Gregg v. Jesberg
Decision Date | 13 December 1892 |
Citation | 20 S.W. 652,113 Mo. 34 |
Parties | Gregg, Appellant, v. Jesberg et al |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Buchanan Circuit Court.--Hon. O. M. Spencer, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
Porter & Woodson for appellant.
(1) The deed is void because of its failure to recite that the deed was "publicly" made. Sullivan v. Donnell, 90 Mo. 278; Bingham v. Birmingham, 103 Mo. 345; Pitkin v. Reibel, 104 Mo. 505. (2) The court will observe that the city tax deeds offered in evidence in this case are almost literal copies of the form prescribed by section 1372, of the Revised Statutes of Missouri for 1889. "The recitals in the deed need not be in the exact order in which they appear in the form; nor need they be in the same words." Sullivan v. Donnell, 90 Mo. 283. (3) If the court was right in excluding the tax deeds offered in evidence and declared the law correctly in holding that said deed was void on its face, then instruction number 2 asked by plaintiff, should have been given, and the jury allowed to pass upon the second count of plaintiff's petition under the testimony of George C. Crowther. Sullivan v. Donnell, 90 Mo. 278; Bingham v Birmingham, 103 Mo. 345, and cases cited; Pitkin v Reibel, 104 Mo. 505; Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1889, sec. 1373.
Hall & Pike for respondent.
(1) The tax deed is void on its face, because the sale therein recited was made without authority of law. The collector must begin his sale at ten o'clock in the forenoon of the first Monday in November and continue from day to day, etc., as long as there are bidders or until the taxes are all paid. Revised Statutes, 1879, sec. 4731; Sullivan v. Donnell, 90 Mo. 283. (2) The validity of the adjourned sale depends upon two things: First, a legal sale must be begun in November; second, the adjourned sale must be legally connected with it. In this case that connection is wanting. In support of this point see: Large v. Fisher, 49 Mo. 307, and cases cited, 309; Yankee v. Thompson, 51 Mo. 234; Pitkin v. Reibel, 104 Mo. 505. (3) The lot was not assessed in the name of the owner, but was assessed in the name of a person who was not owner or occupant. Section 4705, Revised Statutes, 1879, enables the assessor to be absolutely correct in every ingredient of description. It indicates that the assessment must be made in the name of the owner, and the description otherwise must be as accurate as a civil engineer can make it. The assessment was therefore void. Burroughs on Taxation, 203; Abbott v. Lindenbower, 42 Mo. 162, and 46 Mo. 291; Hume v. Wainscott, 46 Mo. 145; Hubbard v. Gilpin, 57 Mo. 441; Ewart v. Hayter, 76 Mo. 134; Gaines v. Fender, 82 Mo. 508; Pearce v. Tittsworth, 88 Mo. 635; State ex rel. v. Railroad, 82 Mo. 684; Railroad v. Negrotto, 40 F. 428; Tracy v. Reed, 38 F. 69; Marx v. Hawthorne, 30 F. 579; Cooley on Constitutional Limitations [6 Ed.] 453, 540, note; Guffy v. O'Reilly, 88 Mo. 418. (4) The purchaser is not entitled to reimbursement; the statute authorizing it presupposes that a valid tax has been levied on the property.
This is an action of ejectment for the recovery of the possession of the east twenty feet of the west ninety-one and two-thirds feet of lots 11 and 12, block 43, Robidoux's addition to the city of St. Joseph.
Plaintiff's claim is founded upon two tax deeds, one of which is an amendment of the other, executed by the collector of city taxes.
In a second count, the plaintiff alleges he purchased the land for delinquent taxes for the years 1881, 1884, 1885 and 1886, and, if his deed is adjudged insufficient, he asks judgment for the amount of taxes paid by him with interest, penalties and costs.
The answer is a general denial.
The plaintiff offered in evidence the following city tax deed:
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