Gregory v. American Thread Co.
| Decision Date | 05 January 1905 |
| Citation | 72 N.E. 962,187 Mass. 239 |
| Parties | GREGORY v. AMERICAN THREAD CO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Green & Bennett, for plaintiff.
Brooks & Hamilton, for defendant.
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff while in the employ of the defendant, in October, 1902. There are counts at common law, and under Rev. Laws, c. 106, § 71 cls. 1, 2. At the close of the evidence for the plaintiff the judge rules that, upon the pleadings and evidence, the plaintiff could not recover, and directed a verdict for the defendant. The case is before us on the plaintiff's exceptions.
We agree with the contention of the defendant that there was no evidence that the defendant was negligent in the manner of instructing the plaintiff, or in the hiring of any fellow servant of the plaintiff. On the remaining counts we are, however, of opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to go to the jury. The facts in the case, as they appear from the plaintiff's evidence, may be briefly stated thus.
The plaintiff was a young woman, 27 or 29 years old. She had been in the employ of the defendant 8 weeks at the time of the accident, and it was her duty to run two lapwinding machines, which faced each other. The function of such a machine is to take cotton from six rolls, arranged along the upper part of the machine, run it through the machine, thereby stretching it, and wind it in a compact form in a single lap upon a bobbin at one end of the machine. At this end there is a lever with which to stop and start the machine. Along the sides of the machine are handles by which, also, the machine can be stopped and started. Two of these are on the back and two on the front of the machine. The machine also stopped automatically when the bobbin was full. The plaintiff had to stop the machine twice in the morning and twice in the afternoon, for the purpose of cleaning it. The day before the accident, while the plaintiff was cleaning the machine, and when it had been stopped, it started up of itself, and the plaintiff was struck over one of her eyes. She complained to one Greaves, a second hand, about the machine's starting of itself. Greaves said: The next morning the plaintiff noticed that the machine was running a soft lap; that is, that the lap on the receiving bobbin was not tight to the bobbin, as was usual. She took out that lap, but the next was the same. She then complained to Greaves, showed the lap to him, and said it was running soft. He said: 'The next one will be all right.' The plaintiff then asked Greaves if he had fixed the machine, and he said: The plaintiff then resumed her work. In the afternoon the lap appeared to be running soft again, and the plaintiff pushed back the lever at the end of the machine, and brought the machine to a full stop. She then put her right hand over the bobbin to ascertain if the lap was soft. While her hand was in this position, the machine started up, and her hand was caught and injured.
The defendant contends that the plaintiff was not in the exercise of due care, and has addressed to us an elaborate argument to show that, instead of putting her right hand over the bobbin, she should have held on to the shipper with her right hand, and put her left hand over the bobbin, or have removed the bobbin. We are of opinion, however, that whether the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care was, on the evidence, a question of fact for the jury, rather than of law for the court. Donahue v. Drown, 154 Mass. 21, 27 N.E. 675.
The next question is whether there was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff relies upon the negligence of Greaves, and also contends that the starting of the machine is some evidence that it was defective. We are of opinion that both of these contentions are correct, and that the question of the defendant's negligence was for the jury. As to Greaves, it appears that he had charge of the operatives of the lap-winding machines, and it was his duty to make all necessary repairs. He comes clearly within Rev Laws, c. 106, § 71, cl. 1. That he was negligent in not repairing the machine at all, or in not repairing it properly, is a fair inference from the fact that the machine started of itself. For his negligence the defendant is responsible under the statute above cited. He is also liable at common law. Donahue v. Drown, 154 Mass. 21, 27 N.E. 675; Mooney v. Connecticut River Lumber Co., 154 Mass. 407, 28 N.E....
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