Gregg v. Moore
| Decision Date | 28 December 1954 |
| Docket Number | No. 16943,16943 |
| Citation | 226 S.C. 366,85 S.E.2d 279 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Marguerite H. GREGG et al., Appellants, v. A. H. MOORE, Respondent. |
Scott & Tyson, Florence, for appellants.
George A. Gill, Jr. and L. S. Dickert, Rock Hill, for respondent.
Primarily, this case involves the validity of a tax title and alleged adverse possession by the purchaser, the respondent, at tax sale. The property in question is located in York County and was purchased prior to 1920 by Miss Marie Gregg of Florence County for the use of her aunt, Miss Allie Cureton, during her lifetime. Miss Gregg died shortly thereafter, leaving a will in which the property was devised to her mother and father for life and with the remainder to her two brothers. Under the terms of her will, she bequeathed a $250 annuity to Miss Cureton and specifically charged all her real estate to the payment of said annuity. The mother of Miss Gregg died in 1921, and in the following year a partition proceeding was instituted between the remaining life tenant, the father (S. M. Gregg) of Marie Gregg, and her two brothers, Ernest S. Gregg and Hazel A. Gregg, which resulted in the property being conveyed to S. M. Gregg in fee simple. The annuity was never released from this property. S. M. Gregg subsequently remarried and in 1927 conveyed the property to his then wife, Marguerite H. Gregg, stating therein that the conveyance was subject to a life estate of Miss Allie Cureton. Marguerite H. Gregg conveyed the properly to the appellants in 1951, after the death of S. M. Gregg.
In 1932, the property was sold for taxes in the name of the Estate of Marie Gregg and purchased by the respondent. Since the property was not sold in the name of the true owner, the tax sale was invalid. For this postulate, citation of authority is unnecessary.
The Circuit Judge did not pass upon the validity of the tax sale. Such issue was not before him, no exception having been taken from the holding of the Referee that it was invalid. However, he found that the respondent had established title by adverse possession. A review of the facts subsequent to 1933 leaves no doubt but that the decision of the lower Court should be reversed on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to establish adverse possession.
Miss Allie Cureton was allowed to remain in possession of the property after the tax sale. She lived on the premises just as she did prior to the tax sale. She moved from the premises to live in the home of the respondent, whose wife was her niece, for a period of three years and during that time she received the rent from the premises, paying one-half to the respondent for board and retaining the other one-half for herself. The respondent testified the property was returned in his name for taxes after 1933 and that he paid the taxes thereon. It is significant that under an arrangement with the owner of the property, the respondent paid the taxes on the property even prior to the invalid tax sale. There is nothing in the record which would indicate or give any notice to the true owner of the property that the respondent claimed title thereto until after the death of Miss Allie Cureton in 1949. If the respondent had intended to contend that he had title to the property after the tax sale, his exercise of ownership should have been such as to indicate to all the exclusiveness of his claim thereto. There is no proof that notice of claim of ownership by the respondent was ever given by the respondent to the appellants or their predecessor in title, ...
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