. Maschinot, 140 Ky. 330, 131 S.W. 23; Shields v. Burge, 171 Ky. 149, 188 S.W. 321.

In McDowell v. Edwards, 156 Ky. 475, 161 S.W. 534, it was said:

"The law looks with suspicion upon the transfers of property by persons mentally or physically infirm to those having custody of them. Even when parties in good health stand in a confidential relation to each other, the burden is upon the stronger character who procures an advantage, to show that a transaction was fair; and relief will be afforded in equity in all such transactions in which influence has been acquired and abused, in which confidence has been reposed and betrayed. Allore v. Jewell, 94 U. S. 512 (24 L. Ed. 260). The relief stands upon the general principle applying to all the varieties of relations in which dominion may be exercised by one person over another."

Again, in Smith v. Snowden, 96 Ky. 32, 27 S.W. 855, 16 Ky. Law Rep. 353, the court said:

"In the case under consideration the grantors were old, ignorant and enfeebled by disease; the grantees were vigorous, aggressive and already in charge of the persons and the property of the grantors. We may say in general that when such a relation exists the person obtaining the benefit must show, by the clearest evidence, that the transaction was...